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Abstract
We argue that the 'N ew  Debt Sustainability Framework7 (DSF), as recently 
introduced by the Bretton Woods Institutions, is tailored to suit the aid allocation 
mechanism centred on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), but 
fails to take into account low-income countries7 economic vulnerability and exposure 
to exogenous shocks. As a result, the DSF further underm ines the effective delivery 
of aid by the International Developm ent Association (IDA), and fails to support 
recipient countries in their efforts to achieve lasting debt sustainability. Furthermore, 
we dem onstrate that the findings of the empirical studies underlying the DSF and 
IDA14 replenishm ent are not robust to the introduction of vulnerability measures, 
such as the Economic Vulnerability Indicator (EVI), which underm ine the 
significance of the CPIA in predicting debt distress episodes. In order to overcome 
the shortcomings of the DSF, we propose the introduction of a Contingency Debt 
Sustainability Framework (CDSF), which distinguishes between the causes of 
vulnerability underlying the external debt problem affecting m ost of the low-income 
countries. D rawing on the most established strands of sovereign debt and contract 
theory literature, we argue that state-contingent debt contracts represent the most 
effective financial instrum ent to link aid allocation and debt relief to recipient 
countries7 financial requirements, contingent on the state of nature. To implement 
state-contingent contracts in the specific context of low-income debtor countries, we 
devise an accounting m ethod by which shock and trend factors in the balance of 
paym ents are distinguished by their exogenous or endogenous origin. On the basis of 
this distinction, the CDSF financially compensates debtor countries for exogenous 
shock and trend factors, w ithout giving rise to significant moral hazard implications. 
The CDSF is then simulated for the case of Uganda during the period 1988-2002, 
dem onstrating its effectiveness in dealing with U ganda's severe exposure to price 
shocks and negative terms of trade.
Table of Contents
List of Tables -9
List of Graphs -11
List of Figures -13
List of Charts and Boxes -14
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations - 15
Part I
1 Introduction and Overview
1.1 Background of the study: vulnerability, aid, and debt - 18
1.2 Objectives and structure of the study - 31
2 The Rationale for State-Contingent Claims in the Face of 
Low-income Countries/ Exposure to Exogenous Shocks
2.1 Introduction - 34
2.2 A sovereign's capacity and willingness to pay - 38
2.3 Illiquidity versus insolvency, and the concept of debt - 43
sustainability
2.4 The debt overhang hypothesis: new lending versus debt relief - 50
2.4.1 The pure disincentive effect from debt overhang - 52
2.4.2 The liquidity-constraint from an excessive level of - 56 
external debt
2.5 Contract indexation and renegotiation -  the case for state- - 61
contingent sovereign debt contracts
2.5.1 A general conceptual framework of contract theory - 63
2.5.2 State-contingent contracts and the incentive to invest - 68 
(adjust)
- 5 -





3 The Shortcomings of the New Debt Sustainability 
Framework
3.1 Introduction - 83
3.2 The IDA-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework and IDA Aid - 85
Allocation
3.3 The major shortcomings of a CPIA-centred debt sustainability - 97
framework
3.3.1 W hen is external debt sustainable? - 98
3.3.2 The CPIA bias of the DSF and its neglect of vulnerability - 122
3.3.3 The major shortcomings of the new Debt Sustainability -125
Assessment
3.4 Concluding remarks -134
A ppendix Tables -136
4 An Assessment of IDA Debt Service Modulation Schemes
4.1 Introduction -143
4.2 The basic design and modalities of IDA indexing schemes - 145
4.3 U ganda case study simulations -149
4.3.1 Real GDP growth indexing -150
4.3.2 U.S. Dollar GDP growth indexing -160
4.3.3 Terms of trade indexing - 164
4.4 Concluding remarks -175
A ppendix A4.1: GDP grow th -  U.S. Dollar vs. LCU Series -178
A ppendix A4.2: Gilbert-Tabova Index vs. Standard TOT Index -181
in the case of Zambia
- 6 -
Part III
5 Proposal for a State-Contingent Debt Sustainability 
Framework
5.1 Introduction -183
5.2 Proposal for a Contingency Debt Sustainability Fram ework -185
5.2.1 Endogenous vs. exogenous balance of paym ents -187
determinants
5.2.2 The contingent credit line -190
5.2.3 Performance assessment against contractual obligations -191
5.2.4 The debt relief mechanism -194
5.2.5 Debt sustainability analysis -195
5.3 An accounting methodology to distinguish exogenous from - 197
mixed-endogenous balance of paym ents effects
5.4 Potential costs and benefits of the CDSF - 210
5.5 Concluding remarks - 213
6 Uganda Countiy Study
6.1 Introduction - 215
6.2 U ganda's balance of paym ents and external debt evolution - 217
6.2.1 Historical overview - 217
6.2.2 The balance of paym ents - 220
6.2.3 The trade balance and the terms of trade - 223
6.2.4 The evolution of Uganda's external debt stock - 232
6.2.5 U ganda's balance of paym ents and external debt -  - 242
sum m ary conclusions
6.3 Application of the Contingency Debt Sustainability Framework - 243
6.3.1 Data sources and computations - 244
6.3.2 On the choice between alternative im plem entation - 247 
variants
- 7 -
6.3.3 Indexing to ad-hoc base year benchmarks - 248
6.3.4 Continuous indexing to moving averages of BOP flows - 251
6.3.5 Simulations of the effects of CDSF on U ganda's debt - 265 
flows and stock
6.4 Concluding remarks - 274
A ppendix A6.1: Data issues relating to U ganda's balance of - 276
paym ents
A ppendix A6.2: Growth of world dem and for U ganda's - 279
exports
A ppendix A6.3: Estimation of im port elasticity - 280
7 Sum m ary Conclusions and A genda for Further Research - 283
List of References - 290
- 8 -
List of Tables
2.1 Renegotiation Model - 78
3.1 CPIA-Dependant Debt Burden Thresholds (DSF vs. IDA14) - 90
3.2 The Traffic Light System to determine the share of grant - 91
financing
3.3 Main features of the W orld Bank and IMF probit analyses -101
underlying the DSF
3.4 IMF-Style Probit Analyses - Table of Results. D ependent - 111
variable: Debt Distress (1/0)
3.5 Probit Regression Results -  CPIA and Governance vs. EVI and - 112
Instability Indicators
3.6 Uganda, Debt Sustainability Analyses, Comparison 2000, 2002 -131
and June 2005, August 2005
3.7 Uganda, DSA 2002 vs. DSA 2006 - NPV Debt/Exports (%) -132
A3.1 Probit Estimations -  Description of Variables and Data Sources -136
A3.2 IMF Probit Results (Original Title: Determinants of Distress) -138
A3.3 Alternative Definitions of Debt Distress — Comparative List of -139
Episodes
A3.4 Simple Probit Regression Results -141
A3.5 Correlation Matrix of Predictors -141
A3.6 Principal Components Analysis (KKM) -141
A3.7 Probit estimations involving the remaining KKM dimensions -142
4.1 Total Debt Service M odulation - Alternative Levels of Lambda -153
4.2 U ganda — Variance Minimising Parameter Calibration in the -157
Case of Real GDP Growth Indexing
4.3 U ganda - Nominal GDP Growth Indexing Simulations -161
4.4 Uganda -  Nominal GDP Growth Indexing Results (1986-2003) - 162
- 9 -
in millions of U.S. Dollars (current), unless indicated otherwise
4.5 Uganda -  Terms of Trade Indexing Simulations -168
4.6 Gilbert-Tabova Debt Service Indexing Scheme -171
4.7 Gilbert-Tabova Indexing Scheme Simulation Results -172
A4.1 Main Statistics Relating to the Nominal and Real Indices (1988- -180
2003)
6.1 Uganda -  Balance of Payments, Selected Aggregates, Millions of - 221
U.S. Dollars, 1980-2003
6.2 Uganda -  Key Commodities Exported, Value Terms, Millions of - 225
U.S. Dollars, 1985-2002
6.3 Export Volatility -  Selected Items - 228
6.4 Uganda -  M erchandise Imports, Value Terms, Millions of U.S. - 228
Dollars, 1985-2002
6.5 U ganda -  External Debt, Millions of U.S. Dollars, 1970-2003 - 233
6.6 Uganda Export Destinations 1996-2002 - 245
6.7 Uganda -  Balance of Payments Effects, Millions of U.S. Dollars, - 253
1988-2002
6.8 Uganda -  Balance of Payments Effects, As Percentage of Total - 254
Effects, 1988-2002
6.9 Uganda -  Contingency Debt Sustainability Framework: - 266
Adjustm ent of N et Flows and External Debt Stock
A6.1 Total Growth Of World D em and For U ganda's Exports - 279
- 10 -
List of Graphs
1.1 Net Barter Terms of Trade (1980-2003) -29
1.2 Price Indices of Selected Commodities (1980-2003) -29
1.3 Price Indices of Selected Commodities (1980-2003) -29
3.1 Sustainable Debt Level and CPIA -104
3.2 Sustainable Debt Level and EVI -115
4.1 Uganda: Real GDP Growth Indexing Scheme (lambda=l) -151
4.2 Alternative Calibrations of the GDP Growth Indexing Scheme -153
4.3 Uganda: Real GDP Growth Index -  MA(5) vs. MA(3) -159
4.4 U ganda -  Export, Im port Prices and the Barter Terms of 
Trade
-167
4.5 U ganda -  Terms of Trade Index -167
4.6 U ganda -  Standard Terms of Trade Index vs. Gilbert-Tabova 
Index
-170
4.7 Uganda, GT-Indexing Scheme -172
4.8 U ganda -  TDS, Original vs. Indexed -172
A4.1 U ganda -  Nominal U.S. Dollar vs. Real GDP Growth (1982- 
1992)
-178
A4.2 U ganda -  Nominal U.S. Dollar vs. Real GDP Growth Index 
(1993-2003)
-178
A4.3 U ganda -  Nominal US$ vs. Constant LCU GDP Growth Index -179
A4.4 Zambia -  Standard Terms of Trade Index vs. Gilbert-Tabova 
Index
-181
6.1 U ganda -  Balance of Payments Aggregates (1980-2003) - 222
6.2 U ganda Coffee Export Price (1970-2004) -226
6.3a Tobacco U nit Value
-1 1 -
-230
6.3b Tea Unit Value -230
6.3c Cotton Unit Value -230
6.3d Fish Unit Value -230
6.4 Uganda -  Terms of Trade in Goods and Services -232
6.5 Total Loan Disbursements (1970-2003) -235
6.6 Total Debt Service Paid (1970-2003) -235
6.7 N et Transfers (1970-2003) -235
6.8 Official N et Resource Transfers (1970-2003) -236
6.9 Total Debt Stock (1970-2003) -236
6.10 Total Debt Service -  Exports Ratio (percent) -236
6.11 Accumulation of Arrears (1970-2003) -237
6.12 Debt Restructuring (1970-2003) -237
6.13 Debt Relief -  Capital Account Inflows (1970-2003) -237
6.14 U ganda Export Volume 1995/1998 -  1999/2002 -249
6.15 U ganda Export Prices 1995/1998 -  1999/2002 -250
6.16 U ganda Export Volumes (1988-2002) -255
6.17 U ganda Export Prices (1988-2002) -256
6.18 U ganda Im port Volumes (1988-2002) -257
6.19 U ganda Im port Prices (1988-2002) -259
6.20 U ganda -  Terms of Trade Effect vs. Total Exogenous Effects -260
6.21 Distribution of BOP Sources of Demand for Official Loans -262
6.22 Average Balance of Payments Effects -263
6.23 U ganda -  All BOP Effects (1988-2002) -264
6.24 U ganda -  N et Transfers (1988-2002) -264
6.25 DIS, AMT, NFL: Actual vs. Adjusted (1988-2002) -267
6.26 U ganda -  Debt Stock Adjustment (1988-2002) -270
- 12 -
List of Figures
2.1 The Debt Laffer Curve
2.2 The Benefits From Debt Relief
2.3 The Benefits From Relieving the Liquidity Constraints
5.1 Actual, Trend and Hypothetical Export Volumes -
- 13 -





Schematic illustration of the building blocks of the aid - 87
allocation and debt sustainability frameworks of IDA and
IMF
The CPIA-Centred Debt Sustainability Framework -  -123
Stylised Implications
Basic Scheme of the Contingency Debt Sustainability -188
Framework
Balance of Payments Effects - 206
- 14 -
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
ADB African Development Bank
AMT Amortization
BOP Balance of Payments
BOPS Balance of Payments Statistics (IMF)
BWI Bretton Woods Institutions
BWI-DSF Debt Sustainability Framework of the Bretton W oods Institutions
CDSF Contingency Debt Sustainability Framework
COV Coefficient of Variation
CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
DIS Disbursement
DSA Debt Sustainability Analysis
DSF Debt Sustainability Framework
DSF/IDA14 The combined framework of debt sustainability and IDA14 
replenishm ent
ECA Economic Commission for Africa (UN)
EDT External Debt Stock
ERP Economic Recovery Programme
ESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)
EVI Economic Vulnerability Index
FAOSTAT Food and Agricultural Organization Statistics
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDF Global Development Finance (World Bank)
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GT Gilbert-Tabova
HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HOS H andbook of Statistics (UN)
ICA International Commodity Agreements
ICRG International Country Risk Guide
IDA International Development Association
- 15 -
IDA13 The 13th Replenishment of the International Development
Association
IDA14 The 14th Replenishment of the International Development
Association
IFS International Financial Statistics (IMF)
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPC Integrated Programme for Commodities
KKM Kraay-Kaufmann-Mastruzzi




MDRI M ultilateral Debt Relief Initiative
MGS Imports of Goods and Services
ML Maximum Likelihood
MT Metric Tonnes
NFL Net Flows on Debt
NPV Net Present Value
NTR Net Transfers on Debt
ODA Official D evelopm ent Assistance
PC Paris Club
PPG Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt
PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (IMF)
REER Real Effective Exchange Rate
SAP Structural A djustment Programme
TDS Total Debt Service
TOT Barter Terms of Trade
U.S. United States
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Developm ent 
US$ United States Dollar
WDI W orld Developm ent Indicators (World Bank)
WR Workers' Remittances
WTA World Trade Analyzer (Statistics Canada - STATCAN)




1 Introduction and Overview
1.1 Background of the study: vulnerability, aid, and debt
Low-income countries (LICs) are extremely vulnerable to exogenous shocks, which 
they experience w ith higher frequency and greater intensity than other developing 
countries (Brooks, 1998; Dehn, 2000a, 2000b; Varangis et al., 2004; Williamson, 2005). 
An exogenous shock is typically defined as an unexpected event beyond the control 
of country authorities and with substantial impact on the economy. Among the 
group of low-income countries, sub-Saharan African countries have long been 
pointed out as suffering from a particularly acute problem  of vulnerability to 
exogenous shocks (Maizels, 1992; Deaton and Miller, 1996; Collier and Gunning, 
1999; Cashin and Pattillo, 2000; UNCTAD, 2003). These countries have been exposed 
to large and frequent commodity price fluctuations, as well as ou tput shocks caused 
by natural disasters, w ith highly disruptive effects on their economies. Moreover, a 
broad array of other exogenous shock-factors typically affects these economies 
through various channels of the balance of payments, including aid volatility (Osei et 
al., 2002; Fielding and Mavrotas, 2005), volatility of foreign direct investment inflows 
and private rem ittances1 (Lensink and Morrissey, 2006), unexpected changes to trade 
partners' trade restrictions (UNCTAD, 2003), as well as civil unrest and wars in 
neighbouring countries (Varangis et al., 2004). Indeed, M artin and Bargawi (2005) 
confirm that most of these factors -  typically in combination w ith each other -  have 
had an extremely high incidence in the case of sub-Saharan African countries since 
the mid-1990s.
Besides natural disasters, to which both analysis and international policy efforts have 
devoted special attention, prim ary commodity prices have long been singled out as 
the prim e causal factor underlying low-income countries' economic vulnerability.
1 For a collection of studies about the relationships between workers' remittances and low-income 
countries' macroeconomic volatility, see the conference proceedings of the research project coordinated 
by the Global Development Network: http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2005/macro/index.
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Particularly in the case of African countries, such vulnerability is directly related to 
their structural dependence on a narrow  basket of prim ary export commodities 
(UNCTAD, 2003), making their economies extremely vulnerable to price volatility. It 
is now  well docum ented that price volatility has increased both in m agnitude and 
frequency over time (Brooks, 1998; Varangis et al. 2004; Cashin and McDermott, 2001), 
rendering macroeconomic managem ent and long-term planning by liquidity- 
constrained LICs increasingly difficult. There are several channels through which 
shocks to a low-income country's trade balance, or to its balance of paym ents more 
generally, feed through into shocks to the real economy. For example, a drop in 
export prices causes a direct fall in income by lowering export revenue, and affects 
domestic tax revenue and consumption through the m ultiplier effect. Furthermore, if 
the country were to avoid the negative investment and grow th effects of curbing 
im ports in response to a shock, it w ould need to lower international reserve holdings 
and/or increase foreign borrowing. Ultimately, a negative price shock forces a 
liquidity-constrained country to choose between lower economic activity, 
unem ploym ent and more poverty, or an increase in its external indebtedness 
(Edwards, 2003a, 2003b; Nissanke and Ferrarini, 2004; Williamson, 2005).
Recent empirical work has found these direct and indirect effects of commodity price 
shocks to be particularly pronounced in terms of low-income countries' economic 
growth. Deaton (1999) finds a close correlation between real commodity prices and 
the GDP grow th rates of African countries. Dehn (2000a) and Collier and Dehn (2001) 
find the impact from negative terms of trade shocks to be in the range of 14 per cent 
of output w hen their indirect knock-on effects on the real economy are considered, 
while positive price shocks were not found to increase GDP growth rates 
significantly. These findings, together w ith the evidence that price slumps tend to be 
longer and more accentuated than price booms (Cashin et al., 2002), suggest that 
LICs' exposure to price shocks has played a particularly im portant role in 
underm ining economic growth.
Apart from price volatility, low-income countries -  and African countries in 
particular -  have been facing a long-term decline in the barter terms of trade of 
commodity-exporting countries (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; Spraos, 1983; Bloch and 
Sapsford, 2000; Cashin and McDermott, 2001). As will be further argued below, the
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secular decline in commodity-exporters' relative prices, and in particular the sharp 
deterioration of low-income countries' terms of trade during the 1980s, is closely 
related to the incapacity of m any of these economies to escape a situation of 
commodity dependence, and has been causing a progressive deterioration in their 
external debt positions (Maizels, 1992).
While m any of the factors affecting balance of paym ent sustainability of low-income 
countries have been of external origin, they have often had such a devastating effect 
because of the inadequate domestic policies these countries have either chosen or 
were compelled to pursue. Indeed, over-borrowing, excessive profligacy during good 
times and the lack of counter-cyclical fiscal policies, misconceived monetary policies, 
as well as sub-optim al diversification efforts are often listed among the major hom e­
grown factors underlying low-income countries' incapacity to adequately curb the 
impact of shocks and deteriorating real commodity prices.
However, there has been a long-standing debate w ith regard to the share of 
responsibility held by debtor countries themselves in rendering their economies less 
resilient to the im pact of exogenous shocks, as well as the optimal extent of support 
to be offered by international development agencies. The two major contending 
positions can roughly be associated w ith those appertaining to the Bretton Woods 
Insitutions (BWI) on the one hand, and the United Nations on the other. With regard 
to the African 'tragedy ', the dom inant interpretation by the BWI has been to place the 
prim ary responsibility w ith forces and constraints inside African countries, 
em phasising the debilitating role of 'bad policies' and 'poor governance' in their 
development prospects. An early interpretation along these lines is usually 
associated w ith the Berg Report -  an influential W orld Bank analysis published in 
1981, laying out an agenda for action in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1981) -  and 
has since represented the essential tenets of the BWIs in relation to the sub-Saharan 
African development crisis.
Highly critical of the policies of African governments, the Berg Report singled out 
overvalued national currencies, industry protection and excessive state intervention 
among the policies most responsible for the African economic stagnation, and 
pointed to the region's underdeveloped hum an resources, political fragility, rapid
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population grow th and climatic and other environmental factors as the basic internal 
structural constraints ham pering development (Arrighi, 2002; Geda, 2002). 
G overnment intervention was thereby considered harm ful to the economy due to the 
limited capability ascribed to the local polity and bureaucracy on the one hand, and 
the deliberate misuse of political pow er in the pursuit of illegitimate rents on the 
other. In this view, "harmful intervention in the economy results not simply from 
botched performance, bu t from the normal way that African governments operate" 
(Schatz, 1996: 241). The remedies proposed by the Berg Report, which are broadly 
reflective of the broader BWI's development strategy that later came to be known as 
the 'W ashington Consensus', entailed the removal of any policy regime that im peded 
the operation of m arket forces and private enterprises (Williamson, 2000, 2003; Fine 
et al., 2001). African countries were thus compelled to liberalise their current accounts 
(with m ounting pressure to open up their capital accounts too), to enact wholesale 
privatisation policies across the key sectors of their economies, and to engage in 
macroeconomic stabilisation programm es with particular em phasis on fiscal restraint 
and low inflation targets.
Furthermore, as a reflection of the underlying distrust in state intervention at the 
domestic level, and intervention in world markets at the international level, the BWI 
approach to solving the African commodity crisis resorted to export diversification as 
a means to escape the effects of term s of trade deterioration, and risk management to 
counter short-term price fluctuations. The reliance on market forces turned out to 
have its pitfalls, however, as African exporters' lack of competitiveness, together with 
a host of m arket barriers, severely ham pered their diversification efforts over time 
(UNCTAD, 2003). Similarly, the W orld Bank's efforts, since the late 1980s, to induce 
developing countries to use commodity-linked financial hedging instrum ents in 
order to counter short-term volatility had barely borne fruit after a decade of 
operations (Maizels, 2000). Since the late 1990s, new approaches to bridge the wide 
gap between the international providers of such instrum ents and the LDC users have 
been under discussion (e.g. see ITF, 1999),
The Berg Report, and the BWI consensus-thinking more generally, ascribe Africa's
balance of paym ents difficulties to poor export performance resulting from flawed
domestic policies, rather than external influences. The 'internalist' and 'state-
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minimalist' diagnoses by the BWI (Arrighi, 2002) were forcefully challenged by 
outside observers (e.g. Helleiner, 1986; Tarp, 1993; Stein and Nissanke, 1999), 
emphasising the presence of theoretical inconsistencies in the analytical framework 
underlying the BWI approach, as well as pointing out severe flaws in the 
methodologies applied to empirically corroborate this framework. Furthermore, on 
the institutional front, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(e.g. see UNCTAD, 2000) and Economic Commission for Africa (e.g. see ECA, 1989) 
countered the W orld Bank's approach by pointing out deep structural deficiencies as 
the main cause of Africa's problems, particularly in terms of economic and social 
infrastructure. From this viewpoint, balance of paym ents deficits, macroeconomic 
vulnerability and overall economic stagnation are considered to be mostly the result 
of Africa's inherited structural weaknesses, causing these economies' narrow  
production and export structures to succumb to the international forces unleashed 
through foreign-imposed openness to international trade and finance. Self- 
perpetrating structural factors are thus seen as the main elements explaining Africa's 
development deficit, w ith the effect of locking its economies into a state of high 
vulnerability towards balance of paym ents instability and secular terms of trade 
deterioration. To break this vicious cycle, the 'structuralists' advocate targeted 
international support of prim ary commodity producers, also in the form of 
coordinated interventions to tame the m arket forces causing excessive fluctuations in 
commodity prices.
The fundam ental tenets underlying the two contrasting schools of thought have 
remained substantially unaltered throughout the past decades, and the divide 
between the positions has not shown any signs of narrowing. Crucially, we argue 
that this fundam ental divide has translated into the long-term failure by the 
international community to support the African region effectively in its struggle 
against external vulnerability, and continues to fail the region today. Roughly stated, 
the two differing perspectives have translated into two distinct areas of international 
efforts w ith regard to Africa's developm ent crisis, whereby the implications of the 
'structuralist' approach have been kept largely isolated from influencing the 
international lending policies guided by the BWI. The BWI have been able to 
promote their policy agenda on the grounds of African countries' dependence on
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official finance to close their persistent balance of paym ents and resource gaps, as an 
external manifestation of the development crisis. By exploiting their institutional 
function to validate recipient countries' policy regimes, the BWI were thus in a 
position to impose upon these countries policy conditionality as a precondition for 
official lending by bilateral donors and, since the mid-1990s, by increasingly 
representing themselves the key source of development finance to low-income 
countries via the soft-loan w indow  of the International Developm ent Association 
(IDA) (Helleiner, 1986; Stein and Nissanke, 1999).
Reflecting a profound reluctance to accept the structuralist position in relation to the 
causes underlying low-income countries' debt problems, the BWI have consistently 
denied that its policy implications have any bearing on the aid and debt relief 
mechanisms. Instead, the structuralist approach remained mostly confined within the 
United Nations, most notably as embodied by the UNCTAD since its inception in 
1964. International action concretised in 1976, in the form of an Integrated 
Programme for Commodities (IPC), under the auspices of UNCTAD. The IPC 
envisaged the establishment of price stabilisation agreements on a range of key 
prim ary export commodities, to be financed by a Common Fund and with the aim of 
avoiding excessive price fluctuations and long-term declines in relative price levels.2 
The main factor triggering international action at the time had been the occurrence of 
successive shocks to w orld commodity markets (including petrol) in the early 1970s, 
which w ere substantially more intensive and persistent than the shocks previously 
recorded since W orld W ar II (Maizels, 1992). Most crucially however, and in contrast 
to the situation of sharp price volatility against fairly stable real price levels 
characterising m ost of the 1970s, the decade following the second oil shock in 1979 
was characterised by a drastic fall in real commodity prices, depressing the barter 
terms of trade against manufactures. Indeed, over the decade of the 1980s, 
commodity prices fell by about 45 per cent, and failed to recover from their 
depressed level over the whole subsequent decade (Maizels, 2000: 3).
2 Actually, the establishment of international commodity agreements had previously been approved by 
the Havana Charter of 1948, leading to price stabilisation agreements for coffee, sugar, tin and wheat 
(Maizels, 2000; Gilbert, 1995).
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International support of commodity producers turned out to be short-lived and 
largely ineffective. Against the background of extreme volatility and substantial 
trend deterioration of commodity prices, the limited capitalisation of the Common 
Fund, as well as the implicit incentive structure of the International Commodity 
Agreements (ICAs), had proven inappropriate to attain their goal of successfully 
tam ing excessive m arket forces (Gilbert, 1995). By the early 1990s, the existing ICAs 
had collapsed, w ith the only exception being natural rubber. As a result, since the 
1990s there has been no effective market-stabilising mechanism in place, nor has an 
international consensus em erged since w ith regard to the re-establishment of any 
such mechanism. Maizels (2000: 4-5) thus concludes that
"it is, perhaps, ironic that this impasse in international commodity policy, which has 
continued throughout the 1990s, began just as the dominant feature of world 
commodity markets changed [...] from excessive short-term price volatility to a sharp 
downward trend in real commodity prices. If anything, commodity-exporting 
countries needed greater support, not less, from the international community during 
this period."
After the demise of international intervention in commodity markets, the only 
remaining international facilities providing BOP support in the face of commodity 
price volatility were the IMF's Compensatory and Contingency Finance Facility, 
which provided tem porary balance of paym ents support on a highly conditional 
basis, and the European Union's STABEX mechanism, which provided compensatory 
aid in response to fluctuation in agricultural export earnings. Both schemes, however, 
turned out to be largely ineffective, or even counter-productive, by inducing pro­
cyclical aid disbursements (Hermann et al., 1990; Collier et al., 1999; Brun et al., 2001).
With international efforts in support of the prim ary commodity exporting countries 
failing to meet their objective of insulating these economies against the effects of 
sharp price fluctuations and unfavourable terms of trade, the m arked overall decline 
of relative prices during the 1980s and 1990s constituted a prim e cause of the 
accumulation of external debt by these countries. Indeed, the cumulative terms of 
trade losses led to a huge build-up of external debt over time, initially through 
increases in their commercial borrowings, and since the late 1980s increasingly in the 
form of conditionality-tied aid from bilateral and multilateral sources. As a result, the 
external debt burden of many low-income countries soared, and m any commodity- 
dependent countries were caught in w hat Maizels (1994: 1688) refers to as a 'debt
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trap'. That is, the persistent requirem ent to service large and increasing burdens of 
external, foreign-currency-denominated debt caused these countries to succumb to a 
vicious cycle of commodity exports expansion, which further increased the 
dow nw ard pressure on world commodity prices and export revenues, and, in turn, 
increased these countries' necessity for securing additional loans, recurrent debt 
restructurings or other forms of relief.
Against the background of commodity-exporting countries' increasing dependence 
on official concessional aid and/or debt restructurings to close their widening 
resource gaps, the BWI played an increasingly prom inent role in setting policy 
conditionality according to their internalist agenda, while the demise of the ICAs was 
largely considered as the ultimate dem onstration of the fallacy of any international 
intervention along structuralist lines. Nissanke (2006) identifies the emergence of 
policy conditionality in the early 1980s as a consequence of the shift from project aid 
tow ard policy-based program m e aid, which was delivered conditional upon 
recipients' pledges to im plement stabilisation-cum-structural reforms. In contrast, the 
mid-late 1990s witnessed a shift from ex-ante to ex-post conditionality, based on a 
selectivity-based mechanism for allocating aid. As the key motivation for this 
fundam ental shift in the aid delivery system, Nissanke (2006) points to the growing 
recognition by the donor com munity that structural adjustm ent programm es (SAPs) 
had failed to induce a sustainable path of economic developm ent in the recipient 
countries, and that ex-ante policy conditionality was largely ineffective in forcing the 
donors' reform agenda on recipient governments. However, she also emphasises that, 
far from representing a break from the conditionality-based aid allocation system, the 
emergence of the 'new  aid architecture' rested on the misconceived, though 
w idespread, recognition that the chief culprit for the failure of the SAP-based aid 
allocation system was 'state failure' of recipient governments. Therefore, in order to 
avoid allocating aid to 'non-perform ing governments' enacting 'bad policies', aid 
allocation had to shift away from an incentives-based mechanism, based on promises 
for policy change, towards a system rew arding well-performing countries for policy- 
compliance on an ex-post basis.
Central to the new  aid architecture and its selectivity-based allocation rule is the
classification of recipient countries according to their ranking in the World Bank's
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Country Policy And Institutional Assessment (CPIA). The CPIA was first introduced 
in the late 1970s and consists of the judgem ent made by World Bank staff w ith regard 
to a set of criteria representing the different policy and institutional dimensions of a 
recipient country's developm ent strategy and outcome (Gelb et ah, 2004; W orld Bank, 
2005a). The criteria have evolved over time, and currently include 16 indicators 
encompassing the clusters of economic management, structural policies, policies for 
social inclusion, and accountability and public sector management. Performance is 
reviewed against specific criteria relating to intermediate variables like trade policy, 
macroeconomic management, corruption and property rights, and is translated into 
scores which constitute the central criteria in the aid allocation process. Against the 
background of the W orld Bank's uniform application of the CPIA mechanism across 
developing countries and time (Herman, 2004), Kanbur (2005) notes that the CPIA's 
criteria-based assessment embodies an 'implicit model of the developm ent process', 
which privileges the assessment of performance upon needs, and thus acts as a 
means to effectively enforce upon recipient countries the BWI's own approach to 
development through the aid leverage. Furthermore, it has been noted that the CPIA 
assessment system totally neglects the role of exogenous shocks in recipient 
countries' performance ranking, w ith a strongly penalising effect on shock-prone 
countries w ithin the aid allocation system (Nissanke and Ferrarini, 2006). Ultimately, 
the CPIA-based aid allocation process effectively translates the internalist position of 
the BWIs into the new aid architecture, w ith the main effect of keeping intact the aid- 
leverage of policy conditionality, while neglecting the crucial role played by 
exogenous factors in determining the development process and outcomes in 
developing countries.
Similar conclusions can be draw n w ith regard to the debt relief initiatives 
characterising the international approach to dealing with the African debt crisis over 
time. Indeed, the conditionality-tied approach to debt relief failed to achieve the aim 
of restoring debt sustainability in Africa mainly due to the neglect of vulnerability 
issues (Nissanke and Ferrarini, 2006), while succumbing to the prerogatives of the 
CPIA-centred incentive structure of the new aid architecture. Between the mid-1980s 
and 1996, international efforts were conducted under the aegis of the Paris Club, first 
in the form of repeated rescheduling and roll-overs of existing loans, and later by
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relieving portions of bilateral official debt flow and stocks. Paris Club relief was 
subject to recipients' implementation of policy conditionality, as dictated by the IMF. 
Meanwhile, bilateral aid was increasingly switching tow ard grant financing, with 
multilateral official lending taking up growing shares of recipient countries' 
program m e and balance of paym ent loans support. By the mid 1990s, many low- 
income countries' exposure to the multilateral donors, including the World Bank and 
IMF, had  increased to levels requiring substantial relief operations in order to avoid 
defaults on multilateral claims and to break their unsustainable drain on poor 
countries' already scai'ce resources. Eventually, am idst growing international 
pressure from civil society and stakeholders, the so-called 'Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries' (HIPC) Initiative was launched in 1996 -  and later in 1999 expanded in 
breadth and scope -  offering comprehensive relief encompassing also multilateral 
official debt, and promising a lasting release from the HIPC debt crisis (IMF and IDA, 
1998).
N otw ithstanding the optimism proclaimed by the sponsoring institutions, it was 
soon clear to outside observers (e.g. GAO, 2000; Nissanke and Ferrarini, 2001; Gunter, 
2002) that the HIPC Initiative was based on severely flawed premises and that it 
w ould fail to meet its goal of achieving debt sustainability. For, as a fundamental 
expression of BWI's 'internalist' position, the HIPC Initiative failed to recognise the 
close linkage between HIPCs' structural fragility and vulnerability to exogenous 
shocks as the central causal factor underlying these countries' debt problems, and 
thus lacked any mechanism to address the roots of the debt problem. Instead, the 
HIPC Initiative was deliberately made conducive to ensuring compatibility w ith the 
incentive structure of the extant selectivity-based aid allocation framework, requiring 
recipient countries to implement policy conditionality according to the newly 
introduced IMF Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF)3 during the years 
between the so-called 'decision and completion points', and before debt forgiveness 
w ould be m ade binding on the creditors. Furthermore, debt relief was entirely 
tailored tow ards the reduction of outstanding debt burden below static thresholds in 
terms of GDP, exports, or budget revenues, which applied invariably across all
3 The PRGF was introduced as the replacement of IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF).
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eligible countries. As a result, the HIPC Initiative ruled out a priori any flexibility of 
debt relief according to country-specific vulnerability (Nissanke and Ferrarini, 2001). 
Instead, it was laid out for funnelling the bulk of the relieved financial resources 
towards the implem entation of national Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS), w ith its 
main focus on social sector policies and w ithout directing sufficient resources 
towards structural and macroeconomic policy measures so as to tackle the deep 
vulnerability issues at the root of the problem (Killick, 2000).
The position held by the international donor community w ith regard to the HIPC 
Initiative, and debt relief more generally, underw ent a rapid change in the early 
2000s. For, it had become increasingly evident that the Initiative w ould fail to achieve 
lasting debt sustainability in the case of most recipient countries, despite the massive 
relief of debt that had already taken place. Most crucially, the second half of the 1990s 
had signalled a period of severe deterioration in the terms of trade of many HIPCs, 
which this time fell under the close scrutiny of the international community through 
the monitoring function entailed by the HIPC debt sustainability assessments. 
Graphs 1.1 to 1.3 clearly dem onstrate the plunge in the net barter terms of trade of 
the group of heavily indebted and least developed countries, which was mainly 
accounted for by a drop in the prices of their key export commodities.4 Against this 
background, HIPC debt sustainability assessments highlighted the severe 
miscalculations by the BWI w ith regard to the prospects of low-income countries for 
achieving debt sustainability, and the W orld Bank's own Operations Evaluations 
D epartm ent voiced strong criticism of the HIPC Initiative's severely overoptimistic 
bias in its underlying projections of recipient countries' export and growth prospects 
(Gautam, 2003; Lala et al., 2006). Subsequently, against the background of 
overwhelming evidence, terms of trade shocks started entering into World Bank and 
IMF reports as a standard explanation of the persistence of external debt problems 
despite massive debt relief operations, notw ithstanding the usual emphasis on home-
4 These graphs relate to and update our earlier analysis (Nissanke and Ferrarini, 2004: 36-37 -  Figures 2.4 
and 2.5). It should be noted that besides the fall in primary commodity prices, the decline in HIPCs' 
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grown policy mistakes and underperformance against policy targets (e.g. IMF, 2003).5
This change in BWI rhetoric was soon followed by im portant policy actions. In 2004, 
the BWI launched their proposal for a New Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF), 
based on the premise of more closely taking into account the role of exogenous 
shocks in determ ining low-income countries' debt sustainability (IMF and IDA, 2004a, 
2004b). In 2005, the DSF was followed by the 14th replenishm ent of the IDA, 
establishing a direct link between debt sustainability concerns and aid allocation, and 
implem enting a partial shift from multilateral loans to grant financing under the 
auspices of the United States Treasury (IDA, 2005a; Sanford, 2002; Cohen and Reisen, 
2005). Also in 2005, the heads of state of the G8, as the major shareholders of the 
BWIs, endorsed the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), leading to 100 per cent 
cancellation of debt owed by HIPC countries to the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
African Developm ent Fund (IDA, 2005c; IMF and IDA, 2006a, 2006c).
There can be no doubt about the significance of these multilateral responses in 
signalling the donor communities' deep dissatisfaction w ith the outcome of the HIPC 
Initiative. Despite appearances, however, the recent shift in the BWI approach does 
not mark a break with its internalist view, nor any opening up tow ards the inclusion 
of the more structuralist concerns in their dealings with low-income countries' 
external vulnerability. In contrast, our detailed analysis in the second part of this 
study dem onstrates that w hat the 'new ' approach actually achieves is to consolidate 
further the fundam ental tenets of past BWI approaches, by subordinating the new 
debt sustainability framework and vulnerability concerns entirely to the prerogatives 
of the extant CPIA-centred aid delivery mechanism and the desired shift from loan to 
grant financing. Furthermore, low-income countries' vulnerability to exogenous 
shocks continues to be largely unaddressed by the new aid and debt sustainability 
framework, which lacks any effective financial support mechanism in the face of 
exogenous shocks. Finally, the BWI framework still fails to correct its aid allocation in 
relation to the resource gap resulting from unfavourable terms of trade. Thereby, the 
multilateral approach crucially fails to acknowledge the causal relationship between
s In contrast, earlier IMF studies pointing to the role of terms and trade shocks in exacerbating low- 
income debt problems (e.g. Brooks et al., 1998) were promoted far less vigorously.
- 30 -
the terms of trade and debt sustainability of low income countries, which has been a 
key reason for the HIPC Initiative's inability to curb external debt stocks.
In sum, the W orld Bank and IMF approach to aid and debt relief has m utated over 
the decades, keeping the multilateral agencies' policy leverage through 
conditionality-tied assistance largely intact. Despite the repeated failures of past
initiatives, the LIC debt problem is now dealt with under the aegis of a multilateral
\
approach w ith a new  outfit but the same old shortcomings, underm ining any 
possibility of achieving lasting debt sustainability.6 Moreover, to the extent that the 
current approach lacks any mechanism to avoid low-income countries again being 
forced to build up unsustainable debt positions in the face of declining terms of trade 
and substantial shocks to their balance of payments, the BWI approach is bound to 
underm ine the positive effects arising from debt cancellation by the MDRI.
1.2 Objectives and structure of the study
This thesis pursues two related objectives. The first consists in a detailed assessment 
of the current debt sustainability framework (DSF), as recently endorsed by the 
World Bank and the IMF. Looking beneath the rhetoric of the official reports, and 
investigating more closely the analytical and empirical grounds on which they rest, 
we pursue the objective of highlighting the unjustifiably long list of shortcomings 
affecting all the central components of the DSF and IDA aid allocation mechanism. In 
the light of the central importance these frameworks have for low-income countries, 
it is all the more remarkable that such a detailed investigation of the DSF had not 
already been conducted, at least to the best of our knowledge.
The second and central focus of analysis is on the introduction of our own proposal 
for a so-called 'Contingency Debt Sustainability Framework'. The CDSF represents
6 Except if one were willing to contemplate the scenario of radical structural breaks along the future 
development path of low-income countries, such as a sudden success of diversification strategies, 
catapulting LICs into export sectors they are competitive in and which are characterised by stable, 
upward-sloping real relative prices. However, such a scenario appears to be even more remote if it is 
considered that diversification strategies tend to move LICs also toward low-skill manufactured exports, 
the terms of trade of which have been declining against high-skill technology-intensive goods. 
Furthermore, the benefits from temporary windfalls, such as the price hikes in mineral commodities 
experienced during recent years, will depend on the future demand induced by the 'Southern engine of 
growth', with the well-known risks for LICs of experiencing particularly severe disruptions from a 
sudden bust following years of price boom.
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an attem pt to lay out the basic mechanisms of an innovative approach to multilateral 
development finance, which makes aid delivery and debt relief contingent on the 
specific shock and trend factors experienced by low-income country recipients. With 
the CDSF, we thus aim to dem onstrate -  w ithout the presum ption of having found 
the definitive answer -  that the long-standing argum ent in favour of such innovative 
financial mechanisms is indeed feasible, and would be highly effective according to 
our case study simulations. Moreover, we argue that in contrast to the current 
multilateral framework, the CDSF provides the basis for incentive-compatible 
development financing, making recipient countries more responsible for their own 
actions and policies. Again, we feel compelled to build our argum ent on the basis of a 
critical examination of the few preceding analyses with regard to debt-service 
m odulation schemes that have been emerging recently, and to test their implications 
against our own, more comprehensive framework.
This study does not aim to espouse any of the antagonistic positions characterising 
the multilateral approaches to low-income countries' debt and development crises. 
Moreover, it deliberately abstracts from an evaluation of policy conditionality and 
actual policy regimes per se, as well as from the broader structural and 
macroeconomic debates that are central to understanding the likely impact of 
development finance on low-income recipients. Such abstraction is certainly most 
tangible in the definition of the performance-assessment mechanism of the CDSF, 
which leaves substantial room for subsequent calibration of the scheme in terms of 
the scope, depth and type of monitoring required by the specific debtor country in 
question. However, while signalling due consideration of the key incentive concerns 
characterising the BWI approach to aid and debt relief, this study is hopefully also 
suitable for showing that the BWI position lacks any such reciprocal consideration for 
the well-founded structuralist concerns, and chooses to impose its approach on 
misleading empirical grounds instead.
The presentation of the above elements is structured along the following lines. 
Following this introduction (Ch.l), Part I of the study features a review of the main 
theoretical contributions advocating the case for contingent debt contracts (Ch.2). 
Part II contains the two chapters evaluating the extant Debt Sustainability 
Framework (Ch.3) and the recent proposals for debt service m odulation schemes
- 32-
(Ch.4). Part III outlines our proposal for a state-contingent scheme (Ch.5), the main 
implications of which are then analysed on the basis of the U ganda country study 
(Ch.6). Finally, the last chapter summarises our main conclusions and outlines the 
agenda for further research (Ch.7).
2 The Rationale for State-Contingent Claims in  the Face of 
Low-income Countries' Exposure to Exogenous Shocks
2.1 Introduction
The international debt crisis of the 1980s led to a surge of literature analysing the 
causes of and possible remedies for sovereign debt crises. Reflecting the hugely 
disruptive effects on the international financial markets posed by defaulting Latin 
American middle-income countries w ith large debts owed to commercial banks, most 
of the early discussions of external debt problems were exclusively focused on this 
group of debtors.1 In contrast, the external debt of low-income countries was mainly 
owed to foreign governments, and therefore posed no direct threat to the 
international financial system. Only in the late 1980s did the literature begin to focus 
increasingly on this group of mostly sub-Saharan African countries, and even more 
so during the 1990s, as the debilitating impact on developm ent of these countries' 
external debt problems became more evident.
With appropriate caveats in mind, the basic tenets of the sovereign debt literature 
apply to both m iddle- and low-income countries: in both cases, the lender-borrower 
relationship is fraught w ith a more or less severe agency problem, arising from 
asymmetry of information and the divergence of interests between the principal 
(bank syndicate, donors) and the agent (borrower). Furthermore, the borrower is a 
sovereign entity, thus largely im m une from the outright enforcement of a debt 
contract im posing any particular behaviour or action deem ed favourable in terms of 
the lenders' (donors') objective function. Against this background, the bulk of the 
early debt literature focussed its attention mainly on explaining the reasons why 
lending to sovereign nations takes place, particularly in relation to the limited 
enforcement mechanisms available to the lenders. It found that if a debt contract 
cannot be enforced through the domestic legal system, the contract m ust necessarily
1 For detailed analyses relating to the 1980s debt crisis involving the middle-income countries, see Smith 
and Cuddington (1984), Husain and Diwan (1989), Frenkel et al. (1989), Cline (1994).
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be conducive to inducing a sovereign's compliance w ith repaym ent obligations in a 
largely self-enforcing manner. Consequently, a debt crisis could be explained in 
relation to an incentive failure, i.e. by a decline in the sovereign's actual or perceived 
willingness to repay outstanding debts, instead of taking an exclusive concern with 
actual capacity to pay.
Although a debtor's capacity and willingness are both necessary conditions for 
lending and repaym ent to occur from an ex-ante perspective, the principal focus of 
any ex-post crisis analysis is to identify the factors affecting actual repaym ent 
capacity. W ith regard to repaym ent capacity, a key concept across the sovereign debt 
literature relates to the distinction between a debtor's liquidity and solvency. Simply 
put, a debtor is said to be illiquid if it temporarily lacks the necessary cash to stay 
current on its debt obligations. New lending, either by the provision of new loans, or 
the rescheduling of principal and interest payments, should then be sufficient to 
solve the tem porary problem in relation to a debtor's current financial situation.
In contrast, insolvency denotes a more severe situation of distress, or negative net 
worth, whereby a debtor's repaym ent obligations exceed its expected stream of 
resources in present value terms. A crucial contribution of the debt literature has 
been to dem onstrate that in the presence of a large debt overhang and looming 
insolvency, it is debt relief, rather than new lending alone, w hich can actually bring 
about welfare-enhancing effects for both parties to the debt contract.2 In the context 
of the debt crisis involving low-income countries, this strand of literature -  usually 
referred to as the 'debt overhang hypothesis' -  has provided the central theoretical 
grounds on which to base the debt relief initiatives, first under the aegis of the Paris 
Club, and since the mid-1990s in the form of the HIPC Initiative. More specifically, 
these contributions revealed the debilitating effects a large debt overhang can have 
on a country's economic growth prospects, both directly, by diverting scarce 
productive resources tow ards debt service, and indirectly, by distorting incentives to 
invest in productive capital, or to enact the necessary structural adjustments and 
economic reforms.
2 See, for example, Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1990).
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O ur discussion below shows that, despite having been given much emphasis as the 
key guiding criteria underlying lenders' policy actions in dealing w ith debtors in 
distress, the distinction between insolvency and illiquidity represents a largely 
misleading concept in the context of sovereign borrowers. For, it is fundamentally 
impossible to determine a country's solvency in the context of an infinite and 
uncertain horizon concerning its income stream. Instead, a borrow er's solvency is 
shown to be determined by the largely self-fulfilling expectations of the lender 
com munity with regard to repaym ent capacity, which in turn guides the lending 
decisions and thus the borrow er's liquidity implications. In such a context, then, 
insolvency ceases to be of any analytical relevance, and the crucial question concerns 
the identification of the key factors determining a debtor's liquidity over time. 
Moreover, the most appropriate lenders' response to averting a crisis m ust not to be 
conducted within the over-simplistic policy space relating to the lending versus 
adjustm ent decision accruing from the illiquidity/insolvency assessment, but needs to 
focus on distinguishing between the liquidity-debilitating factors that are under the 
control of the debtor and those which are not. Put differently, we show that in an 
uncertain environm ent determining a country's repaym ent capacity, the sovereign 
debt literature is largely univocal about the necessity of a debt contract to make a 
distinction between endogenous and exogenous factors affecting repaym ent capacity, 
in order to achieve incentive compatibility in the lender-debtor relationship.
The crucial insights relating to the potential benefits from so-called contingent debt 
contracts are not novel. They were first pointed out in the seminal contributions by 
Sachs (1988, 1989) and Krugman (1988a), arguing for debt contracts to contain a 
'contingency' element in determining a country's repaym ent schedule, in relation to 
the state of nature and its effects on paym ent capacity and a debtor country's overall 
degree of sustainability. The central thrust of these models has subsequently been 
further elaborated by the sovereign debt literature, dem onstrating the supremacy of 
state-contingent contracts over simple loan contracts, and em phasising the need for 
contract indexation and ex-ante renegotiation in order to bring about optimal 
alignment of incentives and to maximise a debt contract's welfare implications. 
Surprisingly, however, these im portant branches of the debt literature received little 
attention in the policy debates of the 1990s and early 2000s, in contrast to the great
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attention given to the literature dealing w ith debt overhang and relief issues, and 
despite the recent em phasis on the role played by exogenous shock factors in 
rendering LICs' debt positions unsustainable. As m entioned in the previous chapter, 
a few tentative proposals for state-contingent debt contracts have been emerging 
recently3, bu t these discussions too appear to be widely detached from the classic 
debt literature. As a result, the rationale for contingent debt relief is typically 
advocated on superficial grounds, failing to fully acknowledge the crucial 
implications of ex-ante contracting.4
In an attempt to re-establish the central thrust of state-contingent debt contract 
argument, this chapter provides a selective review of the seminal contributions 
relating to the 'classic' sovereign debt literature. It thereby aims not only to fill the 
apparent gap left open by the current debate surrounding the issue, but also to 
provide the theoretical underpinning of our own proposal for a contingency debt 
sustainability framework, outlined in Part III of this study. However, it should be 
noted that the sovereign debt literature is rich in excellent contributions, spanning 
over more than two decades of fervid academic writing. Therefore, it is clearly 
beyond the scope of this chapter to provide even the semblance of a comprehensive 
review of this heterogeneous body of literature, or any one of its many strands. 
Rather, we organise the following discussion along the lines of the seminal 
contribution by Krugman (1988a), integrating the argum ent w ith a num ber of crucial 
insights from the broader literature in the fields of sovereign debt and contract theory. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that we devote our attention exclusively to the 
narrow er theoretical aspects relating to state-contingent debt contracts, at the expense 
of a discussion of the broader theoretical literature on foreign aid. The latter body of 
literature is however relevant to the broader context relating to contingency 
instrum ents' implications for the aid allocation process, and has been reviewed 
elsewhere.5
3 In particular, see Guillaumont et al. (2001), Combes and Guillaumont (2002), Gilbert and Tabova (2004), 
as well as the World Bank proposals for debt service linked to repayment capacity, analysed in Chapter
4 below.
4 For example, see the contributions referred to in the previous footnote.
5 The interested reader is referred to Nissanke (2006) and Nissanke and Ferrarini (2006) for an extensive 
outline of the most relevant aspects relating to the specific aid context of state-contingent debt contracts.
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This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides a brief introduction to the 
key features characterising the sovereign debt relationship; Section 2.3 outlines the 
debate surrounding illiquidity, insolvency, and debt sustainability; Section 2.4 
discusses the creditor's dilemma, relating to the optimal response in terms of new 
lending and debt relief in the presence of debt overhang; Section 2.5 outlines the key 
features of state-contingent sovereign debt contracts, w ith particular focus on 
contract indexation and renegotiation; Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 A sovereign's capacity and willingness to pay
Sovereign debt differs from private debt in at least two crucial aspects. First, a 
sovereign usually has a limited scope for providing collateral to guarantee the value 
of loans. In the event of repudiation, the collateralised assets available to creditors 
would be w orth only a small fraction of their financial claims on the country and 
offer insufficient assurance of repayment. Second, in contrast to private debt, 
sovereign debt typically cannot be enforced through the domestic legal system. A 
foreign court has thus very limited ability to force a sovereign to comply with the 
obligations of the debt contract. In a sense, this limit of enforceability puts a 
sovereign 'above the law ' governing domestic debt. The im portant implication of the 
enforcement limit, which also embodies the main element characterising the 
sovereign debt literature as a distinct body of analysis, is that in addition to being 
capable of repaying its debts, a country m ust also be willing to do so.
A country's willingness to fulfil its obligations depends on its incentives to do so, 
which in turn  are influenced by the existence of some sort of enforcement mechanism 
imposing a sufficiently high cost on default. W ithout the prospect of incurring 
significant costs, a country w ould always default on its debts, and, therefore, no 
lending w ould occur in the first place. In order to explain the existence of sovereign 
lending, the early sovereign debt literature took up the task of explaining how and to 
w hat extent alternative enforcement mechanisms may induce a sovereign entity to
repay its debts. W ithout aiming to be comprehensive, the major strands of this 
literature can briefly be sum m arised as follows.6
First consider the example of a country that can credibly commit to a full repaym ent 
of its debts. Assume that foreign debt is used for the purpose of smoothing 
consumption over time, so that the country maximises a constrained inter-temporal 
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W here U denotes utility, Ct is consumption, Yt is output m easured as GDP, J3 is the
country's discount factor, r represents the world interest rate, and subscript t 
indicates the time period to which the variables refer. The feasibility constraint 
defines the limit to consumption: in present value terms, consum ption cannot exceed 
output over the entire time horizon contemplated. Given the standard assumption f3 
< r, expressing willingness to consume out of future income at the given cost of 
capital, the country chooses the feasible consumption path that maximises utility. 
Doing so involves net transfers of debt, the stock of which evolves according to:
A.. = (A  + c , - r ,X i + r )  0 ;
Clearly, for the feasibility constraint to hold, a period of positive net capital transfers 
to the country will have to be followed by a period of repaym ent (i.e. negative net 
transfers, w ith C, <}')). Assume that output is exogenous and deterministic. Then, if
lenders know for certain that the country will repay its debts, they are willing to lend 
up  to a level equalling the present value of the future output stream.
Consider now a sovereign that cannot credibly commit to repaying its debts. Rather, 
the country will repay if and only if the utility associated w ith following a given 
repaym ent path is at least as high as the utility associated w ith defaulting on debt,
6 The literature now contains a large number of often only slightly different models of enforcement 
mechanisms. A more comprehensive survey can be found in Eaton and Fernandez (1995).
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and suffering the consequences of the resulting penalty. Assuming, for example, that 
the penalty from defaulting consists in the exclusion from future access to capital 
markets, the country will repay only if the utility from doing so is higher than the 
utility from defaulting now and consuming its autarkic output thereafter. That is, the 
country will have the incentive to repay if:
The left-hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint represents the present 
value of the utility accruing from following some specific repaym ent path (marked 
by the sign ~), and the right-hand side expresses the utility associated with 
consuming the autarkic output at any time subsequent to the period of default, 
denoted by r. W ithout a perfect enforcement mechanism, the country has no 
incentive to repay, since after period r, consumption w ould have to fall below the 
level of current output, for all t > r. W ithout a strong enforcement mechansim at the 
disposal of the creditor7, the country w ould therefore be strictly better off by 
breaching the contract and consuming the full level of output thereafter.
The central analytical question is thus to identify enforcement mechanisms that make 
the compliance with sovereign debt contracts incentive-compatible. The most 
influential literature has proposed the answer in terms of punitive enforcement, 
relating to the reputational argum ent mentioned in the above exam ple.8 The 
argument was first introduced in a seminal paper by Eaton and Gersowitz (1981)9, 
based on simple intuition: rather than facing the stick of some other punitive action 
by creditors, a sovereign is rew arded with the carrot of increasing its reputational 
asset if it does repay debt, thereby assuring continued access to foreign loans in the
7 It should be noted that the term 'creditor' is used here interchangeably with 'creditors'. For the sake of 
simplicity of the exposition of the key arguments, we therefore abstract from the important collective 
action problems affecting creditors' decisions as a group. Furthermore, the term 'creditor' may be 
thought of as including also the group of concessional creditors, or the donor community as a whole, 
with regard to its loan (not grant) disbursements.
8 Without counting elements such as honour, national pride, or guilt, as enforcement mechanisms, given 
that they are based on a debtor's ethical values, rather than on coercion. Nevertheless, this is not to 
argue that such elements may not play a decisive role in determining a country's decision to repay 
(honour) its debts.
9 It was further elaborated, among others, by Kletzer (1984), Eaton, Gersowitz and Stiglitz (1986), 
Grossman and Van Huyck (1988), Eaton (1990, 1993), Atkeson (1991), Cole, Dow, and English (1995), 
Cole and Kehoe (1996).
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(incentive compatibility constraint) (4)
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future too. 10 Technically, this quid-pro-quo mechanism requires both repeated 
interaction (i.e. a repeated game) to be effective, and the ability by creditors to 
cooperate in carrying out the punishm ent in the event of default (Fafchamps, 1996). 
Moreover, it w ould be ineffective if a defaulting debtor were able to buy insurance 
contracts, so as to allow for consumption smoothing (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a).11 
Also, this mechanism is not suited to inducing continued paym ent by countries 
progressing along their developm ent path, from a low-capital and low-growth period, 
to a period of capital abundance. For in the period of relative capital abundance, the 
carrot of continued access to external capital might offer too weak an incentive for 
inducing repaym ent (Eaton, Gersowitz, and Stiglitz, 1986). While such a scenario is 
still out of reach for most sub-Saharan African countries12, a more relevant argum ent 
in the context of LIC debt is the variant of the reputation argum ent pu t forward in 
relation to these countries' strong incentive to ensure continued access to aid flows. 
Indeed, Fafchamps (1996) shows that the threat of reduced aid flows to non­
complying debtors has usually represented a sufficiently strong (binding) incentive 
to ensure repaym ent in this group of countries.
Ultimately, the presence of some sort of enforcement mechanism ensures that a 
defaulting country at least faces the possibility of penalties. International lending is 
thus made possible to the extent that the expectation of penalty costs provides the 
debtor w ith the incentive to repay. At the same time, however, as long as the 
possibility of default persists, total credit to a country is constrained, and the 
effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism determines the level of constraint. 
Clearly, if both lenders and borrowers knew the costs of default w ith certainty, full
10 If the reputational asset is assumed to increase with every loan repaid, the terms of lending should 
ameliorate accordingly. Alternatively, the reputational asset could be assumed to be lost at the first 
instance of default, with players choosing the punishing strategy at any time thereafter. In this case, the 
reputational argument amounts to a stick, rather than a carrot.
11 However, Bulow and Rogoff's argument concerning the possibility for a post-default debtor to enter 
some sort of income-insurance contract is not particularly compelling, as it is rather unlikely that a 
debtor would be given access to such instruments, but not to regular loans. Moreover, the authors do 
not consider the enforceability limit the debtor may face itself when trying to enforce the insurance 
contracts. See Sachs (1989) for a critique on Bulow and Rogoff (1989a). See Cline (1994) for a broader 
review of the key points raised in the literature.
12 However, the argument might still apply in relation to the availability of alternative sources of 
concessional or commercial debt. For example, China's emergence as an alternative source of lending to 
African countries is increasingly cited as having a potentially debilitating effect on debt enforcement (e.g. 
see the Financial Times article by Beattie and Callan, 2006).
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repaym ent w ould be assured by setting the constraint just below the cost of default. 
With country risk equal to zero, lending would take place at w orld interest prices. In 
the presence of uncertainty, however, the cost of default is unknown. Krugman 
(1985) dem onstrates that a credit constraint persists even in equilibrium. Assume, for 
example, that the enforceable penalty consists of the seizure of the defaulter's foreign 
trade receipts, which in turn depends on export volumes and prices. The overall cost 
associated w ith the penalty will then be uncertain: for example, it may be lower than 
expected if an unanticipated shortfall in either export volumes or a worsening in the 
terms of trade occurs. Hence, Krugman (1985) concludes that lenders w ould react to 
this uncertainty by charging a risk prem ium  to highly indebted countries, as they are 
more likely to default. H igher interest rates in turn increase the expected future debt 
burden, causing excess dem and for credit (i.e. a credit constraint) to persist in 
equilibrium. The crucial message, echoed by most of the sovereign debt literature, is 
that in the presence of an incentive constraint, a first-best allocation of resources is 
rarely attainable.
In sum, the sovereign debt literature shows that both repaym ent capacity and 
incentive compatibility constrain a sovereign's borrowing. As to which constraint is 
more binding, this depends on the enforcement mechanism at the disposal of the 
creditors. With perfect enforcement only capacity to pay matters. Otherwise, a 
debtor's repaym ent incentive will bind, which in turn determines the credit 
constraint imposed by the creditors. Although willingness to pay is a necessary 
condition for repaym ent of debt by a sovereign to occur, it is not sufficient: first and 
foremost, a country m ust have the financial capacity to service its debts. Therefore, to 
determine the appropriate policy-response to a debtor's manifested inability to repay, 
creditors are first required to assess the debtor's state of solvency. Indeed, a country 
may merely be suffering a tem porary shortage of cash, or a more severe problem that 
is also likely to debilitate repaym ents in future periods. A central thrust of the 
sovereign debt literature thus lies in defining the optimal response by creditors on 
the basis of the illiquidity-insolvency dichotomy, which is formally outlined in the 
next section.
2.3 Illiquidity versus insolvency, and the concept of debt sustainability
Drawing on the standard models from the sovereign debt literature, this section 
defines the so-called solvency or transversality condition, distinguishing illiquid 
from insolvent borrowers. We show that such distinction is essentially impossible to 
make in the presence of uncertainty about a debtor country's future stream of income 
or repaym ent capacity, since it is partly determined by factors outside its control. 
Consequently, the em phasis typically placed on the distinction between lending 
versus adjustm ent requirements on the grounds of a debtor country's degree of 
solvency is largely misleading and suboptimal. Indeed, under conditions of 
uncertainty, creditors' choice of optimising actions in response to a debtor in 
apparent distress will largely depend on their own subjective assessment and 
expectations regarding its state of insolvency, and thus assume a self-fulfilling 
character. Essentially, it will be shown that the potential supremacy of state- 
contingent contracts is argued on the grounds of this fundam ental indeterminacy 
problem relating to a sovereign debtor's solvency, w hich abstracts from the 
illiquidity-insolvency dichotomy typically referred to.
Borrowing from Cohen and Katseli (1985) and Krugman (1988a), we set out to state 
the solvency condition more rigorously, assuming first that there is no uncertainty 
about a debtor country's future income stream. Consider an indebted country, which 
services debt out of current export revenues.13 Further assume that the country's rate 
of growth of export value exceeds the interest rate it pays on outstanding debt. Since 
the am ount devoted to repaym ent w ould grow at a higher rate than the outstanding 
debt itself however small a fixed fraction of export proceeds the country were to 
allocate to the repaym ent of debt, it w ould always be sufficient to repay the 
outstanding debt in full by some finite date L By the measure of the present value of 
export earnings over time, the country's gross (external) wealth w ould be infinite,
13 Depending on whether the focus of analysis is more on the internal or the external transfer problem 
associated with a high debt burden, repayment capacity will be expressed in terms of alternative 
measures or indicators. Cohen and Katseli (1985), for instance, choose to emphasise the external transfer 
problem relating to the broadest proxy of a debtor country's payment capacity, measured by gross 
national product. Alternatively, it may be assumed that the fiscal constraint is binding a country's 
internal transfer capacity, and thus solvency is assessed in terms of a country's debt burden as the ratio 
of tax and non-tax revenue (e.g. see Agenor and Montiel, 1999).
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and there w ould be no reason to question its solvency, regardless of the country's
level of outstanding debt.
Some simple algebra helps to illustrate the basic concept. Let the value of outstanding 
debt at time t, D t , be equal to the discounted value of future paym ents, x t :
w here D0 is the initial value of debt, and r is the world interest rate.
Equations (5) and (6) are the standard formulae for com puting the present value of a 
financial asset, which is equal to the present discounted value (PV) of its income 
stream. Consider now a debtor that pays interest falling due in every period, bu t no 
principal. The value of outstanding debt w ould remain constant, and principal w ould 
have to be re-financed each period. Then, considering a period t in the far distant 
future -  at the limit of infinity, t ->oo— the present value of future debt w ould be zero:
Lim (t ~^co) ^  = 0 (Transversality or solvency condition) (7)
As long as the transversality condition holds, i.e. if debt grows at a slower rate than 
the interest rate and regardless of w hether interest is paid partially or in full14, a 
debtor is said to be solvent. Moreover, if equation (7) is true, the above equation (5) 
shows the PV of debt to be exactly equal to the future export stream. This is the same 
as saying that, in conditions of certainty, the market value (V) of outstanding debt 
w ould be same as its face value (Do):
In contrast, if debt is not serviced at all, and both principal and interest are instead 
rolled over in each period, the PV of future debt (growing at rate r) is equal to its 
initial value (i.e. constant):
A> A
(1 + r) ~  (1 + /•) + (1 + r ) ‘ (Present value of outstanding debt in f) (5)
x,
Z), -  (1 + /*) -  x t (Nominal value of outstanding debt in t) (6)
(8)
14 For example, with payment of interest equal to some fraction a, Dt=(l+r(l-n))Dt-i, with Dt growing at 
rate r(l-a)<r when «>0.
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Or, more generally, if debt grows at a faster rate than the interest rate:
Lim (t~}oo)----- —^- > 0 (10)
(1 + r)
And, therefore, the face value of debt is larger than the discounted value of debt 
service, w hich also implies that the m arket value of debt falls short of its face value:15
Consider now a country whose export (i.e. repayment) capacity is growing at rate n 16, 
facing a real world interest rate r. If r>n, the country's wealth is not infinite, and 
solvency requires equation (7) to hold. In other words, the solvency condition 
requires country debt to grow at a rate strictly lower than the interest rate. The 
country's wealth is finite, and to stay solvent, the present value of future debt m ust 
converge to zero. For instance, a country's export capacity growing in steady state at 
rate n=3 and i-6  could simply pay half the interest falling due and still keep its debt- 
to-exports ratio constant. That is, under these conditions, debt w ould be growing at 
the same rate as exports do. An obvious implication of r>n is that the country's debt 
is w orth no more than the present value of its repayments. In contrast, if r<n, the 
present value of country wealth is infinite, and solvency is not even an issue. Any 
positive fraction a of export revenue is sufficient to repay any value of initial debt 
w ithin a finite time horizon. Furthermore, there is no solvency requirem ent to impose 
a constraint on the country's future generation of export revenue, as outstanding debt 
can simply be serviced by the sale of new debt. If r<n, outstanding debt may well be 
w orth more than the present value of the repaym ent stream.
In sum, under conditions of certainty, a debtor's solvency is deterministically 
assessable. Consequently, a country will not have to face credit constraints w hen n>r, 
and will be able to borrow  up to a ceiling equal to the present value of its export
15 Note that with no repayment: Pt=0, Do=Dt/(l+r)t.
16 Of course, the same applies to any other measure of repayment capacity, such as growth in gross 
national product, or total government tax revenue.
( 11)
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stream if r>n. Consequently, up to the solvency ceiling a borrower w ould never have 
to face liquidity constraints, as it would be extended new credits in each and every 
period. Abstracting from collective action problems affecting creditors as a group, 
rational lenders w ould thus simply have to follow deterministic rules in their lending 
decisions.
Krugman (1988a) takes the analysis a step further, to assess the strategic lending 
decision by a creditor dealing with a potentially insolvent, or 'problem ', debtor. 
Typically for this class of models, the author adopts a two-period framework, where 
all future periods are collapsed into the second period, so that the effects of period- 
one actions on debt repaym ent are most easily determ ined.17 Assume, still, that there 
is no uncertainty about future income and that in each period the debtor services 
debt up to its full capacity. Then, a country w ith inherited debt Do, repaym ent 
capacities xi and xi in periods one and two, respectively, and creditor opportunity 
cost given by the w orld interest rate r, can be thought of as having the following 
sequence of repaym ent and new disbursements:
Do; r Period 1 Period 2
Repayment capacity (earnings) XI X2
New lending Do-xi 0
That is, the country repays xi in period one, leaving it w ith the am ount Do-xi of 
outstanding debt, to be fully repaid at the end of period tw o.18 Since repaym ent in 
period two cannot exceed xz, creditors will refinance debt in period one if and only if:
(l+r)(D-xi)<x.2 => (D-xi)<xi/(l+r) =r> xi+X2/(l+r)>D (12)
Otherwise, creditors w ould be lending an am ount equal to X2 -(l+r)(D-xi) at a certain 
loss. Indeed, if the discounted value of income is lower than total debt, i.e.
17 One could think of period-two values as the present discounted value (i.e. a stock) of all future 
disbursement and repayment streams (i.e. flows).
18 Note that repayment capacity, i.e. the maximum resource transfers to creditors, is assumed to be given. 
The bargaining problem between debtors and creditors about the amount of resource transfers will be 
considered below. Here it is sufficient to assume that resource transfers in each period are equal to the 
maximum amount of resources available to a country for the purpose of debt servicing, minus a fraction 
reserved to maintain a minimum subsistence level.
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xi+X2/(l+r)<D, creditors know they will not be paid back the full am ount of new 
lending, and therefore refuse to lend at any level of interest. Creditors reckon that the 
problem is one of insolvency, since outstanding debt cannot possibly be repaid, and 
are left w ith no choice other than to forgive part of outstanding debt. Debt relief then 
takes the form of either reduced principal (lowering Do), or reduced rate of interest 
(on Do and/or Do-xi), or a combination of the two. In sum, w ith no uncertainty about 
future resource transfers, a liquidity problem cannot exist: either the country is able 
to pay, or, if it is not, the problem is exclusively one of insolvency and can only be 
dealt w ith by forgiving the fraction of debt exceeding its ability to pay.
Consider now  how  uncertainty about the country's value of future stream of earnings, 
and thus its future repaym ent capacity, changes the analysis. Uncertainty is 
introduced by assuming repaym ent capacity to be stochastically determ ined by a 
num ber of factors, some of which are exogenous to the borrow er (i.e. any exogenous 
shock affecting the country's repaym ent capacity, such as a drop in the world prices 
of a country's key export commodities), and others that are endogenously 
determ ined by the country itself (e.g. its investment decisions and adjustm ent efforts). 
Adding uncertainty, period-two earnings become a stochastic variable, which for the 
sake of simplicity is assumed to take only two possible realisations of a random  
process: one associated w ith a 'good state' of nature, denoted x g  and occurring w ith 
probability p ,  and the other w ith a 'bad state', xb . The time flow of e x p e c te d  
repaym ents and new  disbursements changes accordingly:
Do; r Period 1 Period 2
Repayment capacity (earnings) XI p X G + ( l - p ) X B
New lending Do-xi 0
As a result, the expected value of repaym ent consistent w ith the solvency condition is 
now:
(l+r)(D-xi)<pxG+(l-p)xB => (D-xi )<(pxc+( 1 -p)xn)/( 1+r) (13)
In contrast to the condition of certainty considered above, here the question as to 
w hether or not the debtor is solvent is not well defined. Certainly, w ith (13) holding
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true, and provided that lenders are risk-neutral, the country will be able to attract 
voluntary lending of the am ount (D-xi). However, even then it is not to be taken for 
granted that the country will actually earn enough to repay its debt, depending 
obviously on the realisation of either state of nature. Therefore, it is up to creditors' 
subjective assessment of a country's solvency -  i.e. condition (13) -  to determine 
whether the country will experience a liquidity crisis. W hat if the inequality 
condition (13) is not fulfilled? At first sight, it would appear that creditors w ould not 
extend further loans (D-xi)  to the country, since the expected value of new funds 
w ould fall short of the am ount lent (i.e. their face value). If so, a liquidity crisis would 
occur in period one, and creditors w ould be able to collect only a fraction Z, in 
present value terms, of outstanding debt. Assuming that Z<(pxG+(l-p)xB)/(l+r) 19, 
creditors can, however, improve on their outcome by rolling over the debt, and 
holding out until period two. This is so because partial default is possible, but not 
certain. If the good state is realised, the creditors may be paid back in full after all. If 
the bad state occurs, they will still have im proved upon the outcome associated with 
a period-one liquidity crisis, as long as they are able to extract from the country an 
interest rate (i) high enough to enable creditors to receive all potential resource 
transfers in either state. This interest rate is maximised by the lenders setting it so as 
to exhaust the resource transfer in the good state: (D-xi)(l+i)=XG.20 Accordingly, the 
scenarios w ould involve:
Do; r Period 1 Period 2
Liquidity crisis (no re­ XT. Z < ( p X G + ( l - p ) X B )
lending)
New lending Do-xi x g  full paym ent (Do-xi)(l+i)
x b  partial default, but maxt ( p X G + ( l - p ) x B )
19 Assuming costs of default arising, for instance, from an imperfect enforcement mechanism, such as the 
inability to seize all available assets of the debtor, or simply from a variety of transaction costs associated 
with default.
20 That is, with i>r if x d ( l+ i )  > D - x i , and r>i if x d ( l+ i )  < D-xi. Creditors, however, will always perceive 
new lending always as concessional, since it exceeds expected value of repayment. Note also that if there 
is some probability of the good state occuring, new lending will always be at i>r.
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Krugman (1988a) emphasises that only existing lenders have the incentive to extend 
new borrowing. By doing so, they maximise the potential resource transfer on total 
outstanding debt, so to say 'defending' its net present value. By contrast, new lenders 
w ould not offer any loans, since the expected value of new  lending falls short of its 
face value:
(pxG+(l-p)xB)/(l+r) < (D-xi)(l+i) = x g  (14)
Viewed in isolation, new  loans to the country are lower than expected repayment, 
which obviously deters new lenders from entering a contract w ith that country,21
With this simple but insightful analysis, Krugman (1988a) was among the first to 
highlight two crucial characteristics involving sovereign debt strategy. First, it 
dem onstrates that the analytical dichotomy of insolvency versus illiquidity is 
essentially flawed: if it could be known with certainty that a country is solvent, 
lenders would extend new  loans in all cases, so as to ensure full repaym ent of 
outstanding loans. In contrast, a country know n to be insolvent would consequently 
also be illiquid, while the opposite w ould not be true. A similar logic applies w hen 
future paym ent capacity is uncertain: as long as creditors deem the expected value of 
resource transfers higher than outstanding debt, new lending will still take place. 
With uncertainty, however, it is creditors' subjective expectations that can bring 
about a liquidity crisis of a solvent borrower. Illiquidity occurs out of expected 
insolvency, w hether or not expectations prove to be w rong ex post. Second, 
Krugman's analysis explains the typical pattern of 'defensive lending', characterising 
the lenders' attitude tow ard highly indebted borrowers, particularly LICs. In 
particular, defensive lending is shown to occur even in a situation of expected 
insolvency, since existing creditors have the incentive to defend their existing loans 
by maximising potential returns (or minimising expected losses) on their overall 
stake in the debtor country.
21 There are many alternative ways to show the rationale for new lending by existing creditors. Suppose, 
for example, that creditors believe that without concerted lending a problem-debtor will default, with 
creditors receiving only a fraction d  of the nominal value of their claims (D). Further, they believe that 
by collectively lending an amount L to the country, the expected loss on outstanding claims falls to a 
fraction d*<d . Although the expected loss on new lending is d*L, and thus unprofitable per se, new  
lending increases the value of existing debt by (d-d*)D. New lending will thus be profitable as long as 
d*l<(d-d*)D (Krugman, 1988b).
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Before turning to the discussion of the strategic choices open to the creditor 
community to deal w ith a problem debtor, it should be em phasised that the 
indeterminacy relating to the illiquidity-insolvency dichotomy is particularly 
pronounced in the case of aid-dependent low-income countries. Indeed, aid 
dependency can be defined as a situation in which the sustainability of a country's 
entire economy, rather than its external debt position alone, crucially hinges upon its 
reliance on official flows. As a result of economic dependency on foreign aid, the 
concept of 'solvency', although fully applicable in the theoretical terms laid out 
above, is thus usually replaced w ith the concept of 'debt sustainability', denoting a 
condition that allows a country's debt to be "[...] serviced w ithout resort to 
exceptional financing or a major future correction in the balance of income and 
expenditure."22 By definition, then, a low-income country's debt sustainability hinges 
on the condition of positive net transfers in every period. In contrast, if the net 
transfers are negative, the country's debt becomes unsustainable, as current debt 
service cannot be met out of current disbursements of new loans. Besides the change 
in notation, however, the basic insights of the model outlined in  this section fully 
apply: in order for net transfers to remain positive, (existing) creditors have an 
incentive to provide relatively higher shares of gross transfers to countries with 
higher debt service. Moreover, the creditors' expectations w ith regard to a country's 
debt sustainability are of a self-fulfilling nature, since debt will be fully serviced, or 
suddenly become unsustainable, depending on the willingness of donors to provide 
positive net transfers through grants and loans.
2.4 The debt overhang hypothesis: new lending versus debt relief
N otw ithstanding the indeterminacy problem relating to a sovereign debtor's 
solvency, creditors have essentially three strategies to choose from in dealing with a 
non-performing or so-called 'problem ' debtor:
(51) stop lending to the country;
(52) re-lend the am ount necessary to avert a liquidity crisis and maximise 
collectable returns;
22 IDA and IMF (2004a: 8)
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(S3) reduce outstanding debt so as to align the scheduled repaym ent
stream w ith expected repaym ent capacity.
It was shown above that as a group, creditors should prefer strategy (S2) to strategy 
(SI). In contrast, each individual creditor w ould prefer (SI) to (S2), thereby free­
riding on the extension of new loans by other creditors. The debt literature shows this 
typical free-rider problem to require collective action measures, as opposed to pure 
market solutions, to bring about an efficient outcome. Such collective action measures 
may either take the form of voluntary collaboration among creditors, for example by 
means of syndicated actions and information sharing, or be enforced by coercive 
measures by creditor governments and multilateral institutions (Bulow and Rogoff, 
1988b; Cline, 1994; Krugman 1988a).
However, abstracting from the free-rider problem and focussing instead on the 
optimal response function relating to the group of creditors as a whole, one of the 
major contributions of the sovereign debt literature has been to dem onstrate that the 
lending strategy (S2) is less efficient than strategy (S3), involving partial relief, or 
forgiveness, of outstanding debt. Indeed, the debt overhang hypothesis, first 
advocated by Krugman (1988a, 1988b) and Sachs (1989), shows that if a debtor's 
response to a creditor's lending strategy is anticipated and internalised by the latter, 
debt relief can actually benefit both the creditor and the debtor, by contrast to the 
strategy involving new lending alone. This crucial insight found great resonance in 
the arguments pu t forward by the debt relief advocates23, and has since been adopted 
as the key rationale underlying the HIPC Initiatives, discussed in the previous 
chapter.
Debt overhang is typically defined as a situation in which creditors do not expect to 
be fully repaid because of the presence of a large debt burden affecting a country's 
willingness or capacity to service its commitments. More specifically, the debt 
litera tu re24 distinguishes two major channels through which an external debt 
overhang affects a debtor country's economic performance and repaym ent capacity: a 
disincentive effect, lowering the expected returns from investm ent (adjustment) that
23 Such as the Jubilee 2000 campaign, or Eurodad.
24 Besides Krugman (1988a, 1988b) and Sachs (1989), see Dooley (1989), Froot (1989), Froot et al. (1989), 
and the literature reviews by Basu (1997) and Cline (1994).
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will be partly taxed away through debt service obligations; and a cash-flow effect — or 
liquidity constraint -  as the result of debt service on the current level of investments 
(adjustment). This latter effect applies to any given level of future debt, and is thus 
different from the former incentive effect, which relates exclusively to the debt stock 
as such.
2.4.1 The pure disincentive effect from debt overhang
Turning first to the pure disincentive effect of a debt overhang, it is typically posited 
that the presence of a large debt stock distorts the incentives of both the creditor and 
the debtor. As was shown in the previous section, creditors could have an incentive 
to continue lending to a problem debtor in order to avoid a loss in terms of nominal 
reflows, in the hope that the debtor will eventually improve its economic conditions 
and repay all its debts at some point in the future. Similarly, the debtor may have the 
incentive to invest less, be it in term s of physical capital or overall development effort, 
because it expects any gains to be siphoned off by the debt service obligations 
ensuing from the large debt burden. By eliminating or reducing these distortions, 
debt relief could benefit both lenders and debtors, because the lenders could increase 
the likelihood that the remaining debt will be repaid in full, while the debtor w ould 
benefit from the growth-enhancing returns of otherwise unexploited investment 
opportunities.
These key intuitions have been best described in the simple terms of the Debt Laffer 
Curve, which was first introduced by Krugman (1988b) and has since entered the 
vocabulary used in the literature and policy debates alike. As shown in Figure 2.1, 
the Debt Laffer Curve relates the face and market values of a country's external debt, 
assuming that a secondary m arket for sovereign debt contracts exists. Up to some 
point in the upw ard-sloping section of the curve, the m arket value of debt (V) is 
equal to its face value (D), as the agents in the m arket expect debt to be fully repaid. 
Up to this am ount of outstanding debt, both existing creditors and new lenders are 
willing to extend further loans to the country. Beyond this level of debt, VID falls 
below the 45 degree line from the origin, and market price of outstanding debt (tan 
V/D) begins to decrease in D. Up to the point where the curve reaches a maximum
(idV/dD=0), incremental units of debt increase the m arket value of total outstanding 
loans. Thus, existing lenders w ould be keen to extend further loans to the country,






while new lenders w ould be reluctant to do so since new loans w ould immediately 
trade at a discount. The situation of debt overhang occurs w hen the debt level rises to 
a level high enough so that any further increase in D lowers the m arket value of 
outstanding debt (D/V) and its unit price (tan D/V). That is, above a certain threshold 
level, the m arket views the debtor as being not likely (or incapable) to repay debt in 
full and values outstanding debt accordingly. Therefore, if the debt overhang is such 
that dV/dD<0, creditors are m ade better off by partially w riting off their collective 
claims. Creditors' collective gain from a reduction in contracted paym ents is 
proportional to the impact on investment of the change in incentives, which is 
maximised w here dV/dD=0. Of course, debt relief will make the debtor similarly 
better off, by reducing the country's discouragement about increasing its repaym ent 
capacity, and thus economic growth and development.
Dooley (1989), Froot (1989), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), and Basu (1997) further 
emphasise the bilateral nature of benefits from debt relief accruing from increased 
investm ent and repaym ent capacity, as synthesised along the lines of Figure 2.2.25
25 This figure is proposed by Basu (1997:143 - Figure 6.6), who borrows from Dooiey (1989).
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Adopting a two-period framework, involving a problem -debtor w ho is temporarily 
cut off from access to fresh lending, the above figure displays the country's 
production possibility frontier along the line AB, w ith total production, as well as 
investment and consumption, m easured on the two axes. W ith no access to foreign 
capital, the country can only invest the fraction of output it decides not to use up  in 
current consumption. If the country chose to consume all available production in 
period 1 (equal to the distance OA), consumption in period tw o w ould have to be 
zero. Alternatively, a country could choose to invest part of its ou tpu t in period one,
Figure 2.2: The Benefits from Debt Relief




O A C, I (Period 1)
say A 'A , and consume the return on investment equal to A 'B ' in period two. If, 
however, the country has inherited a debt from previous periods that forces it to pay 
an am ount A 'B ' to its creditors in period two, its effective production frontier in the I- 
C space w ould shrink to FA'.26 Any investment less than A 'A  in period one would be 
both forgone consumption in period one, and a loss of consum ption in period two, as 
creditors w ould confiscate whatever output available. The effect of the country's debt
26 Assuming that creditors can force the country to fully comply with its debt obligations, i.e. by making 
the so-called 'gunboat' assumption.
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burden on its investm ent decision obviously depends on its indifference curves. 
Assume, as shown in Figure 2,2, that one indifference curve goes through point A, 
w ithout intersecting FA': the country w ould clearly be better off consuming OA  in 
period one, and investing nothing. This is the inefficiency of the disincentive effect, 
similarly to that em phasised in the Debt Laffer Curve above. Both debtors and 
creditors benefit from the removal of the incentive-distorting effect of a debt 
overhang. With first-period consumption at OA, creditors will be paid nothing. In 
contrast, if they were to forgive part of outstanding debt, say equal to the am ount 
FF", the effective production function w ould shift to A "F ". The debtor could now 
reach a higher indifference curve at point E, associated w ith positive investment in 
period one, and creditors w ould be repaid the difference between the original 
am ount of debt and the portion of debt forgiven, FF''. Compared to the scenario of no 
forgiveness, this w ould clearly represent a Pareto-improvement, as both debtor and 
creditor(s) w ould be m ade better off.
The im portant abstraction m ade in the basic overhang models is to treat the debtor 
country as a single economic agent. This assumption is m ade not only to manage the 
country's external debt, bu t also to take investment and consumption decisions. 
Combined w ith the 'gunboat'-assum ption of creditors being fully able to extract 
maximum repayments, this automatically maximises the implicit marginal tax on 
investment, and therefore the debt overhang effect. In practice, however, this chain is 
unlikely to be as tight as assumed on at least two distinct levels. At the governmental 
level, debt m anagem ent is typically conducted by a small fraction of the finance 
ministry, w ith limited influence on investm ent and consumption decisions, which 
often need to be endorsed by the parliament, and therefore w ith little overall 
influence over eventual repaym ent capacity (Sachs, 1990). At the level pertaining to 
the governm ent's interaction w ith the private sector, the debt overhang effect will 
depend on the governm ent's ability to raise revenues from its citizenry. Indeed, 
Husain (1997) shows that the taxation ability of the debtor governm ent is critical in 
determining the m agnitude of the debt overhang effect. He concludes that
"In order for the investment disincentive effects of external debt to be large enough to 
place a country on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve, the government must have 
at its disposal a tax tool with a very high marginal tax rate. [...] Hence, the analysis
implies that efficiency-enhancing debt reduction is possible only if domestic taxes in 
the debtor country are very high." (p.520)
Husain and Diwan (1989) make a related point by noting that individual investors do 
not necessarily internalise in their investment decisions the m arginal tax faced by the 
governm ent and the domestic investor community as a whole. It thus appears 
reasonable to agree w ith Froot (1989) in arguing that investment-incentive effects
"[...] should be interpreted in the broadest possible sense. They include concerns about 
debtor-government taxation as well a penalties imposed by creditors. They might also 
include the uncertainty about (not just the expectation of) future creditor and/or 
debtor-government policies. These uncertainties may discourage physical investment 
which are costly to reverse and encourage capital flight and investment in other non­
productive liquid assets." (p.68)
N um erous empirical analyses have investigated the presence of a negative causal 
relationship betw een the levels of external debt and investment, postulated by the 
debt overhang hypothesis. Overall, the empirical results from both cross-sectionial 
and longitudinal data analysis27, as well as country case s tud ies28 confirm the 
hypothesis, although most of the estimates tend to show the investment-depressing 
effect to be of low intensity. While these findings have also been confirmed in 
relation to the low-income countries29, we agree w ith Hansen (2004), who notes that 
the pure disincentive effects on investment ensuing from debt overhang are likely to 
be smaller for low-income than for middle-income countries, since the net transfers to 
the former have generally been positive and thus reduced the scope for negative 
incentives.
2.4.2 The liquidity-constraint from an excessive level of external debt
Besides the pure disincentive effect associated w ith a debtor's moral hazard problem, 
a debt overhang exerts a strong direct effect in the form of a liquidity constraint on a 
debtor's investm ent and growth opportunities. On the one hand, a country that is cut 
off from the credit markets or faces a binding limit in concessional disbursements
27 For example, see Fry (1989), Eaton (1990), Greene and Villanueva (1991), Diwan and Rodrik (1992), 
Cohen (1993), Kaminsky and Pereira (1996), Deshpande (1997), Pattillo et al. (2002), Clements et al. 
(2004), Imbs and Romain (2005).
28 For example, see Arrau (1990) on Mexico, Morriset (1991) on Argentina, Borensztein (1990) for a case 
study involving a 'representative' debtor country.
29 Many of the above studies (re: footnote no. 27) include a mixed panel of low- and middle-income 
countries. Other studies, such as Elbadawi et al. (1997), focus on the group of LICs as such.
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lacks the necessary funds to exploit high-yielding investm ent opportunities. As a 
result, its investm ent and growth opportunities, and thus repaym ent capacity and 
creditors' perception of solvency will be impaired. On the other hand, the liquidity 
shortage from a debt overhang may introduce further inefficiencies from its 
distorting effects on the debtor country's willingness to adopt reforms and 
adjustments, or generally lower its incentives for undertaking broader development 
efforts.
With regard to the direct effects of a liquidity constraint, it should be noted that these 
offer a theoretically distinct rationalisation of debt relief, com pared to the pure 
disincentive argum ent discussed above. Indeed, for the liquidity-constrained country 
debt relief can only be beneficial insofar as it effectively releases resources to the 
country, and this will only be the case if the am ount forgiven lowers debt service 
requirements below the level of actual debt service capacity before relief. In contrast 
to the effects of relief on a country's disincentive to invest, operating through the 
level of stock of debt, the liquidity effect works through a reduction in the actual, as 
opposed to legal debt service obligations. Therefore, debt relief will have an impact 
through the liquidity channel only insofar as it lowers debt service obligation to a 
level below the debtor's paym ent capacity (Bird and Milne, 2003).
Furthermore, the debt literature points out that if debt relief can alleviate a debtor's 
liquidity constraint and the associated inefficiencies, the same logic m ust also apply 
to the provision of liquidity through new lending. This role of new  lending, as 
opposed to its 'defensive' role, as outlined by Krugman (1988a), emphasises the 
stimulatory function of additional capital on debtor's investment, by taking 
advantage of high-return projects that w ould otherwise have been foregone, and 
allowing it to raise repaym ent capacity in the future. For example, Froot et al. (1989) 
emphasise this role of new lending, as a strategy maximising the value of creditors' 
claims, as compared to the strategy of debt relief alone, which exclusively raises 
expected returns. Indeed, they argue that if the liquidity effect of a debt overhang is 
considered, rather than a creditor's choice between financing and forgiving, there 
will be an optimal combination of the two. Following Froot et al. (1989), the basic
insight can be simply illustrated along the mechanisms of the Debt Laffer Curve, as 
shown in Figure 2.3.30 Consider a country with initial debt at Do and liquidity Lo. The 
expected market value of debt is equal to the vertical distance from the horizontal 
axis at point A. The removal of the disincentive effect by effect of debt relief would 
bring about the Pareto-improving movement to point B along the same Laffer curve. 
New lending releases the liquidity constraint on unexploited investment 
opportunities (or avoids the inefficiencies and distortions associated with 'bad '





policies), further increasing the benefits to creditors and the country. Also, new 
lending eases the liquidity-constrained debtor's time-discount constraint, lowering 
marginal utility of consumption. At point C, associated w ith new lending that shifts 
the curve to Li, creditors have increased the expected value of their claims through 
the alleviation of the liquidity constraint, while the debtors still benefit from the 
removal of the disincentive effect plus higher investment from new  lending. At point 
£, associated with an increase in liquidity up to Li, the benefits from new lending are 
maximised, and cannot be increased w ithout being more than offset by the increase
30 Froot et al. (1989 -  Figure 4).
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in the disincentive effect.31 It follows, therefore, that while debt relief alone can be a 
Pareto-improving strategy, it is not necessarily welfare-maximising. Further 
improvements, both in terms of debtor's and creditors' welfare, can be achieved by 
offering new  lending, thereby easing the liquidity-constraint on the debtor economy, 
exploiting foregone investment opportunities offering positive returns, and raising 
the expected value of repayments.
Sachs (2002, 2004) makes a related argument, w ith a specific focus on the least 
developed countries and the poverty trap they face due to an excessive debt burden. 
Assuming that the saving rate falls to zero when income is below subsistence levels32, 
Sachs (2002) sets real grow th as a function of the stock of physical capital, which is 
assumed to be accumulating as a function of the rates of saving, capital depreciation, 
and population growth. He then postulates that below a certain benchm ark value of 
capital, the saving rate plunges, so that the capital growth rate, thus economic growth, 
becomes negative and the country is effectively caught in w hat Sachs calls a 'poverty 
trap'. In order to escape such a trap and the growth-im peding effects from the severe 
liquidity constraint on investment, only a big push of new  lending and investment 
can help these countries to raise their stock of physical capital beyond the critical 
threshold. Furthermore, similarly to Froot et al. (1989), Sachs' model emphasises the 
requirem ent that debt relief accompany new lending, in order to eliminate the risk of 
a renew ed build-up of a liquidity-constraint over time, and thus to ensure lasting 
debt sustainability.
Beyond the saving and physical capital gaps em phasised by Sachs (2002), an 
im portant insight into the broader policy effects on liquidity-constrained debtor 
countries accrues from the structuralist three-gap models, first pu t forward during 
the early 1990s by Bacha (1990) and Taylor (1993). These authors emphasise the 
multiple requirements on external capital to overcome the three main gaps that 
typically influence a developing country's growth and debt sustainability prospects
31 Whether this point can be reached with zero debt relief depends on the profitability of investment 
opportunities relative to world interest rates, and the rise in the country's marginal utility from debt 
relief. Figure 2.3 displays a theoretical benchmark case for the sake of argument. In practice, creditors 
would most likely choose a combination of debt relief and new lending (see Froot, 1988).
32 More precisely, Sachs (2002) assumes that there are non-linearities in the saving, investment and 
production functions.
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during the early stages of development, namely to provide: additional financial 
liquidity, filling the savings gap; additional foreign exchange to finance the required 
intermediate and investment imports; and the necessary fiscal liquidity to overcome 
the internal transfer problem. In contrast to the earlier two-gap models, such as the 
seminal contribution by Chenery and Strout (1966) stressing the importance of the 
saving-investment and trade-balance gaps as the binding forces on developing 
countries' grow th prospects, Bacha and Taylor emphasise the double transfer 
problem accruing from the fact that debtor nations are required not only to run a 
trade surplus in order to service external debt denom inated in foreign currency, but 
also to run a fiscal surplus in order to finance the inter-linked foreign transfers 
accruing from indebtedness. Ultimately, as a result of excessive debt burdens, debtor 
countries w ould have to cut dow n on productive investm ent and forego long-term 
economic grow th and debt sustainability prospects.
In sum, the sovereign debt literature provides a strong rationale for debt relief as a 
means to overcome the weakening effects of the liquidity constraints resulting from a 
country's debt overhang. It thereby distinguishes between the liquidity-releasing 
effect of debt relief and the incentives-adjusting function, which the empirical 
literature has mostly shown to be of minor intensity. A key implication is that debt 
relief can also prove welfare-improving w hen a country is on the upward-sloping 
side of the Debt Laffer Curve, in contrast to its more limited scope as implied by 
Krugm an's original specification and subsequent interpretations.33 Furthermore, a 
clear case is m ade in favour of the welfare-maximising potential of a strategy 
involving a combination of debt relief and new  lending, whereby the welfare- 
increasing potential from new  lending is proportional to the severity of the liquidity 
constraint faced by the debtor country. The crucial policy issue is thus to address 
optimally the trade-off between the benefits from new lending -  reducing the 
liquidity constraint -  and the resulting upw ard pressure on the level of outstanding 
debt stock, which increases the disincentive implications over time.
33 This clearly counters the arguments by those claiming that debt relief would be beneficial only in the 
context of countries who are on the 'wrong', i.e. down-ward sloping side of the curve (e.g. Cline, 1995).
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It was shown above, however, that under conditions of uncertainty, the attainm ent of 
an optimal, incentive-compatible, solution to the trade-off between new  lending and 
debt relief constitutes a dilemma in the creditor's choice of the optimal strategy for 
maximising the value of existing debt. Such difficulties are exacerbated by 
informational asymmetries characterising the creditor-debtor relationship, which 
introduce im portant strategic elements complicating the definition of efficient 
mechanisms for solving a situation of debt overhang. Clearly, the basic theory of debt 
overhang outlined above does not sufficiently account for the complex dynamics 
involved in the debtor-creditor relationship. For example, the assum ption of creditors 
making a take-it-or-leave-it offer involving some am ount of debt relief and new 
lending certainly fails to capture the debtor's ability to bargain over the offer being 
made; the implicit assum ption of a strong enforcement mechanism, e.g. that 
conditionality will be enforced by creditors to the full extent possible, overlooks the 
costs of punitive actions to the lenders themselves; the assum ption that renegotiation 
of the original debt contract will only take place when the debtor is either incapable 
or unwilling to repay disregards the opportunity for strategic renegotiations to occur 
in an attem pt to change the original conditions of the contract. In order to account for 
these crucial aspects of the creditor-debtor relationship, a strand of theories within 
the sovereign debt literature has focussed on the optimal design of loan contracts, 
accounting for the effects of the terms and conditions of original loan contracts on the 
contracting parties' incentives, as well as the distribution of the bargaining power 
during subsequent renegotiations. By following a variety of alternative approaches, 
the predom inant literature has long pointed to the potential role of state-contingent 
debt contracts, as an optimal instrum ent to resolve the trade-off between creditors' 
lending and relief provisions in an incentive-compatible manner. The next section 
highlights the central insights accruing from this literature, focussing on state- 
contingent and incomplete contract theory.
2.5 Contract indexation and renegotiation -  the case for state-contingent 
sovereign debt contracts
Contract theory focuses on the optimal design of contracts, inducing economic agents
to comply fully w ith the obligations entailed. It thereby draw s an essential distinction
between the complete and incomplete nature of contracts. Consider that, ideally, a
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loan contract w ould specify all the obligations of the contracting parties in every 
possible future contingency. This w ould imply a complete definition, for all periods 
during the contracted relationship and of all actions to be taken by both the lender 
and the debtor in the event of every possible state of nature. For example, a complete 
debt contract w ould have to specify the am ount and direction of net transfer flows 
(i.e. repaym ent and additional loans), the interest on the rem aining debt, as well as 
the set of policy actions to be enacted by the borrow er (investment decisions, 
adjustment). Of course, uncertainty about the future makes the w riting of a complete 
contract essentially unfeasible. Furthermore, the inclusion of covenants covering all 
conceivable contingencies at the time of writing a contract w ould be prohibitively 
costly. As a result, the first-best situation of writing complete contracts, allowing risk- 
sharing over all possible future states of nature, does not occur in practice. Rather, 
contracts are vague or silent on a num ber of key features, and are typically subject to 
renegotiation after the occurrence of events that are not envisioned by the provisions 
of the contract.34
From the late 1980s onwards, the literature started to concentrate on the specific 
features of incomplete contracting. It does appear, however, that there is still no 
universally accepted definition of w hat actually constitutes an incomplete contract. 
For example, Tirole (1999: 743) notes that "while one recognises one w hen one sees it, 
incomplete contracts are not members of any well-circumscribed family; at this stage 
an incomplete contract is rather defined as an ad hoc restriction on the set of feasible 
contracts in a given model." In short, Tirole hints at the fact that while it makes sense 
to classify the approach of the modeller as either complete or incomplete, it is not 
very useful to make this distinction on contracts as such. For example, an observer 
contemplating only a limited set of contracts can identify the optimal contract among 
those considered, bu t could not exclude w ith confidence the possibility that another 
contract, outside the observation set, is superior. Hence, this individual w ould have 
chosen an incomplete contracts approach. If, on the other hand, the observer had 
found the same contract to be optimal by considering the whole set of possible 
contracts, he w ould have chosen a complete contracts approach. Hence,
34 For an introduction to basic contract theory, see Freixas and Rochet (1997). For a more comprehensive 
review of incomplete contract theory, see Tirole (1999).
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incompleteness can be most broadly thought of as referring to the justification of the 
analyst's choice.
In the subsequent discussion, we choose to define incompleteness by negation, i.e. as 
the category of contracts comprising all those that do not completely specify and 
regulate future states of nature. A typical case involving an incomplete contracts 
approach is when the states of nature are observable by the two parties, but cannot 
verified by an outside party. A court, therefore, w ould not be able to observe the state 
of nature, and hence would be unable to determine the contracted obligations of 
either party. In such cases, an incomplete contract w ould typically invest one party 
w ith the right to choose among a set of actions (e.g. sanctions) contingent on the 
realisation of a verifiable signal (e.g. default). However, to the extent that these 
verifiable signals are not perfectly correlated with the unverifiable states of nature, 
the invested party will act according to its own objective function and not necessarily 
choose the most efficient action. In other words, in the presence of moral hazard, 
there is scope for efficiency-enhancing renegotiation. In the context of incomplete 
contracting, the role of a contract is then to limit the tendency of agents to behave 
inefficiently, and also to set the stage for the bargaining game of renegotiations.
Within the narrow  class of models that are of particular relevance to the present 
study, the reference to incomplete contracting is usefully m ade in relation to the 
comparison of two alternative mechanisms of debt workouts: state-contingent 
instrum ents indexing repaym ent obligations to observable states of nature, on the 
one hand, and constant renegotiation mechanisms on the other. Before turning to our 
review of the most relevant contributions in the field, a more general framework 
outlines of the key issues involved and defines the analytical context for the 
following discussion.
2.5.1 A general conceptual framework of contract theory
Central to any contract is the enforcement mechanism that punishes non-complying 
behaviour. The various enforcement mechanisms discussed in the debt-literature will 
be recalled from our discussions in Section 2.2 above. Consider now that any 
combination of reputational and/or coercive punishm ent measures constitute the cost 
of default to the non-complying party. A rational debtor fulfils all contractual
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obligations if the costs (or, equivalently, the benefits) of doing so are smaller than the 
costs (benefits) of breaching the contract and suffering the penalties. That is, applying 
the most general notation:35
Cc(D, t, n) < C b( t, n) te{T}; ne{N} (15)
Where the cost to comply Cc is the cost to repay debt of am ount D, as a function of 
the characteristics of the debtor making up its typology, t, and the state of nature, n. 
Cb denotes the costs associated w ith the breach of contract obligations. These costs 
are also a function of type and nature. Clearly, penalties will depend on the specific 
state of nature, such as the occurrence of shocks, since the latter affect a debtor's 
likelihood of compliance. They also depend on the debtor's characteristics, such as a 
sovereign's ruling class time horizon of staying in power determ ining its valuation of 
reputational capital; the strength of ethical self-enforcement mechanisms; the 
structure of the debtor economy, for example in relation to production 
methodologies and exporting capacity.
Incapacity, as opposed to unwillingness to pay, can be thought of as an infinite level 
of Cc. T  constitutes the set of all possible types the debtor can belong to, including 
any characteristic that is of relevance in the lender-borrower relationship (e.g. 
national pride, productivity, quality of the bureaucracy, etc). The cost of compliance 
varies w ith the debtor's type. N  constitutes the set including any possible 
contingency, therefore any exogenous shock that could possibly influence the 
debtor's compliance w ith contractual obligations. More generally, it is assumed that 
the debtor's type influences its resilience, i.e. the degree to w hich exogenous shocks 
(the state of nature) affect compliance. For example, a well-run finance ministry is 
likely to fulfil the technical requirements better in the wake of a crisis; export 
diversification may pu t an economy in a position to cope better w ith a sudden drop 
in the export prices of prim ary commodities.
The most crucial set of assumptions in contract-theoretic models relate to the 
distribution of information. Clearly, symmetric and complete information about the 
set of possible and actual realisations of both t and n would pose few problems in
35 Borrowing and adapting from Tirole (1999), and Freixas and Rochet (1997).
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writing optimal contracts. The typical problems arise from asymmetric information, 
inducing adverse selection and moral hazard problems in relation to the type and 
actions of the debtor, against the background of a state of nature that is neither 
observable by the creditor nor verifiable by an outside court (or some arbitrator). 
Assuming that the debtor generally has a more complete set of information relating 
to both t and n than does any other party to the contract, the dynamic relationship 
between the parties to a debt contract will be extremely complex, starting w ith the ex 
ante-conditions necessary for both the creditor and the debtor to even agree to a debt 
contract in the first place.
To see the implications, consider that a rational creditor, assum ed to have no prior 
information about the debtor's type, gathers all information about t and n it can, so as 
to form its beliefs about the likelihood of default not occurring (i.e. for condition (15) 
to be fulfilled). Assuming the sets T and N  to be finite, to allow for analytical 
tractability, the creditor can be thought of as forming and ordering its beliefs about 
the expected value of repaym ent across all possible types and contingencies. 
Somewhat abusing notation, this is most easily expressed by equalling the expected 
value of repaym ent conditional on the creditor's belief, E(D\B), to the space 
delimited by the lower and upper delimitations to the sets of possible types and 
states of nature (Ti - Th, and Ni - Nn, respectively).
The creditor will then accept the contract under the condition that the expected value 
of repaym ent is higher than the opportunity cost of D, at the time of making the 
contract. That is, w ith j3 denoting the subjective time discount between the period of 
investment and expected return:
Similarly, the borrow er accepts the contract only if the expected benefits from doing 
so exceed the expected costs. In contrast to the lender, however, the borrow er knows 




E(D\B) > D p (17)
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Where Nm denotes the state of nature, draw n from an ordered set of states of nature, 
and which marks the point of indifference by the debtor between complying and 
breaching the contract, conditional on being of a certain type. Inequality (18) 
therefore expresses the ex-ante condition that the expected benefits from entering the 
contract be greater than the expected costs when compliance occurs (the first right- 
hand term), plus the expected costs associated with the breach of the contract (the 
second right-hand term).
It is now possible to see the ex-ante problems of writing the optimal, incentive-
compatible contract: in the extreme case, creditors adjust penalties to a level that
raises Cb to a point w here it will always be too costly to breach the contract. That is,
they set Cb > Cc V n, t. By lowering the expected benefits from agreeing to the contract
below the penalties, there will exist for every type of debtor the possibility that some
states of nature occur that will make compliance impossible. Hence, no contract will
be made. Similarly, if the creditor sets penalties at a level too low to create incentives
to repay, say equal to zero to take the extreme case, the expected return to its
investment will fall to zero, and therefore no contract comes into existence. For all
other levels of penalties, which fall between the two extreme cases, contracts could be
made on the basis of ex-ante incentives, but all of them are fraught w ith the problems
of adverse selection and moral hazard arising from asymmetric information about n
and f. In the ex-ante context, the adverse selection problem arises when the type of
the debtor is unobservable to the creditor. 'Bad' type debtors have the incentive to
apply for the loan even w hen they know they will not be able to repay it. As a result,
if creditors cannot distinguish 'good ' from 'bad ' type borrowers, credit rationing will
occur, for example along the lines of the model by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
Similarly, debtors have an incentive to misrepresent their type w hen filing for debt
relief, in order to induce an increase in the am ount offered. In contrast, moral hazard
concerns the incentive problem affecting the actions of the debtor after the contract
has been signed (i.e. ex post). To the extent that repaym ent capacity is affected by
debtor's actions, the creditor's return on investment is determ ined by the latter's
ability to identify actions that lower returns and credibly enforce penalties. However,
- 6 6 -
while higher penalties partially alleviate moral hazard problems ex post, they 
exacerbate the adverse selection problem ex ante, thereby tightening the credit 
constraint (Froot et al., 1989). Moreover, the threat of enforcing the penalty, although 
making lending possible ex ante, may not be credible ex post, after the actual breach 
of contract. Indeed, if imposing the penalty is costly to the creditor, the debtor will 
exploit the strategic situation and offer to renegotiate the contract, for example by 
offering a side-paym ent that leaves the creditor indifferent between accepting the 
paym ent and enforcing the penalty (Gale and Hellwig, 1989). More generally, the 
optimal contract solution does not concern the optimisation of ex-ante efficiency, but 
rather its ex-post efficiency, once the true type of debtor (t) has been revealed and the 
state of nature (n) has been realised, and incentives have changed accordingly. 
Therefore, when writing the initial contract, lenders and borrowers foresee 
renegotiation, and the ensuing sub-game equilibrium, which will be different from 
the equilibrium envisioned in the original contract. Rationally, the contracting parties 
will then consider the outcome of the sub-game equilibrium when calculating 
expected benefits. If, however, the renegotiation game has multiple equilibria, and 
the parties typically cannot pre-commit strategies due to the time-inconsistency 
problem, the outcome of the initial contract is essentially indeterminate.
Gale and Hellwig (1989) note in this respect that contract theory solves this 
indeterminacy by assuming that the parties will select the sub-game equilibrium that 
Pareto-dominates all others, at the time of writing the initial contract. It will be 
further shown below, in the discussion of the specific models, how  such an 
assumption is typically implemented. Here, the key point relates to the insight that in 
order to alleviate adverse selection and moral hazard problems, creditors w ould 
optimally distinguish excusable default, due to unanticipated events, from 
inexcusable breach of contract due to negative characteristics of the debtor. From a 
theoretical point of view, this essentially leaves two options to allow for the necessary 
contractual flexibility in high-risk or uncertain environments. If, in the period of 
scheduled repaym ent, information about the type of borrower and the realisation of 
the state of nature is observable by both parties and verifiable by the court, the 
optimal contract is m ade contingent on the state of nature. If, in contrast, information 
about t and/or n is asymmetric, a complete contract cannot be written, and the
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function of the contract is essentially to influence the bargaining pow er of each party 
in the bargaining process during the renegotiations of the original contract. The key 
contributions in relation to the two options are now outlined in turn.
2.5.2 State-contingent contracts and the incentive to invest (adjust)
The history of sovereign borrow ing suggests that defaults are usually associated w ith 
identifiable bad states of the w orld (nature). This is certainly true for low-income 
countries, and has widely been shown to be the case during the 1930s and 1980s debt 
crises.36 An im portant branch of the 1980s and 1990s debt literature has shown 
compellingly that if lenders are able to differentiate excusable defaults that are 
associated w ith identifiable contingencies outside the debtor's control, from outright 
debt repudiation and misbehaviour by the debtor, debt contracts can be designed in 
such a way that the debtor chooses in all states of the world to validate the lender's 
expectations. Furtherm ore, to the extent that lenders can distinguish the effects of 
exogenous shocks (nature) on repaym ent capacity from the effects of factors 
controlled by the debtor country, state-contingent repaym ent eliminates the 
disincentive effects of a debt overhang, and effectively solves the lending-relief trade 
off relating to lenders' choice of action.
Again, K rugm an's (1988a) seminal contribution provides an ideal starting point to 
illustrate the crucial advantages of indexed, or state-contingent, contracts. Returning 
to Krugm an's two-period model w ith reference to standard debt contracts, as 
introduced in Section 2.3 above, consider now a country that has inherited a stock of 
debt D, repays xi in period one, and has the following uncertain resource transfer 
potential in the second and final period:
X 2 = n + t  (19)
W here n is a random  variable ranging from Nt to Nh, and t is now  the choice variable 
capturing the outcome of the debtor's effort to adjust. In period two, the country 
consumes output X2 net of paym ent to the creditors, P.
C2=xz-P (20)
36 E.g. see Eichengreen and Portes (1986) and Sachs (1982).
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The country's social planner maximises utility by maximising consumption in period 
two net of the adjustment costs incurred in period one, v(t).
U=C2-v(t)= X2-P-v(t)= (n+t)-P-v(t) (21)
The incentive problem arising from new  lending, and the trade-off between new 
loans and debt relief was shown above. Now, consider instead that the creditor's 
claim is set to vary with the debtor's ability to repay, by making repaym ent a 
function of second-period expected output, where A  and B are two constant 
param eters set by the creditor:
P=A+Bxi 0<B<1 (22)
Thus,
Ch—xz-P— - A+(1-B)X2 (23)
And the debtor maximises expected utility over the whole range of possible states of 
nature:
A'„
t / “ p = j [ - A  + (1 -  B)(n +  t ) ] f (n)dn -  v(t) (24)
N,
Crucially, the first-order condition maximising expected utility,
SU/a = ( l - B ) - v ' ( t )  = 0, (25)
shows that in the case of output-indexation the incentive problem is not fully 
resolved, since the country will receive only a fraction (1-B) of the improved 
repaym ent capacity from adjustment. Hence, the trade-off between new lending and 
debt forgiveness is still present if the claim is linked to the debtor's broad ability to 
pay. Put differently, as long as effort (f) co-determines repaym ent by raising the 
expected value of period-two output, a fraction of the benefits will go to creditors. 
Therefore, a debtor in overhang will have less incentive to exert the optimal level of 
effort and increase repaym ent capacity.
Krugman (1988a) goes on to show that only by devising a mechanism linking 
paym ent exclusively to the state of nature, that is on n only, can the incentives 
problem be completely resolved. Crucially, the author has to adopt the assumption of 
perfect symmetry of information between the creditor and the debtor, both with
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regard to the exogenous (n) and the endogenous component (t) relating to paym ent 
capacity in period two. If such an assum ption does hold, a complete contract could 
specify paym ent to be independent from t:
P=A + n (26)
And the first-order condition w ould correspondingly be:
SE/St - 1 -  v'(t) = 0 (27)
Thus indicating that the benefits from increased effort w ould accrue to the country in 
full, since the paym ent only w ould depend on the realisation of n.
Krugman (1998a: 26) notes that creditors could still have the incentive to set the 
param eter A  in the repaym ent equation (26) high enough to set it equal to the optimal 
level t, "[...] so that they w ould provide the debtor w ith a marginal incentive to 
adjust yet in the end capture all of the debtor's potential resource transfer." However, 
this w ould not be possible, since im plying that in the event of low n actual repaym ent 
w ould exhaust the entire possible resource transfer capacity of the debtor, who, 
knowing this, w ould again have a disincentive to adjust.
Krugman further notes that the model equally applies to new  lending. Indeed, if 
creditors impose conditionality on new  loans and dem and maximum resource 
transfer (t+n) in every state of nature, the country will have no incentive to adjust. In 
contrast, by linking new  lending to the state of nature, the country will benefit from 
adjustment, and therefore the incentive to adjust will be higher. As a result, state- 
contingent loan instrum ents effectively resolve the trade-off between the two 
strategic choices open to the creditor community in dealing with debt overhang.
The main thrust of K rugm an's insightful model of contingent debt service is to have 
dem onstrated in the simplest possible terms that repaym ent indexed to the state of 
nature is a superior w ay of addressing the debt overhang problem, compared to 
simple loan contracts. Obviously, the optimality of indexation schemes crucially 
hinges upon the assum ption of a creditor's ability to observe all exogenous factors 
affecting repaym ent capacity. To the extent that they cannot, either because the state 
of nature can never be fully specified, or because it can only be imperfectly observed
and verified by anyone other than the debtor itself, some degree of disincentive 
limiting a country's willingness to perform will still be in place.
K rugm an's basic insights have found unusually wide acceptance -  and no substantial 
challenge -  in the subsequent literature. Similar acceptance and broad resonance has 
greeted two further influential contributions of the late 1980s, which elaborate on the 
implications of state-contingent debt contracts. One study, already m entioned above, 
is that of Froot et al. (1989), which confirms the central thrust of K rugm an's analysis, 
bu t further emphasises the limits resulting from asymmetric information. It argues 
that under symmetric information, contracts m ade contingent on variables that are 
not controlled by the debtor create no disincentive effects and lead to the first-best 
level of investment. In contrast, paym ent made contingent on variables under partial 
control of the debtor country, such as output and GDP, lead to moral hazard and a 
sub-optim al level of investment. However, Froot et al. (1989) also find that this may 
not be so under conditions of asymmetric information. In particular, they argue that 
if the creditors cannot fully observe the characteristics of the debtor, the latter will 
have an incentive to misrepresent its private information so as to receive higher debt 
relief and/or more new  loans. The authors conclude that this type of bargaining may 
thus raise the am ount of relief, bu t may also easily cause the negotiation process to 
break down, w ith creditors offering zero relief and debtors refusing to adjust - a 
situation they call a 'stonewalling' equilibrium.
A second study, by Grossman and Van Huyck (1988), elaborates a model of
contingent debt service, which assumes that creditors are able to distinguish
excusable default from unjustifiable repudiation. In contrast to the models devised by
Krugman and Froot et al., however, which implicitly dow nplay the debtor's ex-post
incentive to repudiate debt by focussing instead on the benefits from state-contingent
claims on investm ent decisions and the ensuing capacity to repay, Grossman and
Van Huyck pu t at the centre stage of their analysis the role of contingent debt service
in validating the lenders' expectations so that the sovereign chooses in all states to
validate these expectations. The authors derive a reputational equilibrium w here
consumption sm oothing is achieved by making debt service contingent on the
realisation of income. That is, the sovereign services the full am ount due only when
the state of nature is such that the realisation of income is high. Otherwise, the
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sovereign defaults either in full or in part. However, continued access to loans is 
assured to the sovereign even after the event of default, as long as it validates 
lenders' expectations on debt service. A crucial assumption for this to hold is to 
abstract from savings by the sovereign, so that the Eaton-Gersowitz (1981) 
punishm ent strategy of no future borrow ing in the case of inexcusable default w ould 
limit the sovereign's future consumption stream to future realisations of income. 
More specifically, the main analytical structure of the model is based on the following 
assumptions: The sovereign invests in a concave risk-free productive technology37 
and services debt in such a way as to shift to creditors the risk associated w ith 
negative stochastic shocks on income. The authors emphasise the insurance role of 
state-contingent debt service, noting that
"By borrowing an amount equal to the maximum indemnity for which it would 
contract, a large agent like a sovereign who wants to insure itself against the effects 
of bad states of the world can draw 011 the resources of many small and anonymous 
insurers, with whom it would be costly to write and to enforce contracts requiring 
the payment of an indemnity after the realisation of a bad state of the world." 
(Grossman and Van Huyck, 1989:1089)
The essential assumption, as in Krugman and Froot et al. (1989), is that the exogenous 
stochastic component of income is verifiable, so that lenders can distinguish 
excusable from unjustifiable repudiation. Lenders are assum ed to be also informed 
about the sovereign's time discount rate and its utility function U(c). The analysis 
further assumes that current consumption is exclusively m ade out of past borrowing, 
and not of current debt issuance or domestic savings. Thus, current consumption (a) 
in period t is equal to the return from the last period's borrow ing f(bti), plus the 
stochastic income component zt, m inus current debt service si.
ct=f(bt-i) + zt+st  b t - i > 0 , s t > 0  (28)
Where [f(bt-i) + zt] can be regarded as the sovereign's real national income, w ith zt 
reflecting the random ness of factors affecting national income, such as shocks 
affecting export commodity prices. The realisations of the state of nature, zt, range 
from a good state Z, to a w orst state, z, and are assumed to have a stationary
37 Which is assumed to be available only to itself and not to the creditors. Furthermore, the technology is 
assumed to be risk-free for the purpose of focussing exclusively on the risks accruing from the 
realisations of bad states of nature, and not the economic risk of investment itself.
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probability distribution, p(zs), w ith mean za, These assum ptions imply that the 
sovereign faces a repeated static problem, in which the sovereign's objective in each 
period t is to maximise utility given the expectations conditional on information 
available in f:
U l = u ( c t ) + E l J > rK(cr ) (0<P<1) (29)
r= t+ l
The expected value of repaym ent is the product of repaym ent associated with each 
state of nature and the probability of such a state of nature occurring, across all 
possible states of nature. This expected value sets the credit constraint imposed by 
lenders:
Y  P(z , )Sl \  Or ) = 0  + P )b,-\ w
z
Where (z t ) denotes the debt service lenders in period t-1 expect to be m ade in 
period 1.
If creditors were able to irrevocably and credibly commit in period t-1, to repay debt 
according to the state-contingent contract, such a commitment w ould allow excusable 
default, depending on zi, bu t w ould exclude debtor's repudiation. In short, if lenders' 
expectations on repaym ent due to the perfect commitment technology are:
s.=5;_1(zr) = 5/_1(zi) (31)
the sovereign's choice in period t-1 concerns uniquely the am ount of new borrowing, 
that is bt-i, and the debt servicing commitment on new  debt, bu t not the am ount of 
income to be devoted to servicing existing debt, Sf. Hence, the solution to the social 
planner's maximisation problem  (29) under constraints (28), (30) and (31) are such 
that, in each and every period:
b* = max [f'(bt-i)=l+p; (za-z)/(l+p)] (for all t) (32)
W here b* represents the efficiency-maximising level of debt, which is high enough 
both to allow for the maximisation of returns on investment [marginal return on the 
investment f(bt-i) equal to the risk-free interest rate (1+p)], and, as Grossman and Van 
Huyck (1989:1091) pu t it, "for its lenders to prepay the indem nity associated w ith the 
worst possible state of the world". This indemnity corresponds to the discounted risk
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factor expressed as the difference between the stationary mean and the worst state of 
the world (za-z). Clearly, then, if f(bi-i)=l+p > (zn-z)/(l+p), full risk-shifting would 
require borrow ing beyond the level required for efficient investm ent alone.
Moreover, optimisation requires debt service commitment to be fully contingent, so 
that:
S*(zt) = z/-z" + (l+p)b* (for all t) (33)
That is, the 'norm al' debt service requirem ent (l+p)b* is increased (or decreased) by 
the difference between the realisation of z and the mean value of z, z".
It is easy to see that in the best state of world, such a repaym ent commitment w ould 
allow debt to be serviced in full (as Z-z" represents the maximum payable), while in 
the w orst state (z-z17) total default w ould occur. In contrast, all other realisations 
z<zi<Z w ould im ply partial default. In sum, this repaym ent scheme would shift all 
the risk to the lenders, so that consumption w ould be independent from the 
realisations of z:
c* = f(b*) -  (l+p)b* + za 38 (for all t) (34)
Since the model assumes consumption smoothing to be the function of international 
borrowing, utility is maximised w ith consumption at c* for all t.
The first key result in the Grossman and Van Huyck model is thus to show that 
shifting the risks associated with exogenous shocks affecting repaym ent from the 
borrow er to the creditor is the optimal repaym ent strategy w hen lenders are 
informed about the debtor's characteristics (here fi), and if the latter is able to 
irrevocably commit to repay up to its capacity. In this model, the lender thus 
explicitly acts as the insurer, w ho takes upfront all the indem nity paym ent by 
factoring it, via ' ^ p ( z t)S t’_x(zt), into its expectations of repaym ent. It is im portant to
emphasise, however, that indemnity relates to the sovereign's exposure to risk, and 
not to the risks associated with the investment technology itself, which is purposely 
assum ed to be risk-free. W hat creditors do, instead, is simply to acknowledge ex ante
38 Note that equation (34) is derived by substituting for b*=(za-z)/(l+p) and S*(zt)= zt-za + (l+p)b* into 
equation (28).
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the risk component of investm ent associated w ith verifiable realisations of zi. Clearly, 
there would be no lending if the borrow er were not able to treat the lenders' 
expectations on debt service as a choice variable, depending on its own actions to 
validate those expectations. In other words, if the borrow er w ere to choose si in a way 
to increase current consum ption c\, instead of choosing St so as to validate the lenders' 
expectations on St, utility maximisation w ould imply setting st equal to zero. W ithout 
commitment, lenders w ould thus expect si to equal zero in all periods, and, typically, 
lending w ould not take place.
In relation to all the interm ediate instances, characterised by imperfect commitment 
mechanisms by the borrower, the authors dem onstrate that a reputational 
equilibrium can be achieved as long as actual debt service validates the lenders' 
expectations in a self-confirming manner. That is, even in the case of St being a choice 
variable of the borrower, it will validate debt service expectations, if "the am ount of 
debt and associated debt-servicing expectations are such that the short-run gains 
from repudiation are smaller than the long-run costs from loss of trustw orthy 
reputation." Thus, the authors conclude, "although sovereigns sometimes excusably 
default, they always resist the temptation, which is greater in the good state of the 
world, to repudiate their debts" (Grossman and Van Huyck, 1989: 1097).
In sum, although seen from three slightly different angles, all three models reviewed 
in this section represent w idely acclaimed contributions, which have highlighted the 
supremacy of state-contingent contracts over simple loan contracts. As the most 
crucial assum ption to make for this proposition to be true, they point to the 
requirem ent that lenders be fully able to observe contingent realisations affecting a 
debtor's repaym ent capacity, so as to distinguish betw een excusable and unjustifiable 
default. If that is the case, fully contingent debt contracts that never call for paym ent 
higher than either the debtor's actual capacity to pay, or the am ount the country 
w ould expect to receive by initiating the bargaining process of renegotiation, would 
never be required to actually be formally renegotiated. In this sense, full state- 
contingency of a debt contract rules out renegotiation. In all other circumstances, 
renegotiation will occur at any time the original contract is considered inefficient ex­
post. This last scenario is the focus of our next section.
2.5.3 Contract renegotiation and the bargaining game
There are essentially two reasons for renegotiation: the occurence of events that are 
not envisioned in the original contract, and limited contract enforceability. In the first 
case, renegotiation is either a substitute for costly contractual complexity, or the 
response to surprise factors that could not have been foreseen ex ante. W hether due 
to bounded rationality or simply myopic behaviour by the contracting parties, the 
latter specify only a small subset of actions in the event of the most likely 
circumstances. In the second case, if the enforcement agency is unable to observe 
some actions or param eters of the contract, the set of feasible contracts is restricted to 
those that can be fully validated in court. In principle, if both parties to the contract 
symmetrically observe the source of uncertainty about future states of the world, and 
the realisations of contingencies can be validated by an outside entity (court, 
arbitrator), it w ould be possible to im plem ent efficient state-contingent contracts. 
More generally, if the set of possible contracts were unlimited, the need for 
renegotiation w ould never arise. This is so, because rational agents w ould be able to 
fully anticipate ex ante the outcome from renegotiation of the original contract by 
backward induction, and could fully account for sub-game equilibria in the initial 
contract. With no limit to the complexity of the contract, any possible sub-game 
equilibrium that w ould be achievable by renegotiation can be substituted by a 
contract, which simulates ex-ante all possible ex-post announcem ents by the parties 
and describes for any such announcem ent the interpretation to be given. The result is 
thus a complex, fully-comprehensive contract w ith no renegotiation.39 However, 
writing complex contracts is costly, therefore simple and incomplete contracts are 
likely to be more efficient even if it were possible to write complete contracts. Indeed, 
an im portant strand of literature dem onstrates the desirability of simple, incomplete 
contracts, which can achieve ex-post efficiency at low contracting costs, by allocating 
the bargaining pow er between the parties (e.g. residual control rights) in such a way 
as to induce them  to bargain tow ards the Pareto-frontier.40 In any case, if contract 
param eters (e.g. actions) are unverifiable, making the validation by an outside entity
39 See Tirole (1999) for an interesting discussion on the limits of writing complete contracts.
40 See Schmitz (2001) and Hart and Moore (1998) for an extensive discussion on this point. See Grossman 
and Hart (1986) for their seminal contribution on contractual theory relating to the allocation of residual 
rights.
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impossible, renegotiation of the contract cannot be prevented by the original contract. 
As a result, renegotiation will occur w henever the parties' preferences over the 
feasible set of contracts change after the values of unverifiable param eters are 
realised.
Any analysis taking stock of the advances made in the vast literature focussing on the 
broad implications of optimal contract renegotiation w ould lead our discussion far 
beyond the issues of interest to the later parts of this study. Therefore, the attention in 
this section will be limited to providing a brief overview of the basic theoretical 
structure underlying renegotiation games along the lines of H uberm an and Khan 
(1988), whose framework ideally illustrates the main implications. In line with the 
typical approach adopted in this category of models, the authors make the standard 
assumptions of limited contract enforceability, on the one hand, and high costs 
associated with extreme contract complexity on the other. While appearing 
reasonable, these assum ptions are conducive to showing that it will still be possible 
for renegotiation to occur for strategic reasons, even if there is no uncertainty about 
future contingencies and the drafting of a complete contract w ould thus in principle 
be feasible. Indeed, if some param eters of the contract are unverifiable, hence not 
enforceable, renegotiation will occur w hether or not unforeseen contingencies arise.
To see this, consider the most general structure of a game underlying the relation
between two players, say a borrow er (Player I) and a creditor (Player II). Here, the
relation is assum ed to originate from a loan disbursed to the borrow er in a previous
period. The payoffs of the sequential game depend on the choice of action (Invest,
Consume) taken first by Player I, and afterwards by Player II (Penalty, No Penalty).
Both actions are observable by either player, bu t only Player II's choice is assumed to
be verifiable by an outside court. The pay-offs are co-determined by the debtor's
investment decision, and the state of nature. The latter is observable by the debtor,
but not by the creditor. Table 2.1 lists the payoffs corresponding to each combination
of actions. The pair of actions (7, N) is assumed to represent the Pareto-optimal move.
That is, g+h > e+f, i+j, r+s. Assume that both parties can make contract offers between
subsequent moves. Having assum ed the actions of Player I to be unverifiable, a
contract specifies a pay-off to be made by Player II to Player I as a function of its
actions, bu t not the other w ay round. In terms of Table 2.1, this is achieved by
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superim posing the contracting structure over the technological structure of the 
underlying game.41 The total payoff to either party is the sum of the game pay-offs 
plus the side-paym ents p and n, w hich can also be negative. Assume that contracts 
can be renegotiated at any time between subsequent moves, and that the surplus of 
renegotiation is split between the parties in proportions (c, 1-c).
Table 2.1: Renegotiation Model
(adopted from H uberm an and Khan, 
1988)
Player II (Creditor)
Penalty (P) No penalty (N)
Player I Invest (I) e+p, f-p g+n, h-n
(Debtor)
Consume (C) i+p, j~p r+n, s-n
Consider first the no-contract case. Assume player I moves first, playing I, i.e. the 
debtor chooses to invest the am ount borrowed. Consequently, if h>f, Player II plays h, 
thereby reaching the Pareto optim um  outcome. Clearly, there will be no contract 
acceptable to either party, as no contract exists that could increase both Player I and 
IPs pay-offs above g and h, respectively. This is not so if h<f, w hereby player II w ould 
play P as a response to player Ps choice to invest. It may be assumed, for instance, 
that the pay-off is low because of the realisation of the bad state of nature, which is 
unobservable by the creditor. With pay-offs equal to the pair (e, f), both players can 
be m ade better off by negotiating an agreement, before player II moves, which 
specifies suitable side-payments of the amounts p, n / 2 so as to change the gross pay­
off structure in such a way as to ensure Player II is better off by playing N. This will 
be the case if (h-n)>(f-p) or, equivalently, (h-f)>(n-p). The joint gains, i.e. the Pareto-
41 See Tirole (1999) and Salanie (2005) for a discussion on the super-imposing characteristic of contract 
theory upon game theory.
42 In the specific example at hand, it makes sense to view the side-payments from player II to I as 
assuming a negative sign, as it is more likely that the debtor will have to make concessions in order to 
avoid punishment. However, the general logic applies either way round.
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improvement, from w riting such a contract are therefore (g+h)-(e+f). Depending on 
the bargaining pow er of the parties in the negotiation over the side-payments n and p, 
the contracting gain is split in proportions (c, 1-c). Thus, the pay-off structure after 
renegotiation is c[(g+n)-(e+p)] for Player I, and (l-c)[(h-n)-(f-p)] for player II, which 
defines the division of the gains from contractual cooperation.
It should be noted that the above example applies to any possible combination of 
moves, dem onstrating that if parties can renegotiate an original contract, they will 
always have an incentive to do so if a contract exists that leaves them both better off 
after renegotiation. Moreover, since both debtors and creditors are time-inconsistent 
with regard to their ex-ante and ex-post incentives to invest and penalise, 
respectively, ex-ante efficient contracts will have to be renegotiated so as to adapt to 
the change in the incentives to take Pareto-optimal actions ex post. Ultimately, 
renegotiation will always take place if contracts are not fully state contingent, and the 
fulfilment of contractual obligations cannot be validated.
2.6 Concluding rem arks
The sovereign debt literature constitutes a vast and fascinating area of study, to 
which a brief review cannot possibly do justice. This chapter has therefore focussed 
on highlighting some of the m ost crucial insights from this literature, which we 
believe are sufficiently compelling in order to provide a sound theoretical 
underpinning of the proposal for state-contingent debt contracts advanced in this 
thesis. In particular, we have shown that since the late 1980s a num ber of im portant 
contributions have provided a clear dem onstration of the desirability for debt 
contracts to be indexed to a sovereign's repaym ent capacity, as determined by the 
state of nature. We have laid out the conditions under which fully indexed debt 
contracts will be feasible in achieving an incentive-compatible solution to the debt 
overhang problem affecting sovereign debtor nations, and serve as an instrum ent 
solving the lending-relief dilemm a characterising the lender's optimal response 
strategy.
Of course, such conditions will never be fulfilled in practice, as there will always be 
some degree of asym m etry of information pertaining to the factors determining a 
debtor's repaym ent capacity. However, far from underm ining the case for incomplete
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contingent contracting, such imperfections in the distribution of information have 
been shown to be optimally addressed by timely renegotiation, whereby the residual 
rights are carefully allotted according to the revelations of the parties to the contract. 
Ultimately, it w ould appear that the orderly solution to debt overhang w ould have to 
involve a combination of state-contingent mechanisms, capturing a debtor country's 
paym ent capacity for all possibly observable and verifiable states of nature, and 
allow for renegotiations according to the residual factors affecting the contract's 
outcome. In relation to the latter, an im portant and often neglected insight from the 
literature relates to the incentive-compatibility of new lending in response to 
situations of illiquidity, provided that a sufficiently strong enforcement mechanism 
be in place to control for the debtor's actions outside the realm of the self-enforcing 
contingency mechanisms.
Despite the almost univocal call for state-contingent debt contracts from the vast pool 
of theoretical wisdom, it appears so far to have been largely ignored or 
m isinterpreted by the donor community in dealing with the daunting task of putting 
an end to the debt crisis involving the low-income countries. Indeed, as the second 
part of this study dem onstrates, the current debate and international efforts are still 
far from moving tow ards an im plem entation of state-contingent debt contracts as 
advocated on theoretical grounds. Rather, the recent thinking appears to be evolving 
through some feeble attem pts at linking low-income countries' debt paym ents to 
narrow  measures of servicing capacity, thus failing to make the crucial distinction 
between a debtor's repaym ent capacity as such and the role of the state of nature in 
determ ining it. Against the wealth of contributions dealing w ith these crucial aspects 
in almost every imaginable detail, the current state of affairs in international policy­
making takes on an even more dire aspect if considered against the background of 
low-income countries' universally acknowledged exposure to exogenous shocks. 
Indeed, as m entioned in the previous chapter, it is largely such shocks, mostly 
accruing from unfavourable states of the world, that have been shown to be prim arily 
responsible for further deterioration of the debt problem in low-income countries, 
despite massive relief operations. In an attem pt to rectify the current approach to 
state-contingent debt contracts and to align it with the key tenets from the literature
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reviewed in this chapter, the third and final part of this study outlines our own 
proposal for a comprehensive contingency debt sustainability framework.
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Part II
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3 The Shortcomings of the N ew  Debt Sustainability  
Framework
3.1 Introduction
The w idespread recognition of the HIPC Initiative's lim ited achievements in 
providing lasting resolution to poor countries' external debt problem s induced the 
International Developm ent Association of the World Bank and the International 
M onetary Fund to devise a New Debt Sustainability Fram ework (DSF) for low- 
income countries. Breaking w ith the HIPC Initiative's rigid application of uniform 
benchmarks, in early 2004, a series of joint staff papers introduced the notion of 
policy-dependent debt thresholds, as the central pillar on which to base the new 
multilateral approach. Essentially, this approach consists in the assessment of low- 
income countries' debt sustainability against indicative threshold values of external 
debt burden indicators, which vary according to any country's ranking according to 
the W orld Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). The empirical 
underpinning of the CPIA-based approach to debt sustainability assessm ent arises 
from two separate background studies by the World Bank and IMF. There, the BWI 
claim to have found robust evidence for a positive relationship between policy 
performance, vulnerability to external shocks and the level of external debt, which 
low-income countries are norm ally1 able to sustain w ithout experiencing a situation 
of distress over time. As a corollary to this finding with regard to policy performance, 
the BWI argue that low-income countries' external debt sustainability w ould 
optimally have to be assessed against indicative threshold values inform ed by CPIA 
rankings, rather than against thresholds that are uniform ly applied across all the 
LICs, as it had hitherto been practised by the HIPC Initiative and the Debt 
Sustainability Analyses (DSA). However, in contrast to the central role assigned to 
the CPIA, and despite acknowledging the existence of a causal link between LICs'
1 'Normally' is here intended to signify as an average assessment across low-income countries, along the 
cumulative density function of the (normal) Gaussian distribution.
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vulnerability to external shocks and the occurrence of debt distress, the BWI have 
chosen to relegate vulnerability merely a subsidiary im portance w ithin the new DSF.
The stated aim of the DSF is to "guide borrowing decisions of low-income countries 
in a way that matches their need for funds with their current and prospective ability 
to service debt, tailored to their specific circumstances."2 However, w ith negotiations 
for the 14th replenishm ent of IDA financing (IDA14) well under w ay at the time of its 
release, the DSF proposal was mainly tailored tow ards accommodating the 
incorporation of debt sustainability considerations into the IDA lending process. 
After all, the 13lh IDA replenishment, concluded in 2002, had introduced debt 
sustainability concerns as one of the criteria for accessing LICs' eligibility for IDA 
grant financing, but w ithout making the degree of grant financing dependent on a 
country's actual or potential risk of debt distress. By providing this missing element, 
the proposed DSF was centrally instrum ental to the ongoing IDA14 negotiations, in 
the sense of integrating the framework's implications for multilateral grant financing, 
far beyond the aim of addressing debt sustainability concerns per se.
To that end, and concomitantly w ith the discussions relating to the DSF, a series of 
IDA background papers further elaborated on the options for incorporating the 
proposed CPIA-debt burden thresholds nexus into a viable formula for determining 
the grants share of the overall IDA country financing envelope. Borrowing from the 
typical WTO nomenclature, it was eventually agreed to devise a so-called 'traffic 
light system', which classifies countries according to their risk of debt distress on the 
basis of CPIA-dependent debt thresholds. Thereby, policy-dependant debt threshold 
rankings are effectively translated into debt distress risk rankings, on the basis of 
which the grants share of a country's overall IDA financing is to be determined.
By critically evaluating each of the building blocks underlying the new DSF, 
including the empirical underpinning pu t forward by the BWI, we assess in this 
chapter the likely implications of this framework on low-income countries' debt 
sustainability prospects and the broader aid allocation process. We reach the 
conclusion that despite its desirable aim of bringing about a closer inter-linkage 
between the decision-processes guiding aid allocation and debt sustainability, the
2 IMF and IDA (2004a: 4)
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new DSF-IDA14 framework actually causes debt sustainability to succumb to the 
prerogatives of the aid allocation framework, at the cost of severely underm ining 
low-income countries' debt sustainability prospects. For, to ensure compatibility with 
the performance-based framework characterising the aid allocation process, the DSF 
has been hinged upon a fictitious CPIA-centeredness, which is largely 
unrepresentative of the causal factors determ ining debt sustainability. Put differently, 
we posit that while the new approach is certainly supportive of the existing aid 
allocation fram ework and the m ovement tow ard increasing shares of multilateral 
grant financing, its benefits in terms of debt sustainability w ould ultimately hinge on 
the validity of the postulated relationship between LICs' CPIA performance and their 
debt-carrying capacity. However, after re-assessing the empirical evidence put 
forward in support of the causal link between CPIA and debt distress, we find that 
the centrality of CPIA is essentially unsubstantiated, and that all evidence points to 
the crucial role of economic vulnerability and external shock factors in explaining 
LICs' distress episodes. On these grounds, we reach the conclusion that by failing to 
devise a mechanism to effectively protect vulnerable countries against the impacts 
from external shocks, the DSF-IDA14 framework is inevitably bound to fail the LICs, 
once again, in meeting their aim of achieving lasting debt sustainability.
The rem ainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the central 
elements of the DSF-IDA14 framework. Section 3.3 discusses the main shortcomings 
of the framework, and reassesses the IMF empirical analysis featuring the CPIA as a 
key predictor of debt distress. Section 3.4 summarises our main findings and draw s 
the conclusions.
3.2 The IDA-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework and IDA Aid Allocation
In April 2005, the Executive Boards of the IMF and the W orld Bank endorsed the 
New Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income countries, which had previously 
been outlined and discussed in a num ber of official reports released since early 2004.3 
In March 2005, the IDA concluded the negotiation process w ith regard to its 14th 
replenishment period, establishing the guidelines for the allocation of aid among
3 IMF and IDA (2004a, 2004b, 2005a)
- 85 -
eligible member countries during the period 2005-2008. Since the main focus of the 
discussions relating to the IDA replenishment had been on the debt sustainability 
implications of IDA financing, the new DSF constituted an integrating component of 
the new terms of aid allocation.4 Finally, in recognition of the unsuitability of the 
newly established debt sustainability and IDA allocation frameworks for dealing 
with low-income countries' exposure to large exogenous shocks, in 2005 the W orld 
Bank released its report evaluating a num ber of proposals to address the apparent 
gap left open by the extant frameworks.5
Chart 3.1 shows how  the main elements of the DSF and IDA14 frameworks relate to 
each other, and also includes as a third, related, pillar the recently envisaged World 
Bank proposals for linking concessional debt service to debtors' capacity to pay. The 
various building blocks of both the DSF and IDA allocation are described in turn, 
before turning to an in-depth examination of their shortcomings in relation to the 
overall implications of the DSF.
The Performance Based Allocation System:
The core of the IDA14 allocation process results is essentially unchanged w ith respect 
to previous replenishments, to the extent that it centres on the Performance Based 
Allocation (PBA) system. The PBA rewards IDA-eligible countries6 achieving a 
positive assessment in terms of high CPIA scores and broad compliance w ith IDA 
policy prescriptions w ith a higher proportion of overall IDA allocation. The upper 
left-hand panel of Chart 3.1 shows the country's performance-based rating (PBR) to 
be derived from a LIC's combined score in the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA), the Annual Report on Portfolio Performance (ARPP) relating to 
World Bank lending, and a special governance factor which is mostly derived from 
the CPIA. To a lesser extent, IDA allocation is also informed by borrow ing countries' 
population and per capita gross national income, used as a measure of these 
countries' need for aid. Both measures of performance and needs are then entered 
into a simple PBA allocation formula, which has been criticised for assigning a
4 As discussed in IDA (2004a, 2004b, 2005a).
5 IDA (2005b)
6 The criteria for eligibility are relative poverty (less than U.S. Dollars 965 in terms of 2004 GNI per 










































































































disproportional w eight to the performance factor, thus introducing a substantial 
conditionality bias to the allotm ent mechanism of IDA finance (Kanbur, 2005; 
Nissanke, 2006). Indeed, the distribution of shares to eligible recipient countries out 
of the overall IDA envelope is determ ined essentially on the basis of CPIA and 
governance rankings alone. Only in exceptional circumstances is the overall IDA 
Country Allocation Strategy (CAS) adjusted in light of countries' access to alternative 
W orld Bank lending, or their emergence from conflict or natural disaster (Chart 3.1).
The crucial novelty introduced by the new DSF and IDA14 concerns the 
m ethodology applied to assess borrowing countries' debt sustainability, which, in 
turn, determines the share of grants in country allocations. As mentioned above, 
IDA13 replenishm ent had already introduced grant financing in the year 2002, for the 
first time in W orld Bank's long history of credit disbursements. It did so by making 
eligibility for grant disbursements contingent on a country facing an unsustainable 
debt position, am ong other criteria. However, IDA13 allocation lacked the 
specification of a mechanism by which a country's risk of debt distress, or debt 
sustainability, could be assessed in a manner that could be used to directly inform the 
appropriate share of grant financing. Rather, grant allocation to a specific country 
was bound to an upper limit of 40 per cent, and the actual share was made 
dependent on the specific criteria determ ining its eligibility for grants.7 In contrast, 
IDA14 closes this gap by devising a system for classifying countries according to 
their risk of encountering debt distress, which in turn is determ ined on the basis of 
the new DSF. The latter applies a two-pronged approach to assessing a country's 
ability to service debt over time on the one hand, and to determ ining a sustainable 
path of borrow ing/lending decisions, on the other. The first step consists in defining 
external debt burden  thresholds against which a country's external debt is to be 
assessed. This static approach is then integrated by a second, more dynamic analysis, 
which consists in forward-looking threshold assessments in the context of 
macroeconomic projections under alternative scenarios. The central column of Chart
3.1 stylises the two central elements of the DSF and their role in determining the
7 Tine criteria determining grant eligibility included post-conflict situations, natural disasters, HIV/AIDS 
and debt sustainability. For a detailed description of IDA13, see IDA (2002).
grants/loan mix of IDA financing: (i) indicative debt-burden thresholds and (ii) debt 
sustainability analysis.
Indicative Debt-Burden Thresholds:
The main element of the DSF consists in the definition of country-specific debt 
burden thresholds. Similarly to the earlier debt sustainability analyses conducted by 
the BWI, the debt burden is expressed against broad measures of repaym ent capacity, 
including the ratio of the N et Present Value (NPV) of debt to exports or GDP, as well 
as the ratio of yearly debt service paym ents to exports. However, instead of 
establishing common threshold values of debt ratios across all LICs, the new DSF 
makes these indicative values contingent on a country's CPIA ranking, based on the 
presum ption that "countries operating in a weaker institutional and policy 
environm ent are likely to experience debt distress at significantly lower debt ratios, 
as such countries tend to be more prone to misuse and m ism anagem ent of funds and 
less capable of using their resources productively".8 Both the methodology to derive 
indicative thresholds and the empirical evidence allegedly supporting the BWI's 
hypothesis are based on the probabilistic panel analyses conducted independently by 
the staff of the IMF and W orld Bank, which are evaluated below. It suffices here to 
focus on their m ain outcome, listed in the left-hand panel of Table 3.1: categorising 
countries as poor, m edium  or strong quality, in accordance w ith their CPIA score, the 
DSF threshold analysis establishes the upper limits of the debt burden  ratios each 
category of countries can sustain w ith a 75 per cent likelihood of not falling into debt 
distress in any given year. As is evident from the ensuing thresholds matrix, the debt 
burden indicators are substantially higher for countries w ith higher CPIA ranking, in 
accordance w ith their allegedly greater capacity to carry external debt. For example, 
at the same probability of falling into distress (25 per cent), strong performers are 
deemed capable of bearing three times as much debt in relation to total exports value 
(300 per cent), as are countries w ith poor performance (100 per cent). Table 3.1 shows 
a similar trade-off between debt and CPIA in terms of total debt service: strong 
performers' likelihood of remaining sustainable is associated with a total debt
8 IMF and IDA (2004a: 19)
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service-to-exports-ratio (35 per cent) that is more than twice as high as that of poor 
performers (15 per cent).
Table 3.1: CPIA-Dependant Debt Burden Thresholds (DSF vs. IDA14)
DSF Thresholds (#1) IDA14 Thresholds (#2)
Performance
Category:
Thresholds of Debt Burden 
Indicators (%): CPIA Score:


















Poor 30 100 15 CPIA <3.25 30 100 15
Medium 45 200 25 3.25<CPIA<3.75 40 150 20
Strong 60 300 35 3.75 <  CPIA 50 200 25
Notes:
NPV EDT = net present value of publicly and publicly guaranteed external debt (U.S. Dollars)
XGS = total exports of goods and services (U.S. Dollars)
(#1) Categories defined along the 25th and 75,h percentiles of the CPIA index. Source: IMF and IDA (2004a: 21)
(#2) Categories defined under the alternative specification of cut-off points. Source: IDA (2005a: 4)
The indicative debt burden thresholds of Table 3.1 are central to both the BWI debt 
sustainability analysis, outlined below, and the IDA14 traffic light system, which is 
addressed next.
The Traffic-Light System:
Representing the central link between the DSF and IDA (Chart 3.1), a so-called traffic
light system combines the information accruing from actual debt burdens and CPIA-
dependent thresholds into a ranking of countries according to categories of risk of
distress. This is achieved by calculating the average distance of a country's actual
debt burden  indicators from the indicative thresholds associated w ith its
performance category. These categories are based on empirical grounds that are
identical to those underlying the DSF, and differ only in the cut-offs applied between
the three CPIA categories. That is, while the DSF thresholds are assessed for CPIA
categories defined along the 25lh and 75th percentiles of the CPIA distribution across
LICs, the IDA14 thresholds set the CPIA lower and upper cut-offs at scores 3.25 and
3.75, respectively. The right-hand panel of Table 3.1 dem onstrates that the alternative
cut-offs applied by the traffic light system result in a substantial dow nw ard revision
of thresholds com pared to those underlying the DSF, thus introducing a safety-
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cushion in the assessment of country risks of distress. For example, the IDA14 
classification reduces the gap between strong and poor performers in terms of the 
sustainable debt-to-exports ratio from 200 to 100 per cent. Against these IDA14 
thresholds, the grants-loan mix of IDA's country allocation of aid is then determined 
according to the rule outlined in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: The Traffic Light System to determine the share of grant financing
Actual debt burden minus threshold (#1) Traffic Light (Risk of Distress) Share of grant financing
> 10 % Red (high risk) 100%
< +/- 10% Yellow (moderate risk) 50%
< 10 % Green (low risk) 0%
Notes: (#1) Computed as the larger distance among the average of the relative distances of NPV EDT/GDP and 
NPV EDT/XGS and the proportional distance of the TDS/XGS indicator.
Source: IDA (2005a)
The distance of the actual debt burden ratios from the CPIA-specific threshold values 
classifies LICs as having a high, moderate, or low risk of distress, which, in turn, 
determines the share of grant financing they are entitled to w ithin the overall IDA 
envelope. The grant share is zero in the case of low risk, 50 per cent for countries with 
debt sustainability deem ed to carry m oderate risk, and 100 per cent for high-risk 
countries. Put differently, according to the traffic light system, high-risk countries 
receive the entire IDA financial support in the form of grants, since they are deemed 
unable to carry any further loans w ithout posing serious risks to the sustainability of 
their overall debt exposure.
It should be noted that the passage from CPIA-debt burden thresholds to risk 
rankings within the IDA allocation marks the crucial step of making the DSF 
instrum ental to IDA14, in particular w ith regard to its aim of moving towards 
increasing shares of multilateral grant financing. Indeed, only by devising a CPIA- 
centred concept of debt carrying capacity, can the DSF effectively accommodate the 
prerogatives of the performance-based IDA allocation mechanism, which itself is 
crucially based on an ex-post rew ard system according to CPIA rankings. However, 
it will be dem onstrated below that the CPIA-anchorage of the debt sustainability 
framework fails to accommodate the vulnerability concerns m ost central to the
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achievement of debt sustainability itself. Therefore, the incorporation of the DSF in 
the broader aid allocation framework carries serious risks of underm ining LICs' debt 
sustainability prospects.
The Volume Discount:
Once volum e and grant share of IDA country allocations is determ ined, the last step 
in the IDA allocation process involves the application of an upfront discount to the 
grant com ponent (Chart 3.1). Much discussion among the m ain IDA stakeholders 
seems to assume that such a discount w ould be strictly necessary to address the 
implicit incentive distortions of an allocation system allocating higher shares of 
grants to countries whose risk of distress is assessed as being higher on the basis of 
CPIA-dependent thresholds.9 The typical argum ent posits that a country could well 
have the incentive to increase the grant share of its IDA allocation by failing to 
improve upon its current state of policies and institutions or, in the extreme case, by 
putting in place actions that lower its CPIA ranking far enough to enable it to fall into 
a lower threshold category. A lthough such an argum ent m ay have some validity, to 
the extent that it is simply impossible to rule out that some degree of incentive 
distortions will result from any such mechanism, it can hardly be accepted as a 
general tenet justifying the substantial subtraction of aid by the volum e discount. 
Ultimately, the degree of incentives distortion will depend on a governm ent's 
perception regarding the trade-off from having a high scoring in the CPIA exercise 
against the pursuance of its own policy prerogatives.10 However, any attem pt to 
measure, let alone address, such a trade-off w ould lead to insurm ountable 
complications in the actual applicability of the DSF across a largely heterogeneous 
group of LICs, while the BWI are notably reluctant to m aking any concession with 
regard to the CPIA's application across countries. As a result, the IDA has opted for a 
simplistic approach to dealing w ith the eventuality of negative incentive 
implications, settling for a flat upfront volume discount of 20 per cent.11
9 See, for example, the discussion in IDA (2005a).
10 On the incentive compatibility of alternative debt sustainability frameworks, see also the discussion in 
Chapter 5.
11 Nine per cent of the volume discount are then redistributed among all eligible countries, through the 
PBA allotment mechanism.
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It should be noted that the major drawback of the performance-based allocation 
system in light of this substantial volume discount concerns the retraction of overall 
financial flows to those countries deemed to suffer from the greatest risk of distress. 
To the extent that the traffic light system implies an inverse relationship between a 
LIC's CPIA ranking and the volume of grant financing, it further reduces the overall 
volume of aid allocation to those countries whose risk of distress is deemed highest 
(everything else being the same). As will be further argued below, while the IDA14- 
DSF w ould thus appear to be most paradoxical in light of its liquidity implications 
for a country in distress, the fram ework's internal consistency crucially hinges upon 
its reliance on the CPIA as the central measure informing debt carrying capacity, risk 
of distress, and overall eligibility for aid. Since a debtor's liquidity concerns have no 
bearing on the CPIA, and only marginally affect the traffic light mechanism via the 
debt service ratio, it may thus be concluded that the BWI's fram ework de facto assigns 
the prim ary causal factors and manifestations of debt distress a marginal importance, 
w ith no bearing on the actual aid allocation mechanism. Instead, the liquidity aspects 
of external indebtedness enter the mostly informative nature of forecasting exercises, 
by w ay of DSF debt sustainability analysis, which is outlined next.
Debt Sustainability Analysis:12
Beyond threshold analysis based on the assessment of actual debt burden indicators 
against indicative thresholds, the DSF/IDA14 framework recognises the need for 
forward-looking debt sustainability analysis (DSA) to assess debt burden indicators 
over time and under alternative scenarios. Representing the second pillar of the debt 
sustainability framework outlined in Chart 3.1, DSAs consist in long-term projections 
(20 years) of a country's debt burden indicators and the key macroeconomic, fiscal 
and external debt factors determ ining its debt dynamics. A first template, assessing 
external debt sustainability, projects the evolution of a country's debt stock and 
service against the macroeconomic factors (mostly in relation to the balance of 
payments) which influence its repaym ent capacity and debt dynamics more 
generally. The evolution of actual and projected debt burden thresholds is thus
12 For a detailed description of the new DSA, see further below, as well as World Bank (2005b) and IMF 
and IDA (2004a, 2004b).
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assessed over time, against the CPIA-dependent debt burden thresholds of Table 3.1, 
and under alternative scenarios. The first of these scenarios, the so-called 'baseline', 
embodies the macroeconomic and borrowing projections derived from IDA/IMF 
forecasting models and assumptions. In order to check for over-optimism, which 
characterised past forecasting exercises by both the IDA and the IMF13, the template 
explicitly states the assum ptions underlying macroeconomic items, and makes these 
comparable to the projections taking variables at their ten-year historical average (the 
so-called 'historical' scenario). The distance between baseline and historical scenarios 
thus represents a measure of optimism in IDA's assessment of future country 
performance. A third scenario envisages higher interest rates on new borrowing. 
Together, these scenarios provide some insight into the likely developm ent of debt 
burden indicators against the indicative thresholds over time, which is further 
integrated w ith an accounting methodology for exogenous shocks.
To understand the DSF's approach to exogenous shocks, it should be recalled that it 
is based on empirical studies identifying three predictors of a country's debt distress: 
CPIA performance, the external debt burden, and vulnerability to external shocks. As 
noted above, CPIA performance is taken as the central criterion for identifying 
indicative debt thresholds, which in conjunction w ith actual debt burden indicators 
determine a county's risk of distress as the basis of eligibility for grant financing. 
However, by acknowledging that countries' vulnerability to external shocks is 
thereby left out the process defining indicative thresholds14, the DSF recognises the 
need to capture separately the effects of shocks through so-called 'stress tests'. It 
chooses to do so by defining scenarios that incorporate variations in some of the 
variables affecting debt sustainability, occurring w ith an average 25 per cent 
probability over a sim ulation period of 10 years. This ex-ante approach to dealing 
w ith so-called 'plausible shocks' is im plem ented by so-called 'bound tests', 
simulating a two-year one-standard deviation from historical averages of key
13 It has been mentioned above that the BWI themselves have recently acknowledged the presence of 
over-optimistic assumptions in their forecasting exercises. For example, see Gautam (2003).
14 More precisely, a cross-country average vulnerability to external shocks is considered to the extent 
that it is indirectly reflected in the indicative thresholds derived from probabilistic regressions including 
both CPIA and shock variables. However, the degree to which shocks are reflected by the indicative 
thresholds is marginal at best, and depends on the exact specification used in the empirical exercises 
determining the coefficient of CPIA.
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macroeconomic variables. In the DSA approach, these variables include the real GDP 
growth, export value growth, the U.S. Dollar GDP deflator, and non-debt creating 
financial flows (including FDI and workers' remittances).15
The second tem plate of the DSA concerns the sustainability of public sector external 
debt and is structured similarly to the external debt template. It assesses debt 
sustainability over time on the basis of comparison between the likely developm ent 
of three indicators (NPV Debt/GDP, NPV Debt/XGS and TDS/XGS) against indicative 
thresholds and under alternative assumptions relating to the key factors driving 
public debt dynamics (most im portantly, the prim ary fiscal deficit).
Contingent on DSAs for IDA countries being im plem ented in the future, the IDA14 
framework envisages integrating, and later replacing, the current debt distress 
classification based on the traffic light system and indicative thresholds w ith a 
ranking system based on the forward-looking templates of the DSA. Thereby, a 
country's risk of debt distress w ould be assessed according to a comparative analysis 
of debt indicators and thresholds over time and under the baseline, alternative and 
shock scenarios. According to the overall severity of breach of thresholds, a country 
w ould be ranked using a traffic light system to determine its grant eligibility. At the 
same time, the insights from dynamic sustainability assessments w ould inform the 
IDA's decision regarding the adjustment/financing mix deem ed appropriate for a 
specific debtor country, as an input to the overall IDA country allocation strategy. 
The contemplated integration of the currently static DSF modules with those 
representing the more dynamic forecasting exercises under alternative simulation 
scenarios, is indicated in Chart 3.1 by broken lines, connecting debt sustainability 
analysis, debt distress classification, the traffic light system, as well as the judgement- 
based policy response informing country allocation strategy.
Contingency Instruments:
Finally, Chart 3.1 includes a third pillar, which is not part of the DSF as currently 
envisaged, but represents a recent attem pt by the W orld Bank to address the
15 Any of these indicators enters the macroeconomic and debt ratio projections either singly or in 
combination. See World Bank (2005b).
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fram ework's shortcomings in dealing w ith the occurrence of exogenous shocks. 
Indeed, in a recent report16, the W orld Bank addresses the need to integrate the DSF 
w ith a contingent debt service facility linking borrow ers' debt service to some broad 
m easure of their actual capacity to pay. In order to com prehend the W orld Bank's 
rationale for addressing this apparent weakness of the newly devised DSF, it should 
be recalled from the preceding discussion that the bound tests of the DSA consist of 
simulations of tem porary shocks to projected trends of macroeconomic variables. The 
m agnitude of trend deviations is derived to represent a 25 per cent likelihood of such 
shocks to occurring in a 'representative' (i.e. average) low-income country. While 
these simulations are considered suitable to control for a norm al degree of volatility 
across the sample of LICs, the IDA and IMF themselves acknowledge that this 
approach is not suitable for capturing the (likely) effects of all the large exogenous 
shocks occurring w ith low probability. Furthermore, by focussing on the CPIA and 
debt stock rather than the liquidity dimension of debt sustainability, the IDA14-DSF 
lacks any mechanism by which the disruptions resulting from such shocks could 
effectively be countered. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, it is now generally 
accepted that large exogenous shocks have been responsible for underm ining LICs' 
repaym ent capacity despite the substantial amounts of HIPC debt relief. Against the 
background of a substantial body of evidence pointing to the debilitating effects of 
exogenous shocks on LICs' debt sustainability, and am idst growing calls by the 
broader community of observers for the establishment of measures capable of 
countering the debilitating effects resulting from the latter, the W orld Bank 
eventually found itself forced to confront the issue within the framework of official 
aid and debt sustainability, rather than exclusively through the market-based 
approaches it had  been advocating for several years.17
The proposals pu t forward in the World Bank report on m anaging the debt risk of 
exogenous shocks in low-income countries focus on the introduction of debt service 
m odulation schemes, aimed at linking low-income countries' debt service paym ents
16 IDA (2005b)
17 For example, see the World Bank sponsored feasibility studies by the international Task Force on 
Commodity Risk Management, which was established in 1999 (e.g. see ITF, 1999; and the dedicated 
website, www.itf-commrisk.org).
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to some broad aggregate of repaym ent capacity. The envisaged schemes include 
indexation to real GDP growth, the real exchange rate, or the barter terms of trade, 
and are thoroughly assessed in Chapter 4 of this study. By simulating the likely 
effectiveness of each of the proposed schemes, our analysis shows that they w ould 
largely fail to address the liquidity needs induced by exogenous shocks, for reasons 
related to the inappropriateness of the indexing mechanisms employed and 
constraints im posed on the m odulating potential of the contingency facilities per se. 
Here, in the context of these debt service m odulation schemes' bearing on the overall 
DSF/IDA14 framework, it is sufficient to note that, if ever im plem ented, they w ould 
have the effect of superim posing a liquidity-oriented mechanism onto the core 
modules of the DSF, bu t w ithout altering its CPIA-based allocation effects as such. 
Put differently, the debt service m odulation schemes w ould have the desirable, 
though limited, effect of countering liquidity shocks facing the LICs by front- or back- 
loading debt service in accordance w ith contingent repaym ent capacity. However, 
these mechanisms, as envisaged by the W orld Bank, w ould have no effect on the 
actual am ount and terms of aid allocation over a longer time period, thus leaving the 
basic DSF/IDA structure largely intact. Again, we identify the main problem of the 
BWI approach to be in the subordination of the liquidity-focused contingency 
mechanism to the extant CPIA-centred allocation and sustainability assessment 
framework, which ham pers the potential effectiveness of this otherwise desirable 
(potential) evolution in the multilateral approach. Unfortunately, the final outcome 
resembles instead a patchwork of inconsistent measures, unable to address 
exogenous vulnerability, which is at the heart of the debt problem  facing the low- 
income countries.
3.3 The major shortcomings of a CPIA-centred debt sustainability framework
Taken at face value, the IDA/IMF debt sustainability framework w ould appear to be 
an im portant step forw ard in the multilateral approach to dealing with low-income 
countries' debt crisis. By guiding borrow ing and lending policy in accordance with 
LICs' debt burden, the quality of 'policies and institutions' and the average 
vulnerability to exogenous shocks, the DSF is said to provide the appropriate tool for 
lowering unsustainable debt positions over time and/or to avoid the renewed build­
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up of unsustainable debt. In contrast to previous approaches, the DSF attem pts to 
render operational a more country-specific concept of debt sustainability, involving 
debt burdens assessed against CPIA-dependent thresholds in a forward-looking 
framework of alternative scenarios. Moreover, the scenarios envisaged by the DSA 
are based on more conservative forecasts with regard to the variables determining 
repaym ent capacity, and contemplate the realisation of likely shocks to these 
variables. Com plem entary to dealing with the debt sustainability aspects, the IDA14 
replenishm ent is pu t forw ard as an attem pt to align m ultilateral aid allocation w ith 
debt sustainability concerns. By making the grant share of IDA disbursements 
contingent on a country's perceived risk of distress, the m agnitude of further debt 
accumulation for high-risk countries is lowered. Thereby, the IDA14 determines a 
direct link between IDA allocation and debt sustainability concerns, which was 
absent from previous IDA replenishm ent periods.
Although its proponents exhibit confidence about its potential to support LICs' 
difficult path tow ard sustainability, our more critical assessm ent of the DSF/IDA14 
framework unveils a series of shortcomings, which we deem severe enough to make 
inevitable a renew ed failure in the multilateral attempts to tackle the LICs' debt crisis. 
More specifically, we identify two significant problems underlying the new DSF: 
first, w ith regard to the empirical approach by which the factors determining a 
country's debt carrying capacity are identified and, second, the arbitrary way in 
which the empirical results are chosen to inform both the debt sustainability 
assessment and aid allocation process. The following sections address each of these 
issues in turn.
3.3.1 When is external debt sustainable?
The empirical basis underlying the DSF is remarkably flimsy, relying on the results of 
only two related studies: a prelim inary and incomplete W orld Bank w orking paper 
(Kraay and Nehru, 2004)18, and the IMF replication of a similar analysis, outlined in
18 A shortened version of this study has recently been published (Kraay and Nehru, 2006). Our 
discussion relates to the more comprehensive World Bank working paper, which was circulated in 2004.
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an appendix to the DSF proposal.19 Both studies attem pt to identify the key variables 
explaining the occurrence of debt distress situations in developing countries (or low- 
income countries in the case of the IMF analysis). They are fundam ental to deriving 
the CPIA-dependent debt thresholds (such as those presented in Table 3.1 above), as 
well as constituting the analytical underpinnings of the CPIA-centred linkage 
between the DSF and IDA14 frameworks. Hence, the overall credibility and 
effectiveness of the framework hinges upon the reliability and robustness of its 
underlying empirics.
Essentially, the W orld Bank and IMF analyses represent an attem pt to dem onstrate 
and quantify the importance of the CPIA as a predictor of debt distress episodes 
across countries and time. In line w ith the approach adopted by some other recent 
IMF studies to predicting sovereign debt crisis20, the empirical m ethod rests on the 
binary probit regression model. The functional form of this model is typically 
presented as21:
w here the left hand side of the equation denotes the conditional probability of the 
binary dependent variable y . taking unit value, and the right-hand side is the
standard  cumulative normal distribution of the probit score of the explanatory 
variables, X j , w ith a vector of coefficients, b .
In either study, the probit model is fitted to previously identified debt distress versus 
non-distress episodes as the dependent variabley jr taking value one or zero,
respectively. The explanatory variables x .  are identified ad hoc, as the most plausible
determ inants of debt distress. Table 3.3 summarises the distinctive features of the 
W orld Bank and IMF approach. The former, shown in the left column, identifies debt 
distress periods on the basis of an unbalanced panel dataset including all developing
19 A similar specification also underlies the two studies under consideration. See Appendix I of IMF and 
IDA (2004a: 53-)
20 Among the most recent IMF studies, see Manasse et al. (2003), Reinhart et al. (2003). For a brief review 
of these and older contributions, see Kraay and Nehru (2004),
21 An early contribution to logistic regression analysis can be found in Aldrich and Nelson (1984). A 
more recent approach is shown in Powers and Xie (2000). Also see Greene (2003) for a general overview 
on logistic regression analysis.
(1)
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countries, w ith time-series spanning from 1970 to 2001, according to country-specific 
data availability. Following M cFadden et al. (1985), debt distress episodes are defined 
as periods of at least three consecutive years during which a country is observed as 
having experienced either one or a combination of the following: a high ratio of 
accumulated arrears on total outstanding external debt; the occurrence of Paris Club 
debt rescheduling or reduction; and the recourse to IMF non-concessional lending. In 
contrast, non-distress episodes are defined as a period of five consecutive years 
during which none of the manifestations of distress is observed. Thereby, Kraay and 
N ehru (2004) identify a total of 57 distress and 227 non-distress episodes across 
countries and time. To this subset of observations they then fit the standard binary 
probit regression model outlined above, w ith debt distress as the binary dependent 
variable (setting the latter equal to zero in normal periods and equal to one during 
debt distress episodes), and three sets of explanatory variables. These variables 
include alternative measures of: countries' external debt burden  (the ratio of NPV 
debt to exports or GDP, and the ratio of total debt service to exports); the quality of 
their policies and institutions (as m easured by the CPIA, or the Kaufmann-Kraay- 
M astruzzi Rule of Law Index22); and shocks (real GDP grow th or deviations in the 
real exchange rate and the barter terms of trade). The actual data points entering 
estimations are limited by the concurrent availability of all explanatory variables 
employed in the unbalanced longitudinal data, and are measured for the first year 
of norm al periods and at one year prior to debt distress episodes (to control for 
endogeneity during distress). This yields a total of 163 observations during 1980- 
2001, available for estimations. As shown in the bottom row of Table 3.3, the core
22 The Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi (KKM) index includes six measures of 'governance quality', labelled 
voice and accountability, political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, 
rule of law, control of corruption. For a detailed description of the KKM measures, see Kaufman et al. 
(2004), as well as the World Bank website: www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ govdata2002. For a 
description of the Rule of Law Index employed by Kraay and Nehru (2004), see Annex Table A3.1.
It should be noted that the BWI typically treat the KKM as the closest available substitute to the CPIA. 
For example, Gelb et al. (2004) show that there is a strong correlation between CPIA and KKM rankings 
in the case of both sub-Saharan African and non-African countries. However, while we agree that the 
public availability of the KKM makes it a useful substitute for the widely undisclosed CPIA for the 
purpose of empirical analyses, we see no other reason why the two indicators should a priori be treated 
as substitutes. Indeed, we share the view of Herman (2004), who emphasises that the main thrust of the 
KKM measures has been to highlight the CPIA's susceptibility to misclassification errors.
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Table 3.3 -  Main features of the World Bank and IMF probit analyses underlying the DSF
Feature Kraay and Nehru (2003) IDA and IMF (2004a)
Dataset Unbalanced panel, including data for all 
developing countries (World Bank 
definition), 1970-2001
Unbalanced panel, covering 59 low- 
income countries (World Bank definition)
D efinition of 
D ebt Distress 
Periods
( y j  =  \ )
Periods of at least three years during 
which a country experienced either one 
or a combination of:
(a) Ratio of accumulated arrears to total 
external debt stock > 5%
(b) Ratio of IMF country commitments 
to IMF country quota > 50%
(c) Access to Paris Club rescheduling or 
debt relief
Periods in which:
(a) Ratio of accumulated arrears on 
official external debt to total external 
debt stock (PPG) > 5%
D efinition of 
Normal Periods
(v , = 0 )
At least five consecutive years during 
which none of the three debt-distress 
characteristics are observed.
At least three consecutive years during 




Note: all variables 
are lagged by one 
period to control 
for endogeneity
(a) Debt Burden Indicators:
PV Debt/Exports, Debt Service/Exports, 
Debt/Exports, Debt Service/Reserves
(b) Quality of Policies and Institutions:
CPIA, Kaufniann-Kraay-Mastruzzi Rule 
Of Law Index
(c) Measures of shocks:
Real GDP growth (local currency)
Real exchange rate growth 
Income effect of terms of trade change
(a) Debt Burden Indicators:
NPV Debt/GDP, NPV Debt/Exports, NPV 
Debt/Revenue
(b) Quality of Policies and Institutions:
CPIA, Trade Openness, Real Exchange rate 
and inflation deviations from three-year 
moving average, International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) indices on political risk 
and the quality of bureaucracy.
(c) Measures of shocks:
Real GDP growth (overall shocks measure)
GDP per capita (proxy of a country's 
capacity to cope with external shocks)
African Dummy (capturing vulnerability 




from the core 
specifications 
employed
Estimated effect on the probability of 
debt distress:
Combined, these variables are significant, 
with coefficients taking positive (+) or 
negative (-) sign, as indicated:
- NPV of Debt/Exports (+) or 
Debt Service/Exports (+)
- CPIA (-)
- Real GDP Growth (-)
Estimated effect on the probability of debt 
distress:
Any of the debt burden indicators are 
significant and take positive sign (+), 
mtering the regressions in combination 
with:
- CPIA(-)
- Exchange rate volatility (+)
- Inflation (+)
- ICRG Bureaucracy Index (-)
estimations reported in Kraay and Nehru (2004) yield coefficients that enter the 
regressions significantly and w ith the expected sign, for of each of the key predictors: 
debt burdens, CPIA, and the real GDP growth. According to the two W orld Bank 
researchers, these findings confirm that countries w ith high debt burdens, low CPIA 
scores and low GDP grow th are more likely to experience debt distress. An 
assessment of the predictive pow er of the core specifications em ployed, as well as a 
series of robustness tests, is then shown to corroborate the relevance and statistical 
significance of CPIA, debt burden, and real GDP grow th as predictors of distress. 
However, w hen they replace real GDP grow th -  their central proxy for shocks -  with 
real exchange rate depreciation and changes in the terms of trade, these alternative 
shock measures are shown to be statistically insignificant. W ithout investigating the 
relevance of shocks any further, the authors seem content to em phasise the superior 
statistical performance of the policy variable (CPIA) am ong the core regression 
models they estimate. Moreover, besides attesting the statistical significance of debt 
burden indicators and GDP grow th as a measure of shocks, the authors acknowledge 
that "[...] the predictive pow er of the combined specification is considerably better 
than any univariate prediction, suggesting that it is im portant to take all three factors 
into account w hen assessing the likelihood of debt distress"23.
In sum, the key message of the W orld Bank study is unequivocal: high CPIA scores, 
that is sound policy performance, is the key to increased debt carrying capacity by 
developing countries, while their exposure to shocks is of secondary, yet statistically 
relevant, importance. Similarly explicit are its policy implications w ith regard to IDA 
aid allocation: (i) allotting more aid to countries w ith a higher CPIA ranking is 
compatible w ith debt sustainability concerns; (ii) allotting a higher grant share and 
lower aid share to countries w ith a lower CPIA ranking is likely to increase their debt 
sustainability.
The second column of Table 3.3 summarises the IMF approach to derive CPIA- 
dependent debt burden thresholds. In an attem pt to reproduce and corroborate the 
main results of Kraay and N ehru (2004), IMF staff applies essentially the same 
m ethodology to a sample including low-income countries only, and with the
23 Kraay and Nehru (2004:18)
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inclusion of policy m easures alternative to CPIA. Moreover, since the IMF 
researchers find real GDP grow th -  W orld Bank's key proxy of shocks -  to be 
insignificant in several of their estimations, they replace growth w ith GDP per capita 
and an African dum m y in the fitted models. The former is taken as a measure of 
countries' capacity to cope w ith external shocks, while the latter is supposed to 
capture the exceptionally high degree of vulnerability to commodity price shocks 
characterising the low-income African countries within the group of LICs as a whole. 
Among their so-called policy variables, the IMF focuses prim arily on the CPIA, but 
also includes some additional measures, such as the International Country Risk 
Guide index, trade openness, inflation, and exchange rate volatility.
The IMF results are fully reported in Appendix Table A3.2. Finding the CPIA to be a 
statistically significant predictor of arrears accumulation, the IMF analysis 
corroborates the central thrust of the W orld Bank study. Moreover, the IMF study 
finds that trade openness, exchange rate volatility and the bureaucracy index all 
display significant predictive pow er w hen used in place of CPIA, thus leading to the 
conclusion that policy performance, however measured, represents a reliable 
predictor of distress. Finally, they find the African dum m y and per capita GDP to 
enter regressions significantly, if tested jointly, which is interpreted as a confirmation 
of the role of shocks in determ ining debt distress. In sum, the DSF framework paper 
features the IMF staff analysis as a highly robust validation of the World Bank 
findings, thereby justifying the adoption of the CPIA as the central indicator guiding 
the new debt sustainability framework proposed.
Having affirmed an inverse relationship between countries' policy performance and 
the occurrence of debt distress, the next crucial step in the W orld Bank and IMF 
analyses consists in quantifying the implicit trade-off between debt indicators and 
policy variables. Thereby, they derive the CPIA-dependent thresholds underlying the 
DSF. As already mentioned, the thresholds directly result from the estimated probit 
coefficients, under the assumption of some acceptable degree of distress probability. 
The W orld Bank approach chooses distress probability to represent the average 
unconditional probability of experiencing a situation of distress across countries in 
their sample of identified episodes, which is found to be 25 per cent. Taking a slightly
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different approach, the IMF sets the probability at 20 per cent. The predicted 
standard norm al scores, or probits, accrue from the core estimations, and are 
translated into probabilities along the normal cumulative density function. For 
example, the W orld Bank's core specification includes am ong the explanatory 
variables a constant, the NPV debt-to-exports ratio, the CPIA and the real GDP 
grow th rate. On the basis of the estimated vector of coefficients, b, and the sample 
percentile distribution of the explanatory variables, the trade-off between debt 
burden thresholds and CPIA ratings is readily established by solving the following 
identity for the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of CPIA rankings, keeping real GDP 
grow th at the sample average:
P r O . = 1) = 0.25 = ®(b0 + b ,*  N P V D eb tl  E X P  + b2 * CPIAp MS + b3 * GDPgrowth) (2)
This way, the authors are able to derive the NPV Debt/Exports thresholds compatible 
w ith poor, medium, or strong CPIA scores (i.e. at the 25th- 50th, and 75lh percentile of 
the CPIA ranking, respectively), and w ith a 25 per cent probability of debt distress 
occurring. Similarly, the authors derive debt thresholds for NPV-debt to GDP and 
debt service to export ratios.24
Graph 3.1: Sustainable Debt Level and CPIA
(At 20 Percent Probability of Distress)
Q - o -




 o  D e b t - t o - G D P  0 Debt-to-XGS — —  Debt-to-GDR
Data Source: IMF and IDA (2004a: 60 - Table 2). Also se e  Table A3.1 in the appendix to this chapter.
24 See IMF and IDA (2004a: 20 -  Table 1) and Kraay and Nehru (2004: 39 -  Figure 5).
-104-
By the same method, the IMF derives policy-dependent debt and debt-service 
thresholds, as outlined in the left-hand panel of Table 3.1 above, as well as in 
Appendix Table A3.2.25 The ensuing trade-off between the debt ratios and the CPIA, 
consistent with a 20 per cent probability of distress, is illustrated by Graph 3.1. It can 
be seen that the postulated relationship between policy performance and the debt 
ratios is highly positive. For example, in the case of the debt-to-exports ratio, a policy 
country w ith a 'good' policy (CPIA at the 75Ul percentile) is supposed to be able to 
carry three times as m uch external debt as a badly perform ing country (CPIA at the 
25th percentile).
The choice of 20 per cent distress probability, or 25 per cent in the case of the World 
Bank study, is, of course, a matter of subjective judgement. Flowever, it should be 
noted that while minor changes to the chosen distress value can be shown to have a 
significant influence on the absolute values of the derived debt thresholds, the 
relative distance between the latter in relation to poor, m edium  and strong 
performers remains largely unaffected. Since the implications for the DSF and IDA 
allocation are relevant in relation to relative distance, rather than absolute thresholds, 
a m atter of greater concern with regard to the reliability of the indicative debt burden 
thresholds should actually be that the probit coefficients from which the latter are 
derived tend to vary significantly among alternative specifications in the regression 
models. While this is evident from the detailed results underlying the World Bank 
study26, the IMF fails to report any alternative specifications including the CPIA, 
besides the single column included in Table A3.2. In any case, because probit 
regressions are notably vulnerable to misspecification errors, and lack several of the 
standard testing procedures applicable to regression analysis, there cannot be any 
degree of confidence that the IMF specifications chosen to underlie threshold 
estimates represent an accurate and reliable predictor model of debt distress. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the trade-off identity shown above (equation 
(2)) implies that the relationship between debt burden and quality of policy and
25 The thresholds of Table 3.1 are rounded values, indicating rough approximations the IMF applies for 
operational purposes. In contrast, Annex Table A3.2 shows the actual threshold values, as derived from 
the estimated coefficients.
26 See Tables 4 to 7 in Kraay and Nehru (2004).
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institutions is established by keeping real GDP growth rate at the sample average (or 
taking GNI per capita and the African dum m y at the average, in the case of the IMF 
study). In Kraay and N ehru 's sample, GDP growth is 4.4 per cent.27 However, GDP 
growth being the only proxy for external shocks entering the actual specification 
underlying the determ ination of debt thresholds, calculating debt-policy trade-offs at 
the sample grow th average effectively implies excluding the estimated effect from 
the shocks variable. It is precisely this exclusion of countries' vulnerability to shocks 
from the determ ination of indicative thresholds, underlying the rationale for a 
forward-looking assessm ent of the effects of shocks on debt sustainability, as 
operated by the second pillar of the DSF. Ultimately, the deliberate exclusion of 
shocks in the derivation of policy-dependent thresholds testifies to the extreme bias 
of this approach towards em phasising the CPIA, rather than shocks, as a determ inant 
of debt distress. As m entioned above, CPIA is thereby m ade the operational variable, 
determ ining volum e and grant share of aid allocation, while shocks are relegated to a 
secondary importance, merely inform ing the forecasting scenarios.
Unfortunately, the shortcomings of the empirical approach applied by the W orld 
Bank and IMF run even deeper, and severely underm ine the reliability of the entire 
empirical fram ework underlying the new DSF. In particular, we identify the 
following shortcomings:
(a) Definition of debt distress
Alternative definitions of distress lead to large discrepancies in the identification of 
distress episodes, as w itnessed by a comparison between the W orld Bank and IMF 
episodes. Since m inor changes in the definition of distress lead to substantial 
alterations in the estimated coefficients, the com puted debt burden  thresholds are 
highly sensitive to alternative distress definitions. Indeed, Table A3.3 in the appendix 
to this chapter shows large discrepancies between the distress episodes calculated 
according to the IMF definition, and those resulting from use of the data made 
available by Kraay and Nehru. Furthermore, if the debt distress episodes are 
calculated according to the W orld Bank definition (see Table 3.3 above) and on the
27 As observed from the actual dataset, kindly made available by the authors, but not reported in their 
research paper.
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basis of the available W orld Bank databases, these are seen to be different from those 
com puted by Kraay and N ehru on the basis of their ow n dataset. As a result of these 
large discrepancies, the m agnitude and degree of statistical significance of estimated 
coefficients vary according to the alternative debt distress episodes employed, 
rendering any precise and robust statistical assessment impossible.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the definitions of distress periods applied by the 
W orld Bank and IMF refer to 'last-instance' manifestations of debt distress, rather 
than capturing the precursor signs of illiquidity, such as the financial gap or 
illiquidity facing a country. If countries are assumed to have an incentive to avoid the 
accumulation of official arrears or IMF lending, thus buffering liquidity shortfalls 
through reduced im ports and reserves accumulation, the BWI's distress variables are 
likely to provide an unreliable indicator of actual distress situations.
(b) Explanatory variables (predictors of distress)
The BWTs typical set of explanatory variables includes the CPIA, GDP growth, and 
various debt burden ratios. None of the specifications include measures of 
disbursem ent or volatility of aid, which, appropriately lagged, should explain a high 
portion of illiquidity and repaym ent problems. Furthermore, the significance of CPIA 
is likely to proxy aid disbursem ent and to some extent aid volatility, since aid 
allocation is mostly CPIA-driven. Put differently, the significance of CPIA is likely to 
result from it being endogenous to the aid allocation system itself. Finally, CPIA is as 
much a m easure of policy performance, as it is of vulnerability to exogenous shocks, 
as well as of an undefined set of other factors affecting a country 's CPIA score.28 
W ithout the introduction of further control variables, the CPIA's significance, even if 
confirmed, w ould thus have to be appropriately acknowledged as representing an 
indicator partly determ ined by external shocks. Consequently, the interpretation w ith 
regard to the predictive pow er of policy and shock variables w ould have to shift 
toward shocks and away from an exclusive focus on governance and policy.
Besides applying to the CPIA, this is certainly the case for all the policy variables 
included in the IMF study. For example, trade openness is a m easure distorted by
28 See Nissanke and Ferrarini (2006).
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shocks to im ports and exports values; the real effective exchange rate is affected by a 
num ber of shocks to the trade, m onetary and financial aggregates; inflation is 
strongly influenced by exogenous m onetary and financial shocks, such as unexpected 
fluctuations in aid flows.
A similar argum ent can be pu t forward in relation to GDP growth, which the BWI 
consider to represent a shocks variable. On the contrary, economic grow th should be 
taken to represent both the outcome of endogenous (policy) and exogenous (shocks) 
factors affecting a debtor country's economy. Similarly inadequate are the other 
shocks measures adopted in the IMF approach. For, there is no reason to assume the 
African dum m y as representing a shocks measure per se, rather than capturing a 
num ber of unidentified structural features. In that sense, the African dum m y would 
represent a m easure of resilience to exogenous shocks, rather than m easuring shocks 
per se, which how ever w ould make it partly redundant if used in conjunction with 
gross national income per capita.29
Ultimately, it w ould appear that the choice of predictors deployed in the various BWI 
probit specifications has resulted from a trial-and-error approach, or so-called horse- 
racing of variables, rather than being inform ed by a more solid underlying theoretical 
structure.
c) Technical inaccuracies
A num ber of technical inaccuracies and more or less questionable choices in the 
statistical m ethod are evident in both studies. Firstly, the basic choice of the empirical 
method, favouring probit analysis, is left unqualified, both w ith regard to the 
alternative choice of applying the logistic method instead30, and the application of 
non-param etric approaches, such as binary recursive tree analysis31. More generally,
29 This is the case because GNI per capita can be viewed as the central proxy of a country's resilience to 
shock factors.
30 The logit approach has better properties in the presence of a pronouncedly uneven distribution of the 
binary independent variable, as appears to be the case of the World Bank distress episodes variable 
featuring a disproportionate number of non-distress (0) versus distress (1) events.
31 Binary recursive tree analysis (BRT) is particularly suited in the presence of complex non-linear 
relationships among explanatory variables. A number of IMF studies have adopted this approach in the 
prediction of debt or currency crises, in particular Gosh and Gosh (2002) and Manasse et al. (2003). It is 
not clear why the IMF paper underlying the DSF apparently failed to apply similar analysis to further 
test its results for robustness.
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there is nothing in the BWI approach that w ould resemble a more rigorous approach 
to estimation, as for example is evident from some of its precursor studies, such as 
that of M anasse et al. (2002).
Secondly, the derivation of policy-dependent thresholds assumes linearity in the 
coefficients derived from the probit model, while in fact they are non-linear. More 
specifically, the basic probit model of equation (1) above can be derived from the 
latent variable m odel32
V* = x jb j+ui , (2)
by m apping the infinite space (of unobservable magnitude) of the latent variable onto 
the dichotomous dim ension of the binary variable:
y t = 0 i f  y* < 0 and y. =1 i f  y* > 0 . (3)
Therefore, while it is evident that the explanatory variables, „v., have a linear effect
on y*, such linearity does not translate onto the dichotomous probability space of
y ( , i.e. on the probability that y. = 1. By wrongly making such an assumption, the
BWI analyses disregard the fact that the marginal effects of the predictors, including 
the CPIA, are not constant, but change along the percentile distribution w ithin the 
sample. As a consequence, the linear relationship assum ed in the indicative debt 
burden thresholds and shown in G raph 3.1 introduces an upw ard  bias in the trade­
off between debt burden indicators and CPIA.
In a forthcoming companion paper to the present study, Ferrarini (2007) outlines the 
full results of an empirical reassessm ent of both the W orld Bank and IMF analyses, 
addressing the above caveats. While the final results from binary recursive tree 
analysis are still partly outstanding in relation to our re-estimation of the World Bank 
approach involving all the developing countries, it is possible here to present our key 
empirical findings in relation to the IMF study, involving the group of low-income 
countries.33 We limit the following discussion to the results from that part of our
32 Following Baum (2006).
33 However, it should be noted that the key findings presented below are essentially mirrored by those 
of our broader, fully-fledged deconstruction of the two BWI studies.
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broader analysis, which refutes the IMF conclusions on the same methodological 
grounds as applied by the IMF. O ur approach evolves along several steps, outlined 
next.
By adopting the IMF's distress classification to identify debt distress and non-distress 
episodes as the independent variable (Table A3.3), we first fit the above probit model 
(equation (1)) involving the same set of predictors as applied in the IMF approach. 
That is, we estimate a series of probit regressions, including am ong the explanatory 
variables alternatively one of three debt burden measures, the various policy 
indicators adopted by the IMF study, plus the control variables. Annex Table A.3.1 
contains a detailed description of the various variables and data employed, and 
Annex Table A3.3 lists the distress episodes underlying estimations.
Table 3.4 below reports the results from this first tier of probit specifications in line 
w ith the IMF methodology. Note that for each specification reported in the table, the 
dependent variable is the debt distress dum m y taking a value of one or zero, while 
the explanatory variables are: the three debt ratios, entering regressions alternatively; 
a so-called 'Indicator', referring to the variable specified at the top of each cell of the 
table (e.g. CPIA, Trade Openness); and the 'Controls', referring to the IMF control 
variables defined above. As can be seen, the results reported in the first two rows of 
the table are roughly (in qualitative terms) compatible w ith those reported by the 
IMF (Annex Table A3.2): the debt burden ratios are all highly significant, and the 
other indicators also enter the regression significantly and w ith the expected sign 
(with the exception of trade openness, when estimated in conjunction with the debt- 
to-GDP ratio, which mirrors the IMF result).34 The CPIA coefficient is statistically 
significant, bu t at a lower confidence level than many of the other policy indicators, 
including various measures of governance. Unfortunately, a direct comparison with 
the IMF result is not possible in this case, since the CPIA data series em ployed in this 
study does not fully correspond to the original series available to the BWI (as
34 The negative sign of the estimated coefficients on Governance, TCRG, Rule of Law, results from the 
fact that a higher score in these indicators is associated with relatively worse country performance. It 
should also be noted that in probit regressions, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients depends on 
the scale of the underlying variable. As a result, the estimated magnitudes are not directly comparable to 
each other and the reader is advised to focus mainly on the level of significance instead.
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described in Annex Table A.3.1).
For each specification, Table 3.4 reports the test of joint significance of the two control 
variables, i.e. the African dum m y and the logarithm of per capita GNI. We employ a 
two-tailed W ald test, testing the null hypothesis that both coefficients are jointly zero: 
H 0 : J3AD — p GN[ = 0. The reported p-values of the test lead to the conclusion that
the null hypothesis can be rejected w ith a high degree of confidence, w ith the 
exception of the model specifications including the NPV debt-to-domestic 
governm ent revenue ratio. However, the lack of significance of the control variables 
in these cases is caused by the overall scarcity of revenue data, which reduces the 
num ber of available episodes in comparison to the alternative debt burden ratios. 
Since the typical problem  of revenue data limitations in the case of low-income 
countries leads to insurm ountable constraints also in the context of the present 
analysis, we tend to disregard the estimation results involving the revenue data, and 
choose to focus on the other two debt ratios instead.35 Finally, the bottom rows in 
each of the estimation results reported in Table 3.4 list the implicit thresholds, 
com puted in line w ith the methodology described by equation (2) above. It can be 
seen that the thresholds' m agnitudes are roughly in line w ith those com puted by the 
IMF.
At this point in the analysis, our empirical investigation departs from that of the IMF. 
Whereas the IMF investigation interprets results similar to those reported above as 
sufficient evidence to corroborate the W orld Bank's finding of the central relevance of 
the CPIA and other policy variables in explaining the occurrence of debt distress, we 
are compelled to further investigate the performance of vulnerability indexes in the 
context of the probit analysis laid out. For, the significance of the control variables in 
the above estimations, m irroring those of the IMF, should be interpreted as indicating 
the omission of a num ber of undefined latent variables explaining the particular 
degree of vulnerability characterising the sub-Saharan African countries among the 
group of LICs. However, as m entioned above, the IMF probit specifications fail to
35 The revenue data underlying this analysis was drawn from Kraay and Nehru's dataset, which 
displayed a slightly higher availability of observations than the revenue data available from the World 
Development Indicators and International Financial Statistics datasets.
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include any variable suitable to appropriately isolating the debt distress effect of 
vulnerability factors. Instead of controlling directly for vulnerability, the IMF 
inappropriately subsum es vulnerability factors through the inclusion of so-called 
policy variables, whose m agnitude however is affected by exogenous determinants. 
In light of these considerations, it should be clear that the central th rust of the IMF's 
findings and conclusions w ould be underm ined if we were to find the underlying 
probit regressions to be unsuitable for upholding the statistical significance of policy 
variables upon the inclusion of vulnerability indices.
We investigate the role of shocks, in connection w ith CPIA and governance 
indicators, by first testing the performance of instability indices within the IMF-style 
probit specifications. The bottom  row of Table 3.4 shows the outcome from testing 
the significance of the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) and two of its 
components, the Export Instability Index and the Export Concentration Index.36 Each 
of these indices is shown to be highly significant, and enters the regressions with the 
expected sign: on average, the higher a country's instability, concentration or overall 
economic vulnerability, the greater its likelihood of experiencing distress. 
Interestingly, the results show that the null hypothesis of the control variables is still 
not rejected, which w ould point to the presence of further factors of vulnerability, not 
captured by the indices deployed.37
On the basis of these results, we are now  able to deduce debt thresholds in relation to 
economic vulnerability, as an alternative to the IMF's CPIA-dependent thresholds. 
Graph 3.2 illustrates the trade off between debt ratios and the EVI, com puted on the 
basis of the estimation results reported in Table 3.4. At 25 per cent likelihood of 
distress, highly vulnerable countries (i.e. those allocated at the 75th percentile 
distribution of the EVI) are deem ed compatible w ith debt ratios that are far lower 
than those associated w ith the low-vulnerability countries in the sample. Therefore, it 
may be argued that at this stage of analysis our reassessm ent leads to a policy 
conclusion putting the EVI on equal footing w ith the CPIA. Put differently, the
36 The EVI and its components are described in Annex Table A3.1.
37 However, we also note that the control variables are less significant now, than in the previous 
regressions, if individually tested (these tests are not reported here, but can be made available upon 
request).
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application of the IMF m ethodology w ould be conducive to assigning the EVI a 
central role in guiding the volum e and grant allocation of IDA aid, in the same
Graph 3.2: Sustainable Debt Level and EVI 
(At 25 Percent Probability of Distress)
25 50 75
EVI Distribution (percentiles)
 s  Debt-to-GDP ■0 Debt-to-XGS — * —  Debt-to-GDR
Data Sources: Author's calculations, based on UN, World Bank and IMF data. Debt ratios from the dataset made available be Art Kraay.
m anner and w ith the same degree of confidence as the IMF analysis attem pts to 
establish the prim acy of the CPIA. The policy implications from this assertion should 
be clear. For example, w ith aid and grant allocation centred around the EVI, rather 
than CPIA, countries w ith low vulnerability (25th percentile) w ould be deemed 
capable of carrying almost twice the volum e of debt as low-vulnerability countries 
(75th percentile), while facing the same probability of debt distress consistent with the 
debt-to-exports ratio. As a result, the relative share of aid allocation w ould tilt 
towards low-vulnerability countries, while the relative w eight of grant financing 
w ould increase in favour of highly vulnerable countries. While it should be 
em phasised that we w ould  not necessarily argue in favour of centring aid allocation 
on the EVI in such a mechanical fashion and with the implications described, our key 
point of contention is that the IMF empirics is geared tow ards an essentially 
unsubstantiated establishm ent of the CPIA as a guiding principle of debt 
sustainability, at the expense of vulnerability concerns.
Next, we test the statistical significance of economic vulnerability indicators in 
conjunction w ith the central policy indicators deployed by the IMF, fitting a num ber
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of alternative probit models to the same dataset underlying the previous regressions. 
A dopting debt distress episodes (identified, as before, according to the IMF 
definition) as the binary dependent variable, the performance of each predictor is 
first tested in conjunction with the debt-to-exports ratio and a constant term. Annex 
Table A3.4 summarises the outcome of the preliminary estimations, while Table A3.5 
lists pair-wise correlations among the predictors. It should be noted that we do not 
report the results relating to regressions involving the debt-to-GDP ratio, instead of 
the exports ratio, since they are qualitatively identical across all the specifications 
envisaged. Moreover, we exclude the debt-to-revenue ratio from our analysis, due to 
the above m entioned data limitations relating to domestic governm ent revenue series 
in the available databases. Again, all explanatory variables used for regressions are 
described in Annex Table A3.1. W ith the exception of the aid flows and the terms of 
trade indexes, all predictors are lagged by one period to control for endogeneity.
W ith regard to the single probit estimations listed in Table A3.4, we find that all the 
indicators are significant and enter the regressions w ith the expected sign. That is, 
countries associated w ith higher debt ratios; a relatively higher (i.e. worse) CPIA 
ranking; a lower (i.e. worse) governance or rule-of-law ranking; a higher (i.e. worse) 
economic vulnerability ranking (as m easured by either the EVI, instability, or 
concentration indices, or by a combination of the instability and concentration 
indices); and those w ith relatively lower aid inflows are associated with a higher 
likelihood of experiencing debt distress over time. W ith regard to the GT Index, 
m easuring the terms of trade deviation from four-year moving averages, we note a 
relatively lower significance of its estimated coefficient (at the five per cent level), 
taking a positive sign.38 If confirmed by the more elaborate model specifications 
below, we are inclined to interpret this indicator's positive sign as an indication of 
the distress-inducing effect of relatively lower terms of trade in the years preceding 
the distress episodes, considering that it enters the regressions w ith no time lag. As a 
result, the relative term s of trade increase occurs at a time w hen distress is already
38 Also the pair-wise correlation of the GT Index with the remaining predictors is far lower (see Annex 
Table A3.5).
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manifest, and the indicator marks a situation of im provem ent on the previous years 
of relatively depressed price conditions.
Table 3.5 summarises the results from three further series of probit estimations, 
testing the performance of CPIA and alternative measures of policy performance 
against the various vulnerability indices. The first group of estimations (labelled 
Probit 1 to Probit 5) assesses the significance of the CPIA after including each of the 
vulnerability indicators taken individually. The outcome is striking: the CPIA ceases 
to be significant w hen tested in conjunction with the EVI, its instability and 
concentration components, or the joint instability and concentration term. Instead, 
each of the economic vulnerability indicators enters the regression with the expected 
sign and w ith the highest degree of significance (i.e. w ith a p-value below the 0.1 per 
cent threshold). As an exception, the CPIA is shown to m aintain a low degree of 
statistical significance in combination w ith the GT Index, which is however explained 
by the generally low performance of the GT Index if used in isolation from the more 
comprehensive vulnerability indices (see below). Finally, the debt-to-exports ratio 
confirms, as expected, its high degree of significance in predicting debt distress 
episodes.
In order to test these central results more thoroughly for statistical robustness, we 
apply the likelihood-ratio (LR) test in addition to the standard W ald test, the results 
of which are associated w ith the num ber of stars next to the estim ated coefficients in 
Table 3.5. In the case of maximum-likelihood (ML) estimations, the Wald test 
involves assessing the null hypothesis w ith regard to any of the coefficients' taking 
value zero, along a standard two-tailed test on the basis of the z-statistic.39 In contrast, 
the LR test assesses the same hypothesis by comparing the log-likelihood from the 
full model w ith those of a restricted model im posing certain constraints. For example, 
in order to test for the significance of the CPIA and EVI in the case of the Probit 1 
model in Table 3.5, we first com pute the log-likelihood of the full model, including 
the debt ratio, CPIA, EVI and a constant term. We then re-estimate the log-likelihood
39 Essentially, the Wald test for ML estimations mirrors the Wald test for ordinary least squares 
regression analysis, with the difference that the latter is conducted on the basis of Student's t-statistic. Of 
course, for the Wald test to be reliable, the underlying assumption must hold that the ML estimators be 
distributed asymptotically normally.
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twice, first excluding the CPIA and subsequently the EVI, before com paring the full 
model w ith each of the restricted models. If the constraints implied by the null 
hypothesis (e.g. H o : j3CP,A = 0 )  significantly reduce the log-likelihood, according to
the standard assessm ent along the test statistic, then the null hypothesis is 
rejected.
The reason for applying the LR test to our analysis is its greater degree of reliability 
in the presence of finite samples in  the context of ML estimation.40 Im plem enting the 
test in our probit models one to five (Table 3.5), we find that it fully validates the 
outcome of the W ald test, thereby confirming the statistical significance of the 
economic vulnerability indicators, and the lack thereof in the case of the CPIA. 
Furthermore, the LR test fails to confirm the five per cent level of significance 
resulting from the Wald test in relation to the CPIA w hen it is estimated in 
combination w ith the GT Index, while it confirms the significance of the latter. In 
sum, all the LR tests confirm our central finding, which rejects the significance of the 
CPIA and governance indicators, while em phasising the role of economic 
vulnerability indicators in predicting low-income countries' debt distress.
As a test of overall fit, Table 3.5 displays the pseudo-R-squared statistic at the bottom  
of each of the models estimated. Its value oscillates around 0.25, indicating an 
acceptable degree of fit. However, ML estimation does not allow for a proper R- 
squared to be applied, and the pseudo-R-squared represents a rather unreliable 
substitute.41 A more suitable test in the context of logistic regressions is the 
assessment of each m odel's predictive pow er.42 We choose to im plem ent two 
alternative estimates of predictive power. The first assesses a m odel's capacity to 
predict correctly the actual occurrence of debt and non-debt episodes w ithin the 
entire sample underlying estimations. The num ber of correctly predicted episodes, as 
a ratio of the overall num ber of episodes, provides an indication of the m odel's 
predictive power. Table 3.5 reports this ratio in percentage terms (see 'Predictive 
Power WS'). At an average value of 75 per cent of correctly predicted episodes, it
40 However, the LR test is asymptotically equivalent to the Wald test. For a detailed exposition of post­
estimation issues relating to ML regression, see Greene (2003: 492-).
41 See Greene (2003).
42 A similar method is applied by Kraay and Nehru (2004).
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indicates a generally strong predictive power across all the models, w ith slightly 
higher ratios associated with the less parsimonious models (i.e. those w ith a higher 
num ber of predictors). However, since the set of observations underlying estimation 
and prediction by the within-sample test is the same, a stronger variant of the test 
involves estimation of coefficients on the basis of one sub-sample of data, and 
prediction on the basis of another. We therefore im plem ent a so-called out-of-sample 
test of predictive pow er by first fitting the probit models to a subset of data including 
all available observations between the years 1970 and 1987, and then predict the 
distress events over the years 1988 to 2002 on the basis of the estim ated coefficients of 
the various predictors. Table 3.5 ('Predictive Power OS') shows the out-of-sample 
predictive pow er of our models to be generally lower than that of within-sample 
assessments. Of course, this outcome confirms our expectations, since the 
relationships between predictors and a dependent variable cannot be assumed to 
remain constant across the two periods of time covered by the sub-samples. 
Nevertheless, Table 3.5 shows that the out-of-sample pow er of the specifications 
involving a more comprehensive set of predictors exceeds 70 per cent, confirming the 
remarkably good fit of the models employed.
In light of the above results, it may still be argued that they ultim ately fail to prove 
the lack of significance of the CPIA in predicting debt distress episodes, when used in 
conjunction w ith economic vulnerability indicators. For, the CPIA series underlying 
the regressions is based on rankings by quintiles and also includes fewer 
observations, than in the full set of CPIA scores available to the analyses conducted 
by the W orld Bank and IMF. While this is obviously the case, the simple fact that the 
broader research community is precluded from accessing the original CPIA series is 
hardly an acceptable argum ent for validating the outcomes and robustness of 
empirical research conducted by the BWI on the basis of CPIA data.43 However, 
Kraay and N ehru (2004) claim that their main results hold also w hen tested on the 
basis of country-rankings along the Kaufmann-Kraay-M astruzzi (KKM) governance 
indicators, instead of the CPIA. We test this with a second series of estimations,
43 All requests for access to the original CPIA series underlying the BWI analyses for the purpose of the 
present study have been refused.
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shown in Table 3.5 as Probit 6 to Probit 13. To operationalise the KKM data for use in 
our estimations, we first extract the principal com ponent from the six dimensions 
constituting the KKM indicator: voice and accountability, political stability, 
governm ent effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. 
Finding that the first factor obtained from principal com ponent analysis explains 
about 70 per cent of the overall variation in its single dimensions, we decided to 
retain its predicted score as the representative KKM factor for probit analysis (see 
Annex Table A3.5). In addition, we decided to adopt one of the KKM indices, Rule of 
Law, as an alternative predictor in regressions, following Kraay and N ehru (2004), 
w ho show that this measure of institutional quality is a significant predictor of 
distress if used as an alternative to the CPIA.44
The upper-right panel of Table 3.5 summarises the estimation outcomes assessing the 
performance of the KKM factor (Probit 6 to 9) and the Rule of Law index (Probit 10 to 
13), in conjunction w ith the debt-to-exports ratio and the vulnerability proxies. An 
interesting pattern emerges from these regressions: both the W ald and LR-tests 
clearly confirm the lack of significance of the comprehensive KKM factor, while 
attesting the high degree of significance of the vulnerability indexes. By m irroring the 
previous results in relation to the estimations involving the CPIA, this finding 
crucially corroborates the failure of comprehensive policy or governance indicators to 
explain, or successfully predict, debt distress episodes. Surprisingly, however, the 
narrow er rule of law com ponent is found to be consistently significant when tested 
against the various EVI measures alternatively enter the regressions, though to a 
lesser degree. A lthough this finding w ould appear to confirm Kraay and N ehru 's 
results w ith regard to the KKM rule of law index, it is som ehow puzzling if 
considered in the context of the KKM principal com ponent's evident lack of 
explanatory power. For, the KKM factor displays a substantially higher correlation 
with the CPIA (see Annex Table A3.4) and is, by construction, a qualitatively 
superior synthesis of the KKM governance indicators than the rule of law index. 
Indeed, the rule of law index is merely one out of six dim ensions of governance, and
44 However, the Rule of Law index features a weaker explanatory power than CPIA in their regressions. 
See Kraay and Nehru (2004: 18-19).
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Kraay et al. (2004) themselves provide little reason for privileging one over another. 
Perhaps more relevantly, Kraay and N ehru (2004) omit to explain their choice of this 
particular index as an alternative to CPIA, and neglect even to envisage the use of a 
more comprehensive surrogate for the KKM indices. While these questions remain 
unansw ered, we decided to resolve the KKM puzzle in the context of our analysis by 
testing the remaining five indices for significance. Should the majority of the indices 
indeed confirm the finding relating to the rule of law index, the reliability of the 
principal com ponent w ould be underm ined. The results, sum m arised in Annex Table 
A3.7, confirm the opposite: none of the KKM indices enter the regressions 
significantly (though all do so w ith the expected sign). On this basis, we are able to 
confidently reject the hypothesis that KKM governance indicators, as a substitute for 
CPIA, represent a statistically significant measure relevant to the prediction of debt 
distress episodes. Furtherm ore, in the absence of any evidence that could support an 
alternative explanation, we are tem pted to interpret the significance of the rule of law 
index as a spurious regression result, probably caused by a peculiar correlation 
pattern w ith the debt distress variable in the sample underlying this analysis.45
Finally, as the last step of our probit analysis, we fit a series of models including 
alternative combinations of governance and vulnerability indicators, in conjunction 
w ith average aid inflows and the term s of trade index. We expect aid and the price 
trend to capture the liquidity effects of different m agnitudes of overall loan and grant 
financing, as well as the implicit income effects from terms of trade shocks, during 
the years preceding the occurrence of debt distress episodes in low-income countries. 
In line w ith our expectations, the results from these last specifications, labelled Probit 
14 to Probit 17 in Table 3.5, attest to the statistical relevance of both the moving 
average of aid and the GT index in predicting distress episodes. That is, countries 
enjoying relatively higher aid inflows are less likely to experience debt distress 
during any period covered by our sample, while countries experiencing a relative 
depression in their term s of trade during the years preceding distress episodes are 
more likely to run into a situation of distress. Moreover, the regressions confirm our
45 Moreover, the fact that our finding confirms the IMF study's with regard to the rule of law index 
testifies to the close similarity between the databases underlying the two analyses. This should reinforce 
the crucial bearing of our findings and conclusions on those reached by the IMF.
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previous finding: the debt-to-exports ratio and the vulnerability indexes are found to 
be highly significant, while the CPIA and governance indices fail to enter regressions 
w ith an acceptable degree of significance w hen tested in combination w ith any of the 
measures of vulnerability. Furthermore, we find that the LR-test now assigns a 
slightly lower degree of confidence to the vulnerability indices, w hich is in line with 
our expectations relating to their joint assessment w ith liquidity measures. Finally, it 
should also be noted that the Rule of Law index ceases to be significant w hen the 
liquidity controls are introduced.
In sum, our empirical re-assessment of the BWI analyses underlying the DSF 
provides overwhelm ing evidence for questioning the role of the CPIA and 
governance indicators as reliable and significant predictors of debt distress episodes 
involving low-income countries. Indeed, on the grounds of similar data and 
methodology applied by the IMF, we reach the unequivocal conclusion that their 
finding in relation to the CPIA and other policy indicators results essentially from a 
misspecification problem. Failing to include vulnerability and liquidity measures 
among the crises predictors, the IMF study produces the empirical outcome 
supporting the CPIA's central role within the proposed DSF. Plowever, such 
evidence is proven spurious w hen the CPIA and other governance measures are 
tested in conjunction w ith the EVI or its single components, as well as simple 
measures capturing conditions of relative illiquidity. Indeed, we dem onstrate that it 
is exactly these factors of structural vulnerability to exogenous shocks that 
significantly explain debt distress episodes involving the LICs over time, rather than 
the W orld Bank's governance indicators.
By failing to investigate more thoroughly the robustness of the CPIA and alternative 
governance indicators to the introduction of more relevant predictors, the IMF study 
essentially underm ines the credibility of its own analysis, and thereby that of the DSF 
as a whole.
3.3.2 The CPIA bias of the DSF and its neglect of vulnerability
Despite the fact that neither the policy nor the shock measures em ployed in their 
empirical analyses w ould actually be conducive to supporting such a supposition, it 
should be recalled that the BWI base their proposal for the new  DSF on the claim that
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CPIA, debt burden and shocks are equally significant predictors of debt distress. 
However, the framework paper then assigns to the CPIA, rather than to shocks, the 
central role in determ ining so-called sustainable thresholds. Although inconsistent 
w ith their own conclusions, the BWI thereby relegate vulnerability to a subsidiary, 
rather than equal, role in guiding the debt sustainability assessment and its lending 
implications. To better clarify these aspects, Chart 3.2 stylises the asymmetric roles 
assigned to the key determ inants of debt distress -  debt burden, CPIA and shocks -  
within the DSF and the broader implications for IDA allocation. Each box represents 
a stylised element of the DSF/IDA14 framework, and the arrows indicate the 
direction of causal relationship between these elements, for convenience assuming
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away any multiple feedback effects. Overall, the chart illustrates how  a country's 
CPIA score determines the am ount of IDA country allocation, and, together w ith the 
country's debt burden indicators, the grant share it is deem ed eligible for. For 
example, the lower a country's CPIA ranking, the lower will be its relative share of 
aid w ithin the IDA envelope, and the higher its risk classification, everything else 
being the same. As a consequence, the overall volum e of aid flow to that country 
w ould be further reduced in proportion to the discount applied to the higher grant 
share established by the traffic light system. It may thus be argued that by trying to 
address longer-term debt stock solvency concerns through increased grant financing, 
the DSF/IDA14 framework introduces a perverse liquidity effect concerning the
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immediate and shorter-term  problem s associated with situations of debt distress. In 
fact, w ith  a 20 per cent upfront reduction in overall aid allocation, the DSF reduces 
current net IDA transfers to a country during a period of time equal to the grace 
period of IDA loans (typically 10 years). Ultimately, to the extent that it is illiquidity, 
rather than insolvency, that determines a debtor country's debt sustainability46, the 
CPIA focus of the DSF causes sustainability concerns to succumb to the prerogatives 
of the extant IDA allocation framework, at the cost of losing its effectiveness in 
dealing w ith low-income countries' debt crisis.
In contrast to CPIA, vulnerability to external shocks enters the DSF merely via the 
forecasting exercises constituting its second pillar, while it is left out the core IDA- 
allocation process. The outer left box of Chart 3.2 illustrates the marginal w eight 
assigned to vulnerability to shocks, shown to enter the DSF exclusively through the 
assessment of effects from sim ulated changes to the denom inator variables of the 
debt burden indicators. That is, vulnerability is assessed together w ith the forecasted 
evolution of a country's debt burden (the numerator) in term s of its likely impact on 
debt burden  indicators over time. Assume, for example, that a country scoring low 
in terms of CPIA also has a history of high vulnerability to external shocks affecting 
its exports and repaym ent capacity. Then, insofar as the country's volatility is 
reflected in the denom inator of the debt stock-to-exports ratio and in the historical 
scenario or baseline assum ptions regarding future export revenues, the stress tests of 
the DSF should pick up higher standard deviations and thus signal potential 
breaches of one or more debt burden indicators against thresholds over time. 
However, as it is currently operated, the DSF/IDA14 w ould not take into account 
such a finding in term s of the decision m ade regarding the country 's volum e of IDA 
allocation. Rather, the DSF proposal suggests, in line w ith the usual BWI tenet, that 
"the appropriate policy response [...] w ould generally involve some combination of 
policy adjustm ent to reduce the overall level of borrowing, and -  where possible -  a 
higher share of grant financing or increased concessionality on planned borrow ing."47 
Therefore, provided that it has not already been placed in the highest category of risk
46 On the centrality of illiquidity, as opposed to insolvency, the reader is referred to the discussion in 
Chapter 2.
47 IDA and IMF (2004a: 28)
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distress, the implication for the low-CPIA-high-vulnerability country is likely to be 
an upw ard  shift in the risk category. Accordingly, its grant share w ould further 
increase and the IDA volum e fall, on top of the adjustm ent-induced reduction in the 
level of borrowing, should there be any. In sum, the potential risk from a country's 
vulnerability to exogenous shocks is dealt w ith on a purely informative ex-ante basis 
m ade in accordance w ith the BWI's judgem ent of best response, by which potential 
effects from vulnerability may be translated into a combination of policy adjustm ent 
conditionalities, and, possibly, an increase in the grant share (say, from 50 to 100 per 
cent, m inus the implicit up-front reduction of 20 per cent in overall aid 
disbursements).
Finally, it should be noted that the marginalisation of vulnerability concerns against 
policy prerogatives is also evident for the case of a country w ith low CPIA and low 
vulnerability. In such a case, the dynamic stress tests w ould show none of the 
country's debt burden indicators to be in breach of indicative thresholds over time. 
As should be clear from Chart 3.1, there w ould be no effect in term s of the volume 
and grant share of IDA allocation to that country, since this w ould be determined 
solely by the static threshold analysis of the DSF's first pillar.
In sum, the CPIA constitutes the common central factor underlying both the decision 
processes relating to aid allocation and debt sustainability, while vulnerability plays 
an ancillary role exclusively in the DSA. While a framework centred on the concept of 
performance-based indicative debt burden thresholds ensures overall compatibility 
w ith the prerogatives of the performance-based allocation system of IDA, its failure 
to assign a more central role to vulnerability in  guiding both the aid allocation and 
debt sustainability process remains largely unjustified. Insofar as vulnerability to 
shocks represents a key determ inant of debt distress, any DSF that fails to effectively 
translate vulnerability assessments into appropriate policy responses in terms of 
volume and timing of aid is bound to fail to meet its objective of making debt 
positions sustainable.
3.3.3 The major shortcomings of the new Debt Sustainability Assessment
The inappropriate and biased treatm ent of policy against vulnerability is pervasive 
across all the features of the DSF, including its newly devised Debt Sustainability
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Assessment (DSA). While its central function within the DSF has been outlined 
above, it remains here to examine the crucial shortcomings of the DSA's basic 
accounting mechanism w ith regard to the distinction of endogenous factors affecting 
a debtor country's debt sustainability.
Following W orld Bank (2005b), we first consider the method by which the DSA's 
basic accounting framework is derived from the fundam ental balance of paym ent 
identity, expressed as:
C A B + K A B  + AR = 0 . (4)
W here CAB is the current account balance; KAB  the current and financial account 
balance; and AR denotes change in net international reserve assets. The BOP identity 
can equivalently be expressed to highlight the factors determ ining the evolution of 
external debt:
D t = (1 + /, )Z)f_, -  TBt -  Tr, -  FDI, + ARt (5)
w here Dt is a country's nominal external debt stock in current U.S. Dollars; i, is the
nominal interest rate on external debt; TBt is the trade balance (net exports of goods
and services); Trt are transfers of the current account, including grants and
remittances, and other non debt-creating transfers, including debt relief; and F D It is
net foreign direct investm ent and portfolio flows.48 From (5), it is clear that in order to 
close a financing gap in period t, ensuing from an excess of financial requirements 
(mainly the trade deficit, plus debt service and changes in reserve holdings) over non 
debt-creating resources (mainly grants, FDI and w orkers' remittances), the typical 
low-income country will have to resort to new external loans, thereby putting 
upw ard pressure on its external debt stock, D , .
Since the DSA chooses the ratio of debt stock to GDP as the key measure of debt 
burden, the evolution of external debt burden is expressed as the ratio of the external 
debt stock and its determ inants to GDP. Expressing all terms of identity (5) as a ratio 
to GDP:
48 Note that C A B = (\+ it }Dt  ] - T B t - T r t and K A B = D , + F D l, .
-1 2 6 -
Ad, = d, -  d t_x = ■^j- L -  tb, -  tr, -  fd i t + dr, , (6)
y,
w here small letters indicate the variables as ratio to GDP;y, is GDP in period t; 
and Ad, is the change in external debt stock in relation to period t.
v
Finally, expressing the inverse ratio of change in GDP as: ^ -t-  = l + g f + p , + g tp t ,
y ,
that is by splitting GDP grow th to its real and price com ponents -  g, and 
p, respectively -  and then replacing for GDP change in identity (6), the following 
expression is derived:49
A cl, s  ^ -------------------------------  A(I + g,M-i -tb  _ tr _ f d i  + d  (J)
1 + g , + P , + g , P ,  l + g , + A + S , A  1 + g, + P,+g,P,
Identity (7) highlights the determ inants of year-to-year changes in the debt stock to 
GDP ratio, w hich include the financing gap (as in (6)), plus the factors determining 
GDP growth, nam ely the change in interest rate on external debt, the real GDP 
growth rate, and price and exchange rate changes (the first, second, and third term on 
the right-hand side, respectively). The signs taking each of the term s on the right- 
hand side of identity (7) indicate that a rise in the trade deficit, the interest rate, or 
reserve holdings puts upw ard  pressure on the external debt stock, while higher real 
GDP growth, domestic exchange rate appreciation, price inflation, net inflows of 
grants, remittances, FDI and portfolio flows will have the opposite effect.
Based on the accounting fram ework defined by identity (7), the new  DSA explores 
the future evolution of a LIC's external debt by forecasting its key determinants. In 
particular, taking GDP as representing a debtor econom y's central m easure of 
repaym ent capacity, the new  DSA is based on a GDP-centred concept, which the BWI 
consider to represent endogenous debt dynamics. Endogeneity is thereby simply 
assumed to be expressed by the proportion of change in the external debt stock 
explained by changes in nominal GDP, in turn distinguishing the GDP's real growth 
from price components. In contrast, all other factors influencing external debt are 
subsum ed into the tw o categories of net-debt creating flows and a residual, and are
49 By simple manipulation, not repeated here (see World Bank, 2005b).
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expressed as ratios to GDP to allow for a direct comparison w ith the so-called 
endogenous factors.
Of course, to label GDP-related changes to the external debt ratio as 'endogenous' is 
misleading, to the extent that a debtor country's GDP is determ ined by a w ide array 
of factors, only some of which the country authorities have the pow er to influence. In 
fact, commodity and aid-dependent low-income countries are well know n to possess 
very limited control over the actual development of their stream  of income. 
Variations to the income stream are mostly determ ined by external or exogenous 
causes, such as the terms of trade affecting the trade balance, or the inflows of official 
aid and private remittances. Therefore, it may be argued that the BWI's focus on 
external debt and its determ inants as a ratio to GDP could be described as 
endogenous only to the extent that it explains changes to GDP, and thereby to all the 
variables expressed in terms of their ratio to GDP. However, this relates the concept 
of endogeneity to the assessment process itself, rather than the causal origin of factors 
explaining LICs' evolution of external debt. To see the point, it is sufficient to 
consider that any rate of nominal GDP growth exceeding that of nominal external 
debt causes the debt to GDP indicator to decline, and the same applies to any other 
variable expressed as a proportion of GDP. However, such decline per se neither 
implies sustainability in the external debt position, nor does it distinguish factors that 
are endogenous to debtor country policy from those which are not.
The question arises as to w hy the BWI choose the DSA to address a largely 
meaningless question of debt stock evolution in terms of GDP, while ignoring the 
more relevant distinction between exogenous versus endogenous factors affecting 
external debt sustainability.50 Arguably, the most plausible answ er is that such a 
distinction is not centrally instrum ental to the DSF. This is because the DSF assigns a 
central role to countries' CPIA rankings in the assessment of both debt sustainability 
and policy, w hether or not enacted in response to external shocks, while policy 
conformity w ith IMF/IDA conditionality is assessed and rew arded outside the realm
50 If anything, an analysis of external debt stock evolution in terms of GDP is meaningful in terms of 
cross-country comparisons, including the comparative effect of inflation and exchange rate variations 
across countries. However, the DSA is in the first place an instrument addressing the sustainability of 
external debt in the case of country-specific analysis.
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of the DSA as such.51 Though consistent w ithin the broader DSF and IDA allocation 
context, w e argue that by failing to make such a crucial distinction, the DSA is 
unsuitable for identifying the key causes underm ining debt sustainability, and thus 
for guiding the lending and relief responses of the international community. Indeed, 
our proposal for an alternative accounting m ethod to that of the DSA, outlined in 
Chapter 5 below, extensively dem onstrates that a suitable distinction between the 
factors affecting debt sustainability is indeed feasible, and that such an assessment is 
the precondition for the introduction of state-contingent debt instrum ents that are 
conducive to the achievement of debt sustainability.
Besides the inappropriateness of the DSA accounting mechanism, we identify two 
further shortcomings underm ining its central analytical role w ithin the debt 
sustainability framework: firstly, its reliance on a set of debt burden indicators that 
are intrinsically sensitive to revisions in param eters and accounting practices, thus 
failing to provide reliable measures which are directly com parable over the extensive 
time horizons of simulations; secondly, its central focus on external stock analysis, 
rather than em phasising the crucial factors of liquidity, i.e. the flow variables relating 
to financing requirements, available domestic resources and net financial transfers. 
We now consider each of these issues in turn.
(i) Choice of Debt Burden Indicators:
DSA simulations are essentially focussed on the evolution of three key indicators: the 
NPV of debt to GDP ratio, as a m easure of a country's external debt burden in 
relation to its overall availability of resources; the NPV of debt to exports ratio, in 
relation to the earning capacity of foreign exchange; and the debt service ratio, 
m easuring the drain on a country's current resources due to debt service obligations. 
NPV measures are generally preferred to nominal measures in the context of low- 
income countries, since they capture the high grant element -  or concessionality -  of 
the overall external debt stock outstanding. By representing the discounted value of a 
country's overall future debt service obligations, its NPV debt stock is supposed to 
provide an assessm ent of the actual debt burden, which reflects the lower debt
51 Most notably, this occurs through the performance-based allocation system (PBA) adopted in the 
allocation of IDA, determining the volume of ODA disbursements (see Chart 3.1),
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service paym ents associated w ith highly concessional -  as opposed to non­
concessional -  debt. Much of the criticism that has been raised regarding the use of 
NPV indicators as thresholds for LICs' qualification for the HIPC Initiative equally 
applies to the DSF, and need not repeated here.52 However, our crucial concern in the 
context of debt sustainability analyses relates to NPV indicators' intrinsic 
susceptibility to variations in param eters and accounting methodology. For, if the 
effects from changes in param eters or methodology overshadow  those resulting from 
the actual determ inants of a country's risk of debt distress, debt burden indicators 
largely lose their usefulness as an early w arning mechanism, particularly when they 
are assessed against fixed indicative thresholds.
The point is best illustrated by making a comparison between various sustainability 
analyses actually conducted in relation to a low-income country's external debt over 
time. Consider, for example, an extract of various DSA projections m ade between 
2000 and 2006, in relation to U ganda's53 NPV of debt to exports ratio, as reported in 
IMF progress reviews of U ganda's poverty reduction grow th facility and in various 
earlier debt sustainability analyses. Table 3.6 shows that the estim ated NPV debt-to- 
export ratio exhibits substantial discrepancies, which have arisen mainly from 
changes to the accounting methodology, and to a lesser extent from the revision of 
macroeconomic forecasts. Indeed, m ost of the enormous gap between 2000 and 2002 
estimates, exceeding 100 percentage points from 2004/05 onwards, is due to 
underestim ation of future debt stocks and overestimation of export grow th rates.54 
While the difference in estimates between the two DSAs conducted in 2005 is less 
pronounced, it still em phasises the crucial role of a change in methodology in 
altering the conclusions regarding U ganda's risk of debt distress: w ithout taking into 
account any change in the actual factors determining the country's debt stock 
evolution, the DSF w ould have considered its debt ratio to be in breach of the 
indicative DSF threshold of 200 per cent according to the June 2005 measure, while it 
w ould have come to different conclusions (hence policy effects) according to data
52 E.g. Gunter (2002).
53 While almost every available low-income country's DSA could serve as a representative example, our 
choice of Uganda is determined by our focus on this country also for the case study in Chapter 6 below.
54 It should be noted here that IDA and IMF (2002: 14) justify the difference as being the result of an 
oversight involving incomplete treatment of new financing.
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emerging from the A ugust 2005 analysis, which showed U ganda's debt ratio as 
falling well below the indicative threshold.
Table 3.6: Uganda, Debt Sustainability Analyses, Comparison 2000, 2002 and June 
__________2005, August 2005________________________________________________
NPV D e b t/  
Exports 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
DSA January 2000* 150 138 128 117 109 102 96 91 84 78 73
DSA A ugust 2002* 171 199 209 207 198 188 178 171 165
Difference due  to: U nderestim ation of future deb t stocks (mostly), plus overestim ation of export grow th .
Estim ation Difference (%): 34 71 92 103 106 108 111 118 12 7
DSA June 2005 263 242 225 217 220 222 222
DSA A ugust 2005 193 186 186 186 185 183
Difference due to: D enom inator change, from three-year average to current exports (63%); upw ard  revision of exports (17%)
Estim ation Difference (%): -20 -17 -14 -15 -17 -17
Notes: (*) based on three-year averages of total exports in goods and services 
Sources: Various IMF/IDA DSA docum ent. A uthor's  own calculations.
Table 3.7 emphasises even more strongly the degree to which the intrinsic accounting 
fragility resulting from reliance on NPV data ham pers the DSA's reliability. D rawing 
from an IMF comparison between U ganda's debt sustainability analyses of the years 
2002 and 2006, we calculate a detailed breakdow n of the factors explaining changes 
in the NPV of debt to exports ratio in the year 2004/05. The comparison evidences 
how  substantial the effects of changes to param eters alone can be on the NPV debt to 
exports indicator (65.3 per cent), relative to variations in the key liquidity and 
macroeconomic determinants, which are the variables w ith actual bearing on the 
country's risk of distress. Indeed, the country w ould appear to have substantially 
benefited from a combination of higher than anticipated new  borrow ing (lowering 
the ratio by 14.3 percentage points), while exports were considerably higher than 
expected (changing the debt ratio by 27 percentage points). However, changes in the 
discount rate (increasing the NPV of debt measure) and the exchange rate vis-a-vis 
other currencies (increasing the ratio by 40 per cent) w ould actually have am ounted 
to a net increase of the ratio to 229.4 per cent. It is only because of a change of 
m easurem ent m ethod affecting the denominator, namely by switching from a three- 
year moving average of exports to current year exports, that the ratio actually 
decreased by more than 50 per cent, dow n to 179.1 per cent.
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In the particular instance depicted in Table 3.7, the various sources of discrepancy 
between forecasted and observed measures tend to cancel each other out, thus 
resulting in a relatively close match (18.9 per cent). Nevertheless, it exemplifies well 
the grounds for our concern w ith regard to the D SFs reliance on net present value 
measures of debt, which are subjected to a host of factors underm ining its role as 
meaningful and reliable assessment of a country's risk of distress. Therefore, in 
contrast to the BWI's current practice w ith regard to debt sustainability analysis, in 
Part III of this study we propose an alternative framework, which effectively 
circumvents the reliance on debt ratios as a guiding mechanism for aid allocation and 
debt relief.
Table 3.7: U ganda, DSA 2002 vs, DSA 2006 - NPV Debt/Exports (%)
Year 2004/05
DSA August 2002 - forecasted 198.0
DSA February 2006 - observed 179.1
Total change in ratio -18.9
Change in methodology (denominator now calculated as -50.3
current exports)
Changes in parameters 65.3
o/w: changes in discount rates 24.8
o/w: changes in exchange rates 40.5
Due to unanticipated new borrowing -14.3
o/w: higher than expected disbursements -16.2
o/w: lower concessionality of loans 
Unanticipated change in exports -27.0
Other factors .^4
Source: A uthor's ow n calculations, based on IMF (2006), Sixth Review, A ppendix VI, Table 1.
(ii) Stock versus flow analysis
Our final concern relates to the fact that the DSF assessment of a debtor's risk of 
distress focuses mainly on external debt stocks, instead of flows. Much in line w ith 
the HIPC Initiative's aim of reducing a country's debt stock to levels that are 
considered sustainable, the DSF sustainability analysis of external debt is conducted 
on the basis of two stock measures in NPV terms, plus a single debt service ratio. 
A lthough the debt service ratio is said to be "[...] the best indicator for analysing 
w hether a country is likely to face debt-servicing difficulties in the current period"55,
55 World Bank (2005b: 10)
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it is also seen to understate the future debt service burden in the presence of highly 
concessional loans, which are typically increasing over time. According to the World 
Bank, debt stock indicators are thus to be preferred, since they discount the whole 
stream  of future debt service paym ents and therefore enable better predictions of 
future debt servicing problems.
Arguably, the official line of argum ent underlying the DSF approach to debt 
sustainability assessment points tow ard a primarily informative, rather than 
operational, nature of the DSA exercise, in which the objective of a comprehensive, 
long-term outlook regarding the likelihood of debt distress prevails over the aim of 
timely, effective intervention at the onset of distress. Indeed, as will be extensively 
argued below, the DSF currently does not incorporate any kind of mechanism aimed 
at aligning financial transfers to a borrower with its current financial requirements. 
The only bearing of the DSA on official financial transfers to a low-income country 
results from its qualification of that country's risk of distress, determ ining the degree 
of concessionality -  not the volum e -  of new official borrowing. Clearly, 50 or 100 per 
cent of new borrow ing disbursed in grants, rather than loans, will positively affect a 
debtor's current and future external debt stock position and, ceteris paribus, the 
outlook on its stock indicators. However, official multilateral loans typically concede 
a grace period of ten years, and there will be no positive effect on official debt flows, 
including debt service, for the whole period until servicing of the first grant- 
substituted loans becomes due. Hence, while one can agree w ith the above argum ent 
that debt flow indicators tend to understate the future burden of debt service due to 
grace periods and long m aturity, it is harder to accept that the BWI's favouring of 
debt stock indicators over flow indicators, motivated on purely analytical grounds, 
gives rise to a risk assessm ent methodology that severely dow nplays the role of 
current illiquidity as the m ost crucial factor leading to debt distress.
In sum, debt stock indicators not only fail to provide fully comparable projections of 
a country's actual debt burden  over time, mainly for the accounting reasons outlined 
in the previous section, bu t these indicators also divert attention from the flow 
dimension involving current financial sources and requirements. Thereby, the DSA
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fails to provide a key analytical and operational w arning tool necessary for effective 
and timely official intervention in the case of financial distress.
3.4 C oncluding rem arks
The foregoing discussions reveal a broad spectrum of shortcom ings in the extant 
multilateral approach to addressing low-income countries' debt sustainability 
concerns. By deconstructing the single components of the DSF, and highlighting the 
complex interrelationships between these components and the broader IDA14 
framework, we reach the conclusion that the entire structure of the DSF is affected by 
a severe flaw arising from its subordination to the prerogatives of the aid allocation 
framework. Indeed, it w ould appear that w ith the new DSF, the BWI have effectively 
m anaged to render the debt sustainability assessment and its implications fully 
conform to the CPIA-centred thrust of the IDA14 framework, particularly with 
regard to its aim of increasing the grant share of m ultilateral financing. In order to do 
so, the BWI had  to find and dem onstrate bu t one missing link, w hich w ould relate 
low-income countries' debt sustainability assessment to the CPIA. Resting on 
dangerously flimsy empirical grounds, the BWI showed that such a link does indeed 
exist, and has not hesitated to build upon it their entire argum ent supporting the new 
sustainability framework. Unfortunately, we find the governance-debt distress link 
cannot w ithstand the inclusion of economic vulnerability and liquidity measures, and 
produce evidence underm ining its reliability as the DSF's central building block.
In comparison to the central flaw affecting the role of CPIA in explaining debt 
distress, the num erous shortcomings of the DSF also unveiled in this chapter may 
appear to be of relatively minor importance. Nevertheless, the DSF's reliance on an 
accounting fram ework that disregards the need for an effective distinction between 
the causal factors affecting a country's debt sustainability and its reliance on debt 
measures that tend to further blur, rather than clarify, any such assessment, are 
certainly a sign that the shortcomings of DSF are pervasive and deeply rooted. In 
fact, it appears that the new DSF represents a reinforcement of its predecessors, with 
an additional CPIA twist, rather than introducing a truly 'new ' outlook on the 
m ultilateral approach to the long-standing debt problem.
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The analysis described in this chapter does not address the central question with 
regard to the deeper motives underlying the BWI's (and their main stakeholders') 
reluctance to introduce a m ultilateral instrum ent that could effectively address the 
vulnerability factors they themselves acknowledge as having played a crucial role in 
determ ining the demise of previous multilateral attem pts to make LICs' debt 
sustainable. For such a discussion, the interested reader is referred to Fine (2001), 
who distinguishes between the roles played by rhetoric, scholarship and policy in 
developm ent practice, including the BWI's, and also to Broad (2006), who critically 
outlines the BWI's 'A rt of Paradigm  M aintenance'.
W hat this chapter does show, however, is that the BWI have gone to great lengths to 
mask their reluctance to break w ith the CPIA-centred system they have created as the 
central pillar in dealing w ith the low-income countries. In this sense, our conclusions 
are strongly corroborated by the recently published external audit of World Bank 
analysis between 1998 and 2005, chaired by Angus Deaton (Deaton et al., 2006), 
which criticises the W orld Bank's recurrent practice of using questionable evidence in 
support of its developm ent policies.
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O ur database includes all the 58 countries classified as low- 
income according to the World Bank definition, i.e. those 
countries in which 2005 GNI per capita am ounted to U.S. Dollars 
875 or less.
The database includes time-series spanning from 1970 to 2002. 
D epending on the availability of time-series for the various 
predictors em ployed in the probit regressions, the dataset 
available for estimations is composed as an unbalanced panel.
All distress predictors enter estimation w ith a lag of one year, to 
control for endogeneity. The choice of a one-year lag, rather than 
a more appropriate use of trend deviations, has been m ade to 
resemble the m ethod employed by the IMF and W orld Bank 
studies, thus allowing for better comparability of results.
Following the IMF definition, debt distress is defined as a 
situation in which the ratio of a country's accumulated arrears on 
official external debt to its total external debt stock exceeds the 5 
percent threshold. Non-distress is defined as at least three 
consecutive years in which the ratio falls below the 5 percent 
threshold. The binary variable used in the probit regressions takes 
value one during debt distress episodes, and value zero during 
non-distress episodes.
Time series of CPIA scores are still undisclosed to the public 
dom ain and thus unavailable to researchers outside the W orld 
Bank and IMF. Accordingly, the CPIA series was missing from 
the dataset underlying the Kraay and N ehru analysis. As a 
substitute for the actual CPIA scores, the CPIA series was 
constructed by draw ing from the available CPIA country 
rankings by quintiles, to the extent available for the 'episodes 
years'. The missing data w ithin adjacent years of CPIA 
availability were com puted by interpolation from the CPIA scores 
implicit in various W orld Bank datasets. A higher value of the 
CPIA index constructed for this study is associated with lower 
(worse) performance rankings.
N et present value data of external debt is not available in the 













Rule of Law 
KKM Factor
EVI
extracted from the Kraay-Nehru dataset.
Defined as the ratio of the sum  of exports and im ports to GDP, in 
accordance w ith the IMF study. Data source: W orld Bank - W orld 
D evelopm ent Indicators (online subscription, accessed March 
2005).
Based on Bill Easterly's real exchange rate overvaluation index, 
available in the Kraay-Nehru dataset.
Defined as the deviation of the real exchange rate from the 
preceding three-year average, in accordance w ith the IMF study. 
Data source: W orld Bank - World Developm ent Indicators (online 
subscription, accessed March 2005).
Defined as the annual change in the consum er price index, in 
accordance w ith the IMF study. Data source: W orld Bank - W orld 
Developm ent Indicators (online subscription, accessed March 
2005).
Defined as the deviation from the preceding three-year average of 
the consumer price index, in accordance w ith  the IMF study. Data 
source: World Bank - World Developm ent Indicators (online 
subscription, accessed March 2005).
The International Country Risk Guide Index on the quality of 
bureaucracy, available in the Kraay-Nehru dataset.
The Kaufmann-Kraay-M astruzzi Rule of Law Index, available 
from Kaufmann et al. (2004)
Extracted as the principal component of the six available indices 
in Kaufmann et al. (2004). One principal com ponent was retained, 
explaining about 70 percent of variation in the six single 
dimensions of the overall KKM index. Since the indices cover 
only the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 over the time period of 
analysis, the missing values between 1996 and 2002 were obtained 
by linear interpolation, while the value of the principal 
com ponent in the year 1996 was used for the previous years.
The Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) w as obtained from the 
United Nations Departm ent of Economic and Social Affairs -  
Division for Sustainable Development, New York. The EVI 
em ployed in this study is an UN-weighted index of the following 
indicators: the natural logarithm of population; the share of 
m anufacturing and services sectors in the economy; the export 
concentration index, by UNCTAD; the agricultural instability 
index, by FAO; the export instability index, by IMF. Several years 
of the index have been m ade available by UN for this research 
project, the remaining years were com puted by linear 
interpolation. Lower values of the EVI are associated with a lower 











A component of the EVI, based on UNCTAD's Herfindahl- 
H irschm ann index, which is a measure of the degree of market 
concentration, norm alized to obtain values ranking from 0 to 1 
(maximum concentration).
A terms of trade index constructed by Gilbert and Tabova (2005), 
in line w ith the well-known Deaton-Miller index (Deaton and 
Miller, 1995). The index expresses the percentage gain or loss in 
national income resulting from variations in a country's im port or 
export prices, relative to the preceding four-year average. Price 
variations are w eighted by the value share of single commodities 
in a country's overall export or im port flows. The index excludes 
trade in metals.
Total aid flows (ODA) are m easured as aggregate flows of official 
loans and grants to a low-income country. In order to capture the 
average trade flow effect in the years preceding debt distress 
episodes, aid flows are m easured as the three-years moving 
average.
Table A3.2: IMF Probit Results (Original Title: Determinants of Distress) 1/

























Debt ratio 0.015** 0.002** 0.003** 0.016** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004** 0,002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004**
Policy -0.519** -0.415** -0.404** -0.006** 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.006 O.OOS** 0.006** 0.001 0,002*
P-V alue o f  T est o f  Controls 0.000 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Im plied  T h re sh o ld s  2/3/
Bad Policy 26 S3 I3S 2S 27 161 234
A verage Policy 43 IS6 205 37 34 IS9 261
G ood Policy 5S 276 264 45 3S 202 296
Exchange Rate Volatility Inflation 1CRG B ureaucracy Index ICRG Political Risk Index
Debt-to- D ebt-to- Dcbt-to- Debt-to- Debt-to- D ebt-to- D ebt-to- D ebt-to- Debt-to- D ebt-lo- Debt-to- D ebt-to-
GDP_______ exports revenue GDP exports revenue GDP_______ exports revenue GDP_______ exports revenue
Debt ratio 0.014** 0.002** 0.003** 0.015** 0.003** 0.003** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.002** 0.002** 0.012**
Policy 0.411** 0.429** 0.322** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** -0.312** -0.233** -0.272** -0,016* 0.001 -0.007
P-Value o f  T est o f  Controls 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Im plied  T h re sh o ld s  21)1
Bad Policy 15 44 127 36 137 206 3 16
Average Policy 23 103 156 39 154 241 7 17 26
Good Policy 33 174 191 40 160 252 29 48 131 34
Source: IMF and IDA (2004b: 60 -  Appendix I, T able 2)
Original table notes: 1 * and ** denotes significance at the 5%  and 1% level respectively. 2/ Debt ratios are in present value term s using constant discount rates. 3 M issing 
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Table A3.4: Simple Probit Regression Results
NPV Debt/Export Ratio 0.003***
CPIA 0.083**
EVI 0.026***
GT Index (ToT) 0.003*
Export Instability Index 0,031***
Export Concentration Index 1.576***
Instability-Concentration 0.045***
KKM Factor -0.065**
Rule of Law (KKM) -0.535***
Aid (MA3) -0.841***
Note: These probit specifications include debt distress as the dependent 
binary variable, and the debt-exports ratio plus any of the indicators listed, 
taken each singularly. Also note that am ong the various specifications, the 
coefficient of the debt-exports ratio is not the same, b u t oscillates mainly 
around the indicated value o f 0.003.
Degree of confidence in significance tests: (***) 0.1% (**)!% (*)5% ()>5%
















GT Index -0.054 0.014 1.000
Export Instability 0.309 0.703 -0.039 1.000
Export Concentration 0.287 0.754 -0.008 0.369 1.000
Export Multiplier 0.341 0.825 -0.029 0.793 0.806 1.000
KKM Factor -0.678 -0.241 0.029 -0.392 -0.190 -0.336 1.000
Rule of Law -0.537 -0.278 0.059 -0.384 -0.322 -0.434 0.683 1.000
Aid (MA3) -0.303 -0.438 0.031 -0.279 -0.311 -0.289 0.115 0.255 1
Note: These are pair-w ise correlations relating to the entire data sam ple. Data source described Table A3.1.
Table A3.6: Principal Components Analysis (KKM)
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Compl 4.15923 3.50615 0.6932 0.6932
Comp2 .65308 .220642 0.1088 0.8021
Comp3 .432438 .0747382 0.0721 0.8741
Comp4 .3577 .138603 0.0596 0.9337
Comp5 .219097 .0406448 0.0365 0.9703
Comp6 .178452 0.0297 1.0000
Source: A uthor's calculations. Data source described Table A3.1.
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Table A3.7: Probit estimations involving the remaining KKM dimensions
KKM Component: Voice and Accountability Political Stability Government Effectiveness
Vulnerability Index: EVI Inst.-Conc. EVI Inst.-Conc. EVI Inst.-Conc.
Debt/EXP 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
KKM Component -0.132 -0.181 -0.216 -0.217 -0.491* -0.352
Vulnerability Index 0.025** O o *^3 f—L * * 0.028** 0.068*** 0.022* 0.065**
Constant -0.731** -1.399*** 2.018*** -1.352*** 1.884*** -1.431***
KKM Component: Regulatory Quality Control of Corruption
Vulnerability Index: EVI Inst.-Conc. EVI Inst.-Conc.
Debt/EXP 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
KKM Component -0.259 -0.115 -0.568* -0.374
Vulnerability Index 0.025** 0.071*** 0.025** 0.066**
Constant -1.846*** -1.324*** 2.062*** -1.467***
Notes:
Degree of confidence in significance tests: (***) 0.1% (**) 1% (*) 5% ()  >5% 
LR-tests have been om itted.
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4 An A ssessm ent of IDA Debt Service M odulation Schemes
4.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter outlined the W orld Bank's rationale for envisaging the 
introduction of debt service m odulation schemes as an integrating component of the 
new DSF (in particular, see the discussion in section 3.2). In an implicit admission of 
the DSF's failure to effectively protect low-income countries against exogenous 
shocks, in May 2005, the IDA released a report entitled "M anaging the Debt Risk of 
Exogenous Shock in Low-income Countries" (IDA, 2005b), evaluating a num ber of 
financial instrum ents that creditors could offer to help mitigate the impact of such 
shocks. However, far from representing a break w ith the tenets underlying the DSF, 
the IDA sets out the latest analysis by em phasising its common foundations with the 
DSF:
"Recent work by the Bank and Fund on an operation framework of debt 
sustainability in low-income countries identified exogenous shocks as one of three 
factors strongly affecting the risk of debt distress; the other two being the debt 
burden and the quality of policies and institutions. While the primary 
responsibility for dealing with the effects of shocks rests with low-income 
countries [...] themselves, the international community can also play a constructive 
and supportive role, provided such support is fully consistent with the country's 
own development priorities as expressed in the PRSP. Furthermore, better 
management of shocks is in the interest of official creditors."1
Signalling great caution against im pinging upon any of the DSF's operational and 
broader aid implications, the IDA defines the criteria any ex-ante scheme w ould have 
to fulfil in order to be given consideration w ithin the existing framework. As the 
overarching condition the IDA stipulates that creditors w ould face no losses of re­
flows in nom inal terms, and that the risk implications for creditors be limited, 
particularly in view of adverse selection and moral hazard effects.2 In other words, in 




timing, rather than the overall volum e of aid re-flows in nominal terms, and that its 
overall benefits to borrowers w ould be matched by those from pooling service risks 
across donors' debt portfolios, thus offsetting the net costs.
On such a premise, which de facto imposes the constraint of creditor loss 
m inimisation over the objective of borrow er benefit maximisation, it should be no 
surprise that the IDA review is mainly focussed on assessing ex-ante instrum ents' 
comparative risk-sharing and risk-pooling effects across countries and time. Indeed, 
in order to guarantee 'fairness' and 'applicability' of any new  instrum ent, its key 
param eters are assessed and calibrated across a panel of selected LICs in relation to 
overall cost-benefit implications, rather than being optimised to ensure effectiveness 
and benefit maximisation at the individual country level. Instead, by placing 
stringent constraints on the qualifying and evaluative process of ex-ante schemes, the 
IDA essentially fails to address the central policy objective, which is to maximise the 
individual country's insulation against exogenous shocks under the aegis of an 
innovative multilateral financing scheme.
Arguably, the IDA moved tow ards applying such creditor-centred bias of analysis 
out of apprehension regarding financial innovation that w ould necessarily imply 
substantial ex-ante commitments and potential costs to be borne by donors, 
additional to those that the current IDA/DSF framework already entails.3 Indeed, it 
should be noted that IDA's report is merely a response to a request by its Board of 
Governors and the Developm ent Committee to further investigate the potential scope 
of m ultilateral measures, and thus lacks the donor com m unity's m andate to actually 
propose any scheme that w ould have far-reaching implications for existing 
commitments.
The multilateral agency's methodological bias may thus be largely attributed to 
institutional constraints affecting its capacity to effectively explore the scope and 
potential of innovative financial instrum ents. Free from any such constraints, our 
own assessment of the IDA ex-ante mechanisms takes an alternative approach, w ith 
the main focus on these schemes' potential effects at the single country level.
3 This is certainly true for the official IDA report. The background studies to the report apply equally 
strict constraints, with the exception of Tabova (2004), who examines the option of a trust fund that 
would finance the additional costs involving her scheme (see Tabova 2004:11).
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Thereby, we place the main em phasis on assessing their potential to achieve the goal 
of effective protection against shocks, under the operational constraints im posed by 
the IDA. Moreover, we choose to disregard the comparative implications of creditors' 
risk-pooling benefits across schemes. For, if the financial instrum ents should prove 
ineffective in achieving their prim ary goal, any cost-benefit assessm ent relating to 
creditors w ould be largely irrelevant.
Our analysis draw s directly from and refers to the background papers underlying the 
IDA report, rather than to the report per se. It proceeds by first deriving a generalised 
scheme representing the key features of the various mechanisms proposed, and then 
sim ulating their performance on the basis of a case study, taking U ganda's historical 
context as an example. The rem ainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section
4.2 describes the essential thrust characterising the schemes underlying the IDA 
report; Section 4.3 simulates the main implications of each of the schemes for the case 
of Uganda; Section 4.4 derives the main conclusions from our assessment.
4.2 The basic design and modalities of IDA indexing schemes
Our assessment specifically relates to the contingency instrum ents proposed by 
Gilbert and Tabova (2005), Tabova (2004), and Vostroknutova (2005).“' Each of these 
papers essentially proposes some variation on a common basic scheme, which 
attem pts to link sovereign debt service paym ents to some index capturing a debtor's 
ability to repay debt. Central to all the instrum ents is the definition of modalities and 
terms applied to identifying exogenous shocks and to translating these into a 
proportional revision of a debtor's scheduled stream of debt service. Each scheme 
thus consists of three basic elements: (i) an index, to identify the occurrence of shocks; 
(2) threshold measures, defining the intensity of shocks triggering the scheme's 
intervention; (3) a formula, or set of rules, specifying the response function to the 
occurrence of shocks.5
4 We choose not to present our simulation results in relation to the proposal by Vostroknutova and Yi 
(2005), who evaluate the possibility of indexing official debt service to borrowers' foreign exchange rate. 
For, nominal exchange rate protection is also implicit in Vostroknutova's proposal for U.S. Dollar GDP 
indexing, the results of which are presented below.
5 As Gilbert and Tabova (2005) have succinctly put it.
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Among the proposed schemes, a key distinguishing feature relates to the choice of
the indexing variable. Tabova (2004) and Vostroknutova (2005) index debt service 
paym ents to countries' GDP growth, taken to represent the broadest m easure of 
economy-wide effects from shocks on repaym ent capacity. In contrast, Gilbert and 
Tabova (2005) ask w hether concessional debt service could be linked to commodity 
prices, by accelerating and delaying repaym ents according to a trade-weighted 
terms-of-trade index.
With the exception of the instrum ent proposed by Gilbert and Tabova (2005), the 
other IDA schemes rely on a similarly structured index and m odulating formulae. 
The index is typically defined as the control variable's deviation from its moving 
average:
w here z t is the indexing variable in period f, e.g. the real GDP grow th rate, and z t is 
a backward-looking moving average,
It should be noted that LICs' year-to-year variability in the indexing variable z t is
typically high, making the choice of lags (n ) in the com putation of moving averages 
an im portant m atter of judgement. Too narrow  a time span (n) assigns too high a 
w eight to years of exceptional growth (either positive or negative), while too many 
lags w ould fail to capture m id-term  changes in the trend of real grow th and render 
the scheme less flexible to adjusting to structural changes in the underlying variable. 
While the IDA authors' common choice is four lags (»=4), our own simulations 
dem onstrate a high sensitivity to the choice of lags, and thus each scheme is assessed 
by adopting both a shorter (n=3) and a longer (n=5) lag structure.
Furthermore, the index I t is said to fulfil the IDA's requirem ent that any such
financial instrum ent "minimize the opportunities for m oral hazard and adverse 
selection"6. For, its proponents argue that no debtor governm ent w ould have a
= {z t ~ z X (1)
(2 )
6 IDA (2005b: 15)
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typical moral hazard  incentive to m isreport or purposely influence the indexing 
variable, given that the cum ulative effect on the moving average w ould require that 
such action be continued over several periods before debt service w ould actually be 
lowered. For example, a country could hardly be envisaged as ham pering on purpose 
its GDP grow th over a prolonged period of time, just to reap the meagre benefits 
from a temporarily lower stream of debt service. Furtherm ore, it is argued that it 
w ould be difficult for countries to accurately forecast future deviations from moving 
averages, particularly w ith  regard to foreseeing the odds of actually benefiting from 
the scheme. It is therefore likely, its proponents argue, that these difficulties w ould 
reduce the risk of adverse selection occurring, which w ould see exclusively countries 
w ith down-side risks signing up to participate.7
As extensively discussed in Chapter 5 below, our own assessm ent shows the BWI's 
emphasis on the risks of incentive distortions to be largely exaggerated, and argues 
that they w ould be best addressed outside the realm of contingency mechanisms per 
se. Arguably, any IDA- dependent country undergoing the periodical reporting and 
screening exercises conducted by the BWI w ould neither have m uch opportunity to 
cheat, nor the incentive to do so, as long as the scheme is considered beneficial and 
the punishm ent for cheats entails their exclusion from it (even less so if punishm ent 
entailed indeterm inate exclusion from the soft-loan window). Furthermore, the 
adverse selection fears appear to be largely misplaced in the context of financial 
innovation that is supposed to appeal precisely to those countries displaying the 
highest degree of vulnerability and down-side risks. Adverse selection is thus largely 
an issue associated w ith a cost-minimising creditor-centred approach, but should 
have little bearing on our own assessment.
Contrary to the concern expressed in the IDA papers w ith regard to moral hazard 
implications, we note that their simple index may actually have the desirable effect of 
m odulating debt service (or any other financial flow) not only to fluctuations around 
the moving trend bu t also to the trend itself. For example, an index formulated 
according to equation (1) w ould necessarily include the m arginal trend effect of any 
variable falling below its declining moving average trend (and vice versa for the case
7 Assuming, of course, that participation in the scheme could not be forced upon any country.
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of an increasing trend). Therefore, the index may actually involve the potential of 
introducing incentive distortions, to the extent that the underlying indexed variable 
is at least partially under the control of the debtor country's authorities (e.g. GDP
inconsistent w ith the IDA's own premise, such a property is desirable if a more 
sophisticated control system for incentive distortions is pu t in place (e.g. as outlined 
in Chapter 5).
To control more accurately for the incentive implications of IDA schemes, 
Vostroknutova (2005) proposes an alternative variant of the above index, now 
defined as the ratio of the deviation of z, to the moving average of deviations during
the previous n periods. Consequently, I t takes a value greater (less) than one if
current trend deviation is greater (less) than the average deviation over the previous 
n years:
Such an index is suitable for distinguishing exceptionally pronounced deviations 
from those which fall w ithin the average degree of volatility the country has been 
facing, bu t lacks the advantage of trend m odulation of the alternative specification.
H aving defined the index, the IDA financing schemes establish a formula to translate 
variations of the index into debt service modulations. The form ula generally applied 
is expressed by:
growth, foreign exchange rate variations). While this w ould make the index largely
(3)
D S ' s  min^OS,", D S"  (l +  A\z, -  z, |)] 
D S '  = max[o, DS"  (l -  /l|z, -z ,|)]  
DS! = DS,"
if /, > 1 and
if /, < — 1 and (4)
where:
DS't is revised debt service in period t;
D S " is debt service originally due in period f;
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X is a param eter regulating the degree of adjustment.
Note that the formula (4) im plem ents a cap-floor approach, so that revised debt 
service will neither exceed // times the am ount originally due, nor fall below zero.8 
If the current period 's trend deviation is greater than average, i.e. I  > 1, debt service
is to be increased by an am ount equal to its trend deviation m ultiplied by a factor X . 
However, should such a revision increase debt service by more than a certain 
multiple of original debt service due, then jliDS° will set an upper limit applied to 
the scheme's actual m odulation of debt service in any given year. Similarly, if 
current period 's trend deviation falls below the moving average, i.e • i , <  — 1, debt 
service is to be reduced by an am ount equal to its trend deviation m ultiplied by a 
factor X . Again, the floor of zero debt service will bind if the revised debt service 
w ould otherwise become negative. Finally, it should be noted that 
param eter X calibrates the impact of the scheme, i.e. the degree to which debt service 
is m odulated by the distance of the indexing variable from its m oving average. In the 
simulation exercises below, we show that the actual calibration of this param eter is 
central to determ ining each instrum ent's potential in term s of the benefits accruing to 
single borrowers.
4.3 U ganda case study sim ulations
W ithout any pretence of providing a particularly com prehensive empirical 
assessment, this section aims at providing a first insight into the IDA instrum ents' 
likely implications on a low-income country's debt service schedule. O ur simulation 
framework takes a backward-looking, historical, approach, w ith particular focus on 
the case of U ganda during 1986-2003 and various sub-periods.9 While the time 
horizon of analysis is constrained by the availability of data, it includes U ganda's 
experience of a series of pronounced shocks adversely affecting its external balances
8 Negative debt service would imply an augmentation of scheduled disbursements on top the 
rescheduling already granted, and thus sensibly add to the pledges donors would have to make ex-ante 
in order to establish the instrument. As mentioned, such implications are ruled out by the IDA 
requirements.
9 Besides Uganda, we tested the main implications of the IDA schemes for Ghana, Mozambique, and 
Zambia (not reported here). The simulations generally corroborate our findings in relation to the 
Uganda case study. Our choice to present the detailed results for Uganda, instead of other LICs', rests on 
our focus on this country for the central case study related to our proposal for a contingency scheme. 
The reasons underlying our focus on Uganda are extensively described in Chapter 6, Section 6.1.
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and economic performance. The underlying data are extracted from the World 
Bank's Global Developm ent Finance (GDF) and W orld Developm ent Indicators 
(WDI) databases.10 The following sections outline the specific simulation context and 
our main results in relation to the ex-ante schemes underlying by the IDA report.
4.3.1 Real GDP growth indexing
We first im plem ent the indexing scheme outlined in the above equations (3) and (4), 
w hereby z t is set equal to U ganda's rate of real GDP grow th11 in period f. In order to 
ensure comparability w ith the results of Vostroknutova (2005), we set the cap applied 
to maximum total debt service at // =2, and also apply a service floor equal to zero. 
We then simulate the im plem entation of the instrum ent over the period 1995-2003, 
w ith particular focus on its implications in term s of debt service revisions in each 
period.
The four quadrants of G raph 4.1 sum m arise the main simulation outputs relating to 
the GDP indexing scheme, w ith lam bda set at unit value. Q uadrant I displays 
U ganda's real GDP grow th rate, as well as the current and average deviations of the 
latter from its moving average grow th rate (taking a five-years average, i.e. n=5). The 
series in Q uadrant I constitute the elements underlying the instrum ent's index, in 
accordance w ith equation (3) above. The third quadrant of Graph 4.1 shows this 
index, in the case of Uganda, to exceed the chosen bandw idth of +/-1 in all but one 
year (i.e. 2002). Put differently, the country is shown to have suffered from 
considerable year-to-year variation in its real GDP grow th rate, which causes the 
index to exceed unit value in absolute terms during almost the entire period of 
observation. As a result, the scheme is sim ulated to frequently trigger automatic 
revisions of U ganda's total debt service d u e12, in accordance with formula (4). The
10 The data underlying simulations were extracted from the GDF and WDI online databases in February 
2005 (institutional subscribers' access). To ensure better consistency across series, all data in real terms 
have been re-indexed to the base year 1995.
11 Real GDP growth is measured in terms of constant local currency units (drawn from WDI).
12 Total debt service includes Uganda's debt service payments on total long-term debt (i.e. public and 
publicly guaranteed and private non-guaranteed debt), use of IMF credit, and interest on short-term 
debt. Debt service payments are the sum of principal repayments and interest payments in the year 
specified. We also used alternative specifications of total debt service, e.g. by including changes in the 
stock of arrears outstanding, which however did not significantly alter the simulation results.
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ensuing debt service revision is plotted in quadrant II of G raph 4.1, against the total 
debt service originally due. At low values of X , proportional changes in debt service 
are of limited effect in m odulating the country's overall debt servicing curve. For, 
even substantial deviations in U ganda's growth rate merely translate to proportional 
deviations in the level, rather than differences, of the country's debt service flow over 
time. For example, in the year 1998 the deviation of U ganda's real GDP grow th rate 
fell short of its average by a sizeable 3.2 per cent. As a result, the effects from setting 
param eter X =1, i.e. by translating GDP mean-deviations into changes in debt service 
on a one-to-one basis, are of limited m agnitude w hen m easured in terms of absolute 
differences between original and m odulated debt service. The limited effect is even 
more strongly em phasised w hen debt service m odulation is expressed as a ratio to 
GDP. Indeed, quadrant IV shows TDS savings13 to range only between -0.13 and 0.07 
expressed as a percentage of GDP, thus representing negligibly small revisions to the 
country's debt burden.
Of course, higher values of the m odulation param eter A proportionally increase the 
scheme's effect on debt service due, and thus on debt service savings. G raph 4.2 and 
Table 4.1 compare the scheme's effectiveness in adjusting U ganda's debt service 
during the years of major trend deviations in the real grow th index, for increasing 
levels of X . Consider, for example, the period 1995-1997, during which Uganda was 
suffering from a continuously declining real GDP grow th ra te .14 By construction, the 
growth-indexing instrum ent is not able to suitably capture the effects of such 
continuing decline over several subsequent periods, as is evident from Panel III of 
Graph 4.1. Indeed, the latter shows the index to fall below the m inus-one intervention 
m ark only in 1997, w hen debt service reductions w ould have started to take effect. 
However, Table 4.1 shows that at X =1, debt service w ould have continued to 
increase during 1995-1997 despite the revisions, and despite U ganda facing a 
declining GDP grow th rate. Only by increasing the instrum ent's m odulation factor to
13 TDS Savings is a term used here to denote differences between original and modulated debt service 
during the period of observation, independently of whether the scheme would entail TDS differences to 
be rescheduled or forgiven. Positive (negative) values of TDS Savings are associated with a higher 
(lower) debt service over the entire simulation period.
14 Such a decline is mostly related to a plunge in (green) coffee prices, Uganda's main export item, after 
prices had reached their peak in 1995. See Chapter 6 for a detailed description of Uganda's historical 
growth and export performance.
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X =2 w ould the scheme have been sufficiently effective to actually lower debt service 
to accommodate the below-average grow th rate in 1997, as captured by the index. 
Moreover, it w ould have taken X =3 to more than offsett the increase in debt service 
originally due during 1995-1997, in order to accommodate the declining growth rates 
during that period.
Graph 4.2: Alternative Calibrations of the Real GDP Growth Indexing Scheme






Table 4.1: Total Debt Service M odulation - Alternative Levels of Lambda
U.S.DolIars
















1995 135 143 -0.13 150 -0.26 158 -0.39
1996 148 151 -0.05 154 -0.09 157 -0.14
1997 161 157 0.06 152 0.13 148 0.19
1998 153 148 0.07 143 0.14 138 0.21
1999 131 132 -0.01 132 -0.02 133 -0.03
2000 74 72 0.02 71 0.04 69 0.06
2001 50 49 0.01 49 0.02 48 0.03
2002 71 71 0.00 71 0.00 71 0.00
2003 84 83 0.01 82 0.02 81 0.03
TDS savings 1995-2003 1 -0.01 3 -0.02 4 -0.03
TDS savings 1996-2003 9 0.12 18 0.24 27 0.36
Note: A uthor's  sim ulations based  on GDF data
Furthermore, we observe that even at X =3, the instrum ent's net TDS savings
implications are extremely limited, reaching a maximum of -0.39 per cent of GDP in
1995. However, besides negligible year-to-year savings, the bottom  rows of Table 4.1
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show that the net savings effect of the scheme over the entire simulation horizon is 
extremely low, as well as being highly sensitive to the exclusion of single years. As a 
percentage of GDP, net total savings from debt service reductions are close to zero 
during 1995-2003, while they am ount to about one third of a percentage point of GDP 
w hen 1995 -  a year of substantially higher than average grow th -  is excluded. A 
similar conclusion is reached regarding absolute, rather than proportional, effects: 
TDS savings are close to zero if 1995 is included (Table 4.1).
Finally, it should be noted that the GDP indexing scheme's effect on debt service 
m odulation depends on the level of a country's debt service originally scheduled. 
That is, the higher (lower) debt service due, the higher (lower) the change in debt 
service will be. As a consequence, debt service adjustment m ay well be penalising a 
country if during the overall duration of the scheme years of higher-than-average 
grow th associated w ith high debt service due outnum ber years of lower-than- 
average grow th combined w ith low levels of debt service due. For example, consider 
Graph 4.1: in 1996 U ganda experienced a positive growth deviation of about 19 per 
cent, which w ould have triggered an upw ard TDS revision of about US$ 3 million; in 
contrast, a negative grow th deviation of approximately 14 per cent in 2001 w ould 
have reduced the country's TDS by only US$ 0.7 million.
In sum, the above simulation results dem onstrate the real GDP-indexing 
m echanism 's overall w eak potential to tilt debt service in response to U ganda's GDP 
growth, and thus to significantly align its debt service with broad capacity to pay. In 
particular, the instrum ent's index is unsuitable for capturing trend reversals in the 
grow th rate, and its m odulation formula is highly sensitive to the actual choice of the 
bandw idth triggering intervention, as well as the actual setting of the calibration 
param eter X .  To be effective, the latter w ould have to be adjusted according to the 
specific circumstances facing each individual LIC, particularly w ith regard to the 
level and moving average variables underlying the growth indexing mechanism and 
the specific debt service pattern. However, country specificity is incompatible w ith 
the IDA's requirem ent for uniform ly applied rules and param eters across countries, 
which in the context of the IDA instrum ent considered here implies the application of 
a uniform param eter X across all the low-income countries.
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In pursuance of a suitable way of determ ining the optimal value of X  in the context 
of growth-indexing, the background papers to the W orld Bank report put forward
two alternative calibration methods, which differ in term s of the policy target
of the GDP-indexing instrum ent, Vostroknutova (2005) suggests that X be set either 
at un it value or, alternatively, to assign X the median value between the m inimum 
and m axim um  grow th deviations across the entire sample of IDA-countries. While 
the former approach is chosen on grounds of simplicity, the latter is said to aim at 
achieving a more equally distributed pattern of debt service modulations across 
countries. This is because it w ould minimise the num ber of times the average country 
w ould encounter the binding limits of the scheme and end up paying either the 
m inim um  (i.e. zero) or m axim um  am ount (i.e. twice) of debt service due. While this 
may be true, we w ould add that nothing in this calibration approach ensures a 'fair' 
distribution of gains among LICs, and even less so the instrum ent's potential to 
effectively cushioning shortfalls of GDP growth in the case of individual countries. 
Indeed, it is sufficient to consider that Vostroknutova (2005) identifies X equal to 
2.05 as the optimal calibration value, which our simulations have shown to entail 
negligibly small changes to U ganda's debt servicing schedule, far from effectively 
aiding the country in times of particular difficulty.
While Vostroknutova (2005) fails to provide compelling evidence in support of her 
proposal, Tabova (2004) proposes a potentially more prom ising method of 
calibration. This takes as prim e objective the adjustm ent of the debt service stream in 
line with a LIC's real GDP growth, thereby reducing the variability of the TDS to 
GDP ratio. In pursuance of this goal, Tabova (2004) proposes that the value of X be 
determ ined so as to minimise the volatility of the TDS-GDP ratio, which is m easured 
as the variation of the indexed debt service to GDP ratio against its moving average:
pursued. With the main focus on the creditor costs implied by alternative calibrations
min VAR (5)
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where —-—-  is the ratio of indexed debt service to nominal GDP, andt d s !;
is the moving average of this ratio.
The minimisation objective is then sim ulated by im plem enting the same scheme as in
To assess Tabova's approach, we first need to solve the m inimisation problem. We 
decide to take a heuristic approach by devising an iterative procedure that converges 
to the variance minimising param eter in relation to equation (5).16 Focussing again on 
the case of Uganda, we now conduct a broader range of simulations, covering the 
longer period 1986-2003 as well as two shorter sub-periods to control for the scheme's 
sensitivity to the exclusion of years, and setting the lag structure (n) of the index to 
include alternatively five or three years.
Table 4.2 lists the simulation results from our iterative solutions to equation (5) in 
relation to the different lag structures and simulation periods contemplated. The 
upper rows of the table provide the sum m ary statistics of the scheme's index. A 
positive (negative) average value of the index over the simulation period indicates an 
overall positive (negative) trend in U ganda's GDP growth, which causes debt service 
revisions to take a negative (positive) average value over the period (bottom row of 
Table 4.2). Moreover, the index is shown to take an average close to zero across 
simulations, which determ ines the scheme's m odulation effects to be generally low, 
as reflected by the low m agnitudes of both absolute and relative TDS savings.
15 Tabova (2004) also tests an alternative objective, defined as the volatility of the residual foreign 
exchange-to-GDP ratio, where residual foreign exchange is computed as the sum of export receipts 
minus oil imports and debt service outlays. This variant is not included here, since the variance 
minimisation procedure is identical to the case of the TDS-GDP ratio.
16 The variance-minimisation procedure was coded in Stata9. Due to space limitations, the lengthy 
program code, as well as the detailed iteration outputs, are not reported here, but can be made available 
by the author upon request (in relation to all the LICs).
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However, while these results reflect those of Table 4.1 -  em ploying a different index -  
our key focus here is on the scheme's effectiveness in reducing the variation in the 
TDS-GDP ratio. The latter is assessed by the difference in variance before and after 
the introduction of the m odulation scheme. Table 4.2 compares the scheme's 
effectiveness in reducing variations between the identified variance-minimising 
values of param eter X and the scenarios w ith X at unit value. It can be observed that 
the optimal calibration values, indicated as X * , fall w ithin a relatively narrow  range, 
spanning from 0.5 to 2.8. For example, the simulation scenario shown in the first 
column of Table 4.2 indicates the variance-minimising value of X * to converge at the 
value 2.1. Accordingly, the TDS m odulation effect w ould cause TDS/GDP variability 
to fall by about 10 per cent during 1995-2003, while debt service w ould decline by 
only USD 1.5m, or 0.14 per cent of total debt service paid over the same period. 
However, the results listed in the second column show that w hen the simulation 
period is reduced by one single year, to 1996-2003, it appears that there exists no 
value for X >0 that could reduce the variance of the original TDS-GDP ratio, and thus 
the scheme w ould not even be activated during the w hole period of analysis. In 
contrast, the third column shows that an extension of the period to include the years 
1986-2003, w ould have variance-minimising X set at 0.8. This, however, w ould 
reduce the variability of the TDS-GDP ratio by less than 0.5 per cent during the same 
period, while the country w ould see its debt service revised upw ards by almost US$ 
23 million. Arguably, in the face of an accelerated repaym ent stream  it is questionable 
w hether the country authorities w ould consider the net benefits from a negligibly 
small reduction in the TDS-GDP ratio to be positive.
The scheme's intrinsic sensitivity to period selection is further evidenced by 
comparing its effectiveness using different lag structures. A lthough the difference 
between the tw o differently lagged indexes is not particularly pronounced in the case 
of U ganda (Graph 4.3), Table 4.2 shows that the simulations adopting a backward- 
looking moving average of three, as opposed to five, years (72=3), yield results that 
differ considerably in the determ ination of variance-minimising X . Since a shorter 
moving average is more suitable to capturing short-term cyclicality, we w ould expect 
it to constitute a more effective benchm arking m ethod in the presence of U ganda's 
high variability around trend. Indeed, our results confirm that for any chosen period,
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a comparison of sim ulations based on MA(5) against MA(3) shows the latter to be 
associated with a higher calibration param eter A  and a stronger decline in TDS/GDP 
variability.




1988 19921990 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Real GDP Growth index M A S  0—  Real GDP Growth Index MA3
In sum, our simulations of the real-GDP indexing scheme under the pursuance of 
variance minimisation appear to confirm its limited effectiveness in m odulating 
U ganda's debt service to any significant degree. The best results are achieved by 
indexing to a backward-looking grow th benchmark of three lags, and for higher 
values of A . However, even then, the variability of the TDS-GDP ratio shows only a 
limited decline, and may well be associated w ith an overall acceleration of the debt 
service stream  com pared to no intervention. Furthermore, optimal calibration 
appears to be highly sensitive to period selection.
Against this background, showing severe limitations of this scheme's applicability to
the case of a single country, it is evident that such difficulties w ould be almost
insurm ountable in the cross-country context contemplated by the IDA. The
calibration of the instrum ent to objectives such as minimisation of debt ratio volatility
w ould be impossible, and the requirem ent for uniform param eters across countries
would lead to severe discrepancies in the instrum ent's im pact across countries.
Ultimately, the pursuance of creditor cost limitation would be likely to lead to the
application of a low param eter value, similar to Vostroknutova's scenario setting A
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at unit value, thus foregoing any potential to effectively address the repaym ent 
difficulties across countries and time.
4.3.2 U.S. D ollar GDP grow th indexing
A country's total external debt service is typically denom inated in current U.S. 
Dollars. Therefore, to more effectively align debt service w ith a country's capacity to 
pay, an insurance scheme could be indexed to GDP grow th in current U.S. Dollar 
terms. While indexing to a country's deviations in the real GDP grow th rate captures 
broad macroeconomic circumstances, the growth rate denom inated in current U.S. 
Dollars encompasses a broader range of factors affecting a country's capacity to pay. 
Besides real growth, it reflects both changes in a borrow er's currency exchange rate 
to the dollar (or to a basket of creditors' currencies) and domestic inflation (see 
Annex A4.1 to this chapter for a description of basic relationships between the two 
grow th series). On such a premise, Vostroknutova (2005) contemplates applying the 
IDA scheme to LICs' GDP grow th deviations denom inated in U.S. Dollars, instead of 
constant local currency units.
To assess the IDA scheme's performance with U.S. Dollar GDP indexation, we 
reiterate here our sim ulation m ethod in line w ith Tabova's variance minimisation 
approach to calibration, in order to provide a direct comparison w ith the real growth 
indexing scheme considered above.17 Table 4.3 summarises our main simulation 
results. Strikingly, except for the 1995-2003 period (first column), in none of the 
contemplated scenarios is the scheme suitable for achieving its goal of variance 
minimisation of the TDS-GDP ratio. Due to the sheer m agnitude of the index 
deviations, there is no value of A > 0 which could translate changes in nominal GDP 
grow th into volatility-reducing revisions of the country's debt service stream .18 In 
contrast, the results dem onstrate that proportional debt service revisions, i.e. at A — 1 
as applied by V ostroknutova (2005), render the revised TDS-GDP ratio extremely
17 It should be noted that the IDA review does not directly address U.S. Dollar indexing among the 
schemes contemplated, and only does so implicitly, with reference to the background paper by 
Vostroknutova (2005). Furthermore, the IDA includes a scenario indexing to countries' real exchange 
rates. As already mentioned, we do rrot include this scheme among our reported simulations, since our 
results in relation to the latter are partly subsumed in the broader growth indexing scenario reported in 
this section (in relation to the nominal, rather than real exchange rate).
18 We reach the same conclusion also by applying alternative measures of volatility, e.g. the growth 
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volatile, and lead to substantial debt service savings particularly during years 
characterised by a strongly negative index mean (i.e. w hen positive and negative 
yearly m odulations do not tend to cancel each other out).
Table 4.4 shows more detailed simulation results relating to the scheme's effect 
during each single year between 1986 and 2003. The years 1989 and 1995 mark, 
respectively, the peak and dip levels of the growth index. Debt service is reduced by 
46 percent, or US$ 87 million, in 1989, and increases by 48 per cent or US$ 65 million 
in 1995, when positive grow th deviation is highest. A lthough the scheme's liquidity 
effects are of substantial m agnitude in absolute terms, they are limited when 
m easured as a percentage of GDP: the yearly TDS savings ratio reaches its peak at 
1.65 per cent, in 1989, and subsequently declines along the negative trend of the TDS- 
GDP ratio. Furtherm ore, it should be noted that yearly liquidity effects of debt 
service m odulation are distorted by indexing to MA(5) deviations as opposed to 
yearly fluctuations of GDP growth. For example, in 1989, nominal GDP fell by about 
19 per cent com pared to its level during the previous year, while its deviation from 
MA(5) was 46 per cent. This caused the scheme to trigger a debt service revision that 
was more than twice as high as the am ount w arranted by the year-to-year variation. 
However, to the extent that year-to-year variation captures the actual burden of 
external debt in term s of financial liquidity, or capacity to pay more in general, 
indexing schemes should em ploy a smaller num ber of lags, and thereby assign a 
proportionally higher weight to current deviation. Finally, Table 4.3 shows the sum  
of U ganda's sim ulated debt service savings to be US$ 126 million over the period 
1986-2003. Rather than representing a substantial am ount of additional aid to the 
country, it should be noted that this scheme's financial implications w ould am ount to 
only about 1.2 per cent of the total am ount of official financial developm ent 
assistance to U ganda over the same period.
In sum, our sim ulations support the view that nominal GDP indexing, being
susceptible to a broader range of factors influencing a country's repaym ent capacity,
could, in principle, offer better risk hedging proprieties to low-income countries. In
particular, we find that such a scheme could lead to a substantial degree of yearly
debt service revisions, depending on the specific param eter settings applied.
However, the scheme's broader potential for protection also increases the
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discrepancies am ong individual countries' actual exposure to GDP fluctuations over 
time. Therefore, the nominal GDP scheme is bound to present even greater 
calibration difficulties than those discussed in relation to the real GDP scheme, and is 
largely unsuitable for uniform  application across the group of low-income countries, 
as m andated by the IDA.
Finally, it should be recalled from our discussions in Chapters 2 and 3, that the 
greatest weakness of GDP indexing schemes results from their lack of differentiation 
between exogenous and endogenous determinants. Therefore, these instrum ents are 
unsuitable for m aking the fundam ental distinction between a borrow er's capacity to 
pay, and the state of nature affecting the latter. While this problem  is already intrinsic 
in the real GDP measure, serving as an indexing variable to the scheme considered in 
the previous section, it is greatly exacerbated in the case of current U.S. Dollar 
growth indexing, involving a broad spectrum  of possible causes affecting a country's 
m onetary variables. Ultimately, by introducing the potential for incentive problems 
(e.g. a country's disincentive to exceed the average growth rate or to meet an inflation 
target), these schemes fail to correctly interpret the basic tenets underlying the design 
of incentive-compatible contingency instrum ents, and thereby could hardly 
constitute a viable option for application to the broader creditor community. In this 
sense, the IDA's underlying assumption, i.e. that indexing to trend deviations w ould 
largely deter incentive distortions, is clearly inconsistent w ith it ow n preconditions 
on ex-ante instrum ents.
4.3.3 Term s of trade indexing
An im portant variant of the common IDA scheme is introduced by gearing a debtor's 
debt service to some index capturing its terms of trade (TOT), rather than GDP. To 
the extent that a country's export commodity prices do not significantly diverge from 
world prices, and the country lacks the market power to substantially influence these 
prices, its terms of trade constitute a sound basis for an index reflecting truly 
exogenous shocks to a country's repaym ent capacity. By indexing to a variable 
proxying the state of nature, rather than capacity to pay as such, it largely avoids the
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indeterminacy underlying the GDP-based indices, and thus most of the incentive 
hazards associated w ith the latter.19
However, instead of properly appreciating the advantages from indexing to 
exogenously determ ined prices, rather than to GDP, the IDA report ascribes it the 
following characteristics:
"An instrument that links official debt service to changes in a country-specific 
commodity price index allows for timely adjustment in resource flows in the event 
of a terms-of-trade shocks. [..-1
The timing risks that the creditor would face are likely to be small. [...] A 
simulation of a portfolio of conventional concessional credits and a similar 
portfolio of credits indexed to commodity prices found that the latter resulted in an 
approximate loss of 0.5 percent of total reflows in net present value terms. [...]
The design of the instrument avoids incentives for misreporting as the calculation 
of required debt service is based on international commodity prices. [...]
This instrument would only insure against unfavourable international commodity 
price developments, but would not insure against other commodity-related shocks 
that affect a country's repayment capacity." (IDA 2005:17-18)
Clearly, this characterisation of the scheme reflects both the IDA report's central 
creditor bias, and the mostly operational concern it exhibits w ith regard to the 
incentive effects. Indeed, the incentive effects are reduced to representing mere 
m isreporting concerns, rather than centring attention on the crucial issues relating to 
the ex-ante scheme's incentive implications. Arguably, by failing to compare 
alternative schemes on such grounds, the IDA report lacks any relevant bearing on 
the analysis of their true implications and likely effectiveness in either debtor or 
creditor countries.
In relation to our assessment of the TOT-indexing scheme in the case of Uganda we 
choose to follow two different approaches, w ith the aim of providing a comparison of 
its performance w ith those of the GDP schemes considered above. We first 
restructure the basic scheme outlined in Section 4.2, using a terms of trade index 
relying on unit value prices. Subsequently, we simulate an alternative instrum ent, as
19 Although it may still be argued that insuring against a low-income country's vulnerability to terms of 
trade shocks includes a protection bias in favour of countries with greater vulnerability, which, in turn, 
may introduce a distortion in their incentive to free themselves from the reliance on a narrow and 
vulnerable basket of export commodities. While it is impossible here to expand on the broader 
implications from protection against terms of trade shocks, the reader is referred to the discussion in 
Chapter 5 below.
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contemplated by the IDA on the basis of the trade-weighted terms of trade index
devised by Gilbert and Tabova (2005).
4.3.3.1 Terms of trade indexing with the standard IDA scheme
The basic IDA scheme is readily adapted to indexing changes in U ganda's terms of 




where the country's (barter) term s of trade are defined as:
ToT, =
X G S USD
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where X G S usd and M G S usd are the unit values 20 of exports and imports, 
respectively;
and where the backward-looking moving average of the ToT is:
ToT, = - Y T oT, . . 
n /=i
(8)





T D S , 1* —
X G S t n
VT > 0 (9)
Turning to the sim ulation results, Graph 4.4 displays export and im port unit values 
relating to U ganda during 1986-2003. Over the entire period, export prices show a 
pronounced dow nw ard trend, with the exception of a sharp rise in 1995, while 
im port prices tend to flatten out from the early 1990s onwards. Consequently, the 
terms of trade closely follow the dow nw ard trend in export prices, particularly since 
the early 1990s.21
20 Unit value is the ratio of export (import) value to export (import) volume. Unit values are calculated 
from WDI data, and correspond to those published in the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics CD-ROM 
(2005) but offering greater availability of observations.
21 For a detailed description of Uganda's TOT pattern, see Chapter 6 below.
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S ource: A uthors calculations, based  on WDI data
G raph 4.5 plots the index, I t , calculated as the ratio of U ganda's term s of trade to its 
moving average (assuming a three-year lag structure). By indexing the scheme to / , ,  
debt service is to adjust to both TOT fluctuations around the trend and to the trend 
itself. Together, these forces cause the index to fluctuate broadly between -40 and +60 
per cent, and the strong dow nw ard pressure from worsening term s of trade is shown 
to restrict the index mostly to the negative area of the graph.
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 > TOT — 0 —  TOT MA(3) I -  TOT - TOT MA(3) Ratio
Saunca: A uthors calculations, based  on WDI d ata
Table 4.5 lists the results from simulations over alternative periods and lag structures. 
Contrary to the GDP indexing schemes, calibration of X to the objective of variance-
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minimisation is achieved by all the scenarios, and is highly effective in reducing 
volatility in the TDS-XGS ratio. The latter is shown to fall by between 8 and 80 per 
cent, and, overall, X at unit value w ould appear to be the optim ising calibration 
value of the scheme's key param eter across the various scenarios. The average value 
of the index is consistently negative, reflecting a situation of generally worsening 
terms of trade, and takes more negative values w hen the peak year of 1995 is 
excluded. The index triggers substantial debt service adjustments, both on a yearly 
basis and in term s of total changes to debt service over the various periods of 
application. For example, depending on the lag structure of the index, the application 
of the scheme over the period 1986-2003 would have led debt service to fall by 
between 12 and 16 per cent as ratio to total debt service due, despite the inclusion of 
the TOT upsw ing during 1994/95.








Mean -0.08 -0.15 -0.17 -0.05 -0.13 -0.11
Standard Deviation 0.28 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.13 0.22
Min -0.35 -0.35 -0.38 -0.28 -0.28 -0.36
Max 0.52 0.13 0.52 0.61 0.07 0.61
Calibration X (8) 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.6 1.1
Var (TDS7XGS) Original 19.9 21.8 97.4 62.3 65.2 113.7
Var (TDS/XGS) Revised 100.0 59.7 180.3 135.5 71.4 182.2
Difference in Variance (%) -80.1 -63.5 -46.0 -54.0 -8.6 -37.6
Total Sum of TDS Savings 12 92 356 13 57 288
Total Sum of TDS 1006 871 2264 1006 871 2435
TDS Savings (% ofTDS) 1.2 10.6 15.7 1.3 6.5 11.8
Source: A uthors ' calculations, based on WDI and  GDF data.
Notes: (#) V ariance-m inim ising value of lam bda.
In sum, the U ganda case study dem onstrates that terms of trade indexing dearly 
outperform s its GDP-anchored variant. Applying our own specification as a hybrid 
version of the proposals of Vostroknutova (2005) and Tabova (2005), and defining an 
alternative index optimally capturing trend variations, we show  that the scheme has 
the potential to effectively reduce the volatility of the debt servicing-to-exports ratio. 
Moreover, the scheme shows itself to be less vulnerable to the type of incentive issues 
addressed by the IDA, while also fulfilling our own criterion in relation to its ability 
to link debt service paym ents to a proxy that is far closer to representing the state of 
nature, than is GDP.
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4.3.3.2 Terms of trade indexing along the Gilbert and Tabova (2005) scheme22
In an interesting study underlying the IDA report, Gilbert and Tabova (2005) conduct 
an investigation into the potential benefits of terms-of-trade insurance schemes. W ary 
of potential incentive distortions introduced by indexing to unit values, which could 
induce debtor governm ents to over-report im port prices and under-report export 
prices, the authors opt for the em ployment of an alternative term s of trade index, 
reflecting w orld prices instead of country-specific unit values. However, by 
em phasising the benefits of w orld prices over export and im port unit values, Gilbert 
and Tabova (2005) appear not to fully acknowledge that un it values, such as those 
underlying the TOT Index used in the previous scheme, have the great benefit of 
reflecting country-specific attributes of particular prim ary exports, such as quality 
characteristics and specific grades. Since these characteristics have a decisive bearing 
on the price a specific commodity commands in the international markets (e.g. coffee, 
cocoa, tobacco), an index based on unit values offers broader protection against a 
country's susceptibility to exogenous shocks affecting prices through altered 
commodity characteristics (e.g. as a consequence of climatic shocks).
Essentially, the authors compute their index following a m ethod identical to that 
applied in the seminal contribution by Deaton and Miller (1995), but decide to 
exclude from the index all those prim ary commodities for w hich w orld prices are not 
well-defined (e.g. iron ore and oils), as well as metals exports.23 The index is thus 
defined as:24
purpose of this study.
23 Since metals exports fail to explain growth in the regressions, Gilbert and Tabova perform to estimate 
the TOT-GDP growth relationship. However, while dropping metals from the index appears to be less of 
a problem when applied to Uganda, which relies on few other metals exports with the exception of gold 
(see Chapter 6), the same could not be argued in the case of other mainly metal-exporting LICs, such as 
Zambia (copper) or Ghana (gold). Furthermore, the exclusion of oil from LICs' import bill is bound to 
heavily distort the assessment of the balance of payments impacts from fluctuations in the world price of 
their primary import item.
24 See Tabova and Gilbert (2005: 5-9) for a detailed description of the index.
KPttJ
( 10)
22 We thank Alexandra Tabova for having kindly made available their terms of trade index for the
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w here m is the total num ber of commodities i entering the index; \v'it represents the 
weights of the relative im portance of specific commodities w ithin any country j 's  
exports and their value share in that country's national income; p u denotes the
matrix of prices across commodities and time, and p u is the moving average of the 
matrix of prices, defined as:
— 1 "
Pu = ~ l L P u - '  
f t  i=\
( 11 )
The authors choose to have a lag-structure of four years (n=4). A comparison between 
the Gilbert-Tabova Index and the barter terms of trade index for U ganda shows a 
close similarity between the two series in the observed pattern over time (Graph 
4.6).25 In the case of our country study, this w ould support the application of either 
index, whereby the inclusion of lags remains a largely arbitrary m atter of judgement. 
However, the same does not apply for LICs who are predom inantly metals exporters, 
in which case the GT Index is largely inapplicable (e.g. see the table in Annex A4.2, 
for the case of Zambia).
Graph 4.6: Uganda - Standard Terms o f Trade Index vs. G ilbert-Tabova index
- q
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
ToT / TOT MA(4) Ratio G T-lndex
Source: A uthors calculations, based  on WDI data and Gilbert and Tabova (2005)
Relying on the on the above-defined index, Gilbert and Tabova (2005) design their 
m odulation scheme w ith the objective of limiting the im pact of adverse shocks on the 
borrow ing countries, but em phasising that this should be achieved "w ithout
25 Note that the GT-lndex is only available for the period up to 2001.
-1 7 0 -
imposing a substantial cost to the lending institution".26 Instead of pursuing variance- 
minimisation as such, the authors calibrate their instrum ent using a trial-and-error 
approach, roughly exploring the cost-benefit effects from alternative param eter 
settings across the 56 low-income countries included in their sample. The authors 
eventually settle for the param eter values listed in Table 4.6, which at the same time 
constitute their instrum ent's m odulation formula. Gilbert and Tabova (2005) apply a 
cap-floor approach to limit m axim um  and minimum debt service revision, similarly 
to the general IDA scheme. However, in contrast to the IDA scheme, and in particular 
to the Vostroknutova (2005) index outlined above, they define asymmetric bands of 
+1 and -2.5 per cent, as a safeguard to borrowers against too high positive debt 
service m odulation during (very) propitious periods, and also to exclude the 
possibility of negative debt service modulation, i.e. the automatic disbursem ents of 
additional loans, during very adverse periods. In all other respects, the instrum ent 
works similarly to the other schemes featured by the IDA report. For example, an 
index value ranging between +0.5 and -1.25 per cent w ould leave a country's debt 
service stream  intact, while an index value falling between -1.25 and -2.5 per cent 
would qualify for a debt service reduction by one half of the am ount originally 
scheduled for the particular year of observation.
Table 4.6: Gilbert-Tabova Debt Service Indexing Scheme
Period Index value Debt Service Multiple
Very propitious I { >1% 150%
Propitious 1 % > I t >0.5% 125%
Neutral 0.5% > I t > -1 .25% 100%
Adverse -1 .25%  > / ,  > -2 .5 % 50%
Very adverse -  2.5% > I, 0%
Source: Gilbert and Tabova (2005), adapted by the author.
Turning now  to simulations, we decide to apply the GT-instrument to the case of 
Uganda over the entire period of availability of the GT-index, i.e. 1985-2001, and by 
adopting the same calibration underlying the authors' own simulations. G raph 4.7 
shows that the GT-scheme applied according to the param eter settings of Table 4.6
26 Gilbert and Tabova (2005:12)
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Source: A uthors calculations, based  on WDI data and Gilbert and Tabova (2005)
Graph 4.8: Uganda - TDS, Original vs. Indexed
(Million U.S.Dollars)
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Source: Author's simulation, relying on WDI and GDF data, and the GT-lndex by Gilbert and Tabova (2005)
Table 4.7: Gilbert-Tabova Indexing Scheme Simulation Results
Period 1985-2001 1986-2001 1995-2001 1996-2001
Index
Mean -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
Std. Dev. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Minimum -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Maximum 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Var (TDS/XGS) Original 281 300 34 39
Var (TDS/XGS) Revised 346 321 136 132
Difference in Variance (%) 65 21 102 93
Total Sum of TDS Savings 518 596 -54 13
Total Sum of TDS 2436 2281 852 717
TDS Savings (% of TDS) 21.3 26.1 -6.4 1.8
Source: A uthor's sim ulations, based on WDI and  GDF data, and  the term s of trade index devised by Gilbert and Tabova (2005).
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w ould identify 29 per cent of the years as very propitious, 24 per cent as neutral, 18 
per cent as adverse, and 24 per cent as very adverse. As a result of Uganda's 
predom inantly adverse terms of trade evolution, Graph 4.8 shows the instrum ent to 
result in an overall debt service reduction over the entire period, and to reduce debt 
service to zero in about one quarter of the years. Moreover, debt service reductions 
are shown to be substantial, exceeding US$ 250 million in the year 1988 alone. 
Between 1988 and 1991, Uganda w ould have seen its entire debt service rescheduled 
to the future.
Table 4.7 provides a more detailed sum m ary of all the relevant simulation results 
across alternative time periods. A comparison across periods shows the instrum ent's 
effects to be highly sensitive to the exclusion of single years, both in terms of TDS 
savings and the volatility of the TDS-XGS ratio. Since the scheme is not calibrated to 
minimise volatility, the variance of the TDS-XGS ratio is consistently increased by the 
debt service revisions, and doubles during the shorter periods of application. While 
variance minimisation is not among the scheme's objectives, and is thus not the most 
appropriate measure for assessing its performance, it should be noted that it also 
appears to fail to fulfil its prim ary objective, i.e. to provide effective protection at 
minimised cost to creditors. While effective protection is indeed achieved by means 
of substantial yearly rescheduling, as shown in G raph 4.8, Table 4.7 also shows that 
such rescheduling tends to rapidly accumulate, particularly over the longer periods 
of simulations. For example, after the im plem entation period spanning from 1985 to 
2001, U ganda's debt stock w ould have increased by US$ 518 million, accruing from 
the accumulation of rescheduled arrears. As result, the effects of the scheme appear 
to be largely inconsistent w ith the IDA prerogatives, and thus w ith the authors' own 
target of devising a scheme in line w ith those requirements.
W ith regard to this finding, it is w orth mentioning that Gilbert and Tabova (2005) 
reach a conclusion that strongly contrasts w ith our own simulation results. Indeed, 
using a different methodology, based on forward-looking Monte Carlo simulations of 
terms of trade shocks, the authors estimate that after an application period of 25 or 15 
years U ganda's accumulated arrears w ould am ount to only 3.6 and 1.8 per cent,
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respectively, of the initial debt stock. 27 Unfortunately, the difference in 
methodological approach makes it impossible to directly compare these results w ith 
those derived from the deterministic, historical simulations we conduct here. 
However, the m agnitude of the discrepancy w ith our results is striking: we calculate 
that over the same period of 15 years, spanning between 1987 and 2001, U ganda's 
TDS arrears w ould actually have increased by a sizeable 35.4 per cent in relation to its 
initial debt stock, com pared to the 1.8 per cent found by Gilbert and Tabova (2005). 
W hen comparing results, it should be noted that a strong argum ent in favour of our 
approach is its focus on assessing the scheme's potential effects in relation to the 
terms of trade shocks U ganda is actually known to have experienced. In contrast, the 
bootstrapping method applied by Gilbert and Tabova (2005) creates a fictitious 
simulation scenario, representing an environm ent the average IDA-only country is 
assum ed to be experiencing over some chosen time horizon spanning into the future. 
While either methodology may be said to have its specific advantages and 
drawbacks, the general experience has dem onstrated that forecasting scenarios 
involving low-income countries are usually far off any reasonable m argin of error.28
It could still be argued that the cost-minimising objective of the GT-scheme w ould be 
achieved if its overall reflows implications to the lending institutions were to average 
out among participating low-income countries. While this w ould crucially depend on 
the specific correlation structure of shock events actually experienced across 
countries and time, it w ould still remain necessary to optimise the scheme for the 
individual participating country, in order to avoid the creation of severe incentive 
distortions. For example, the substantial accumulation of arrears over prolonged 
periods by some countries, e.g. Uganda, would entail a w ide array of typical 
disincentive problem s similar to those associated with a situation of debt overhang. 
In contrast, in the case of other countries, the prospects of prolonged periods of debt 
service accelerations could lead to an excessive liquidity squeeze, and thus accentuate 
adverse selection problems.
27 See Gilbert and Tabova (2005: 27 -  Table 5).
28 The simulations underlying the BWI debt sustainability assessment (DSA) being perhaps the most 
suitable example in this context (see Chapter 3).
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In sum, we fail to find the GT-scheme to be particularly compelling on the basis of its 
com parative performance against the alternative TOT-instrument analysed above. 
On the basis of our U ganda country study, we find the instrum ent's rigid param eter 
calibration to underm ine its capacity to adequately adjust to a specific pattern of 
terms of trade evolution. Thereby, the GT-scheme lacks the desirable flexibility of the 
alternative TOT-instrument, including its potential for achieving the desirable 
variance-minimising effect. Furthermore, as the central feature of the Gilbert and 
Tabova (2004) approach, the trade w eighted terms of trade index exhibits the severe 
shortcoming of excluding metals and oil prices, which makes it unsuitable for 
application across LICs, thus foregoing its potential as a useful world-price-based 
alternative to the simple barter terms of trade index.
4.4 Concluding remarks
Against the background of a long-standing reluctance to even contemplate the 
potential role of contingency schemes in addressing low-income countries' 
vulnerability to exogenous shocks, the ex-ante instrum ents envisaged by the recent 
IDA report mark an im portant step forw ard in the multilateral approach. The general 
scheme we have analysed in this section, as a surrogate for those proposed by the 
background papers underlying the report, offers a simple instrum ent that can be 
tailored to include a variety of alternative indexing variables.
Among the instrum ents considered in the context of our U ganda country study 
simulations, the terms of trade indexing schemes seem to be best suited to adjusting a 
country's debt service to capacity to pay. The basic TOT-instrum ent also appears to 
have a greater potential to reduce TDS-XGS volatility, provided that the IDA's 
requirem ent of creditor-cost minimisation is not m ade binding. In contrast, GDP 
schemes seem to perform less well, and are also bound to present greater calibration 
difficulties due to the disparate factors affecting GDP grow th across countries. 
However, while param eter calibration in the case of one country has been shown to 
be problematic, the IDA requirem ent of uniform param eter setting across low-income 
countries appears to be largely impractical. For, there is no possible way of 
determ ining an optimal param eter setting that w ould ensure the instrum ents' 
suitability for beneficial application across all the LICs. Instead, the IDA's prerogative
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of minimising creditor costs w ould probably lead to a weak calibration of any 
instrum ent envisaged, w ith focus on risk-pooling characteristics across creditors' 
portfolios, and negligible liquidity effects for individual debtor countries.
More fundamentally, the proponents of these instrum ents seem to disregard the 
conceptual difference between a country's repaym ent capacity and the state of nature 
that influences it. The importance of such a distinction being m ade in order to ensure 
an insurance scheme's incentive compatibility has long been in the domain of our 
understanding in relation to these issues, as was extensively discussed in Chapter 2 
of this study. However, rather than addressing these instrum ents' more profound 
incentive implications, the IDA' emphasis seems to be placed on the more superficial, 
and arguably less decisive, aspects of distortions, such as a borrow er's scope for 
misreporting or even tilting its exports to reap some short-sighted benefits. While 
failing to even appropriately address the latter, e.g. by w rongly assuming the 
incentive compatibility of indices based on moving averages, the IDA fails to realise 
the broader shortcomings of its approach in relation to contingency schemes.
Ultimately, none of the schemes analysed in this section is fully appropriate for 
assessing the various sources of vulnerability affecting a country's capacity to pay, 
nor to address the actual financial needs arising from shocks. For, indexing faces a 
trade-off between capturing the shocks from a limited, well-defined source (e.g. the 
terms of trade), thus ignoring all other im portant sources of shocks to an economy, 
and the insurm ountable complications from disentangling exogenous from 
endogenously determ ined shocks w hen indexing to broader proxies of repaym ent 
capacity (e.g. nominal GDP growth). Also, debt service adjustm ent constitutes but 
one of the items constituting overall net official financial transfers to a debtor 
economy, which, as a whole, w ould have to represent the m odulating variable. Put 
differently, in order to m odulate effectively a country's liquidity, a financing scheme 
w ould need to adjust financial flows beyond debt service scheduled, w ith a broader 
objective of m odulating flows in response to financial requirements and involving at 
least some degree of new financing and/or relief of existing debt.
We conclude our analysis with a final reflection in relation to the IDA ex-ante 
scheme's proposed allocation w ithin the overall Debt Sustainability Framework (i.e.
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the third pillar in Chart 3.1 of the preceding chapter). It will be recalled from the 
discussions in Chapter 3 that the DSF's debt sustainability assessment is crucially 
focussed on the evolution of external debt in relation to debtor's GDP. Moreover, it 
has been pointed out that the rationale for the integration of IDA ex-ante schemes 
into the DSF arises out of its failure to protect countries against the large, 
unforeseeable shocks occurring with relatively low frequency. In light of these 
considerations, it w ould appear that for reasons of internal consistency, the DSF 
w ould have to be integrated with an ex-ante scheme indexing to countries' nominal 
GDP growth, mirroring the accounting method underlying the DSA. As a result, the 
DSF's extant shortcomings w ould be likely to be further exacerbated by adding those 
identified in relation to the GDP-indexing scheme. Besides, as already mentioned in 
Chapter 3, even if we w ere to assume away the flaws affecting the indexing scheme, 
the overall constellation of the DSF w ould still represent an inconsistent patchwork 
of interrelated modules. For, the central thrust of the CPIA-centred IDA14/DSF 
regime w ould continue to determine the fundamental aspects relating to LICs' debt 
sustainability, namely volume and type of aid allocation, while the contingency 
scheme w ould have no bearing other than on debt service rescheduling. However, to 
the extent that debt service streams are of mostly trivial m agnitude compared to the 
bulk of financial flows involving a LIC's aid-dependency on donors, the potential 
benefits from indexing w ould be proportionally small.
In sum, we confirm our assessment of the extant DSF as leading to particularly 
negative and worrisome conclusions, also with regard to the outlook of its 
implications after the inclusion of a contingent facility along the lines of the IDA 
schemes considered in this chapter. As we will extensively dem onstrate in the third 
and final part of this study, a more positive outlook for low-income countries' debt 
sustainability over time will only be achieved by entirely rethinking the current aid 
allocation and debt sustainability frameworks, on the basis of a more central role 
assigned to contingency schemes informing the donors' response to those countries' 
vulnerability to exogenous shocks.
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Appendices
Appendix A4.1: GDP growth -  U.S. Dollar vs. LCU Series
The two GDP grow th series underlying simulations in Section 4.3 are draw n from the 
World D evelopm ent Indicator database, which derives these data as follows. 
Consider Graphs A4.1 and A4.2, illustrating the relation between U ganda's real GDP 
growth, in constant local currency units (LCU), the yearly rate of change of its 
exchange rate expressed as Shillings to the U.S. Dollar, domestic inflation as 
m easured by GDP deflator, and its GDP growth rate expressed in current U.S. Dollar
Graph A4.1: Uganda - Nominal U.S. Dollar vs. Real GDP Growth (1982-1992)
---------------------------------------------------------------r ~ ----------------------------------     -T--------------------— -----------— --------------   1---------------------------------------   r—
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991
 °-----  Real G D P Grow th R ale (C onstan t LCU) — 0—-  E xchange R a te  -  R a te  of C h a n g e  (U SD  to LCU)
—  o —  Inflation - R a te  of C h an g e  (LCU)____________— a —  Nominal G D P Growth R ate  (C urren t USD)
Source; Author's calculations, based on WD1 data
Graph A4.2: Uganda - Nominal U.S. Dollar vs. Real GDP Growth Index (1993-2003)
o
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
— a  R eal G D P Growth R a te  (C onstan t LCU) — - -  -  E xchange R ate  - R ate  of C h a n g e  (USD to LCU)
—  p  —  inflation - R ate  of C h an g e  (LCU) ________ — ■=■—  Nominal G D P Grow th R a te  (C urren t USD)
Source: Author’s  calculations, based on WDI data
-178-
terms. Since all series are expressed in terms of their yearly rate of change, U.S. Dollar 
GDP growth is the net sum  of the real measure in constant LCU terms, plus inflation 
and the exchange rate. Uganda liberalised its exchange rate in 1993; previous to this, 
it was heavily adm inistered and subject to extreme fluctuations. Graph A4.1 shows 
the typically offsetting effect between inflation and the (official) nominal exchange 
rate during 1983-1992, which how ever causes the U.S. Dollar denom inated growth 
rate to fluctuate around the more stable LCU growth rate. Graph A4.2 shows the 
same relationships with reference to more tranquil times, and during which exchange 
rate determination was mostly left to the m arkets.29 To better see the relationships 
among the WDI data, consider for example the year 1999: the real LCU growth rate is 
shown to be positive, which w ould possibly have caused the indexing scheme to 
revise U ganda's debt service upw ard. However, that period's m arked depreciation of 
the exchange rate of the Shilling to the Dollar against the background of low 
domestic inflation caused Uganda's U.S. Dollar-denominated grow th rate to turn 
negative. As a result, the IDA scheme indexed to nominal GDP growth w ould have 
had the opposite effects on U ganda's debt service revision. To the extent that 
repaym ent capacity depends on a country's current disposal of U.S. Dollars to service 
its debts, the nominal scheme w ould have offered more comprehensive protection 
against the exchange rate factor underm ining U ganda's paym ent capacity in 1999.30
Graph A4.3: Uganda -  Nominal U .S .$ vs. Constant LCU GDP Growth Index
o
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
19931989 1991 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Nom inal G D P Growth Index M A 5  & R eal G D P Growth Index MA5 |
29 See Chapter 6 for a detailed background on Uganda's historical vicissitudes.
30 Whereby it should be recalled from the discussion in Chapter 3 that we reject IDA's presumption that 
GDP growth could represent a suitable measure of repayment capacity.
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Table A4.1: Main Statistics Relating to the Nominal and Real Indices (1988-2003)
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Correlation
U.S. GDP Growth -0.06 0.25 -0.46 0.48 0.04
LCU GDP Growth 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.07
Source: A uthor's calculations, based on WDI data.
Finally, consider the different m agnitude of fluctiations relating to the two alternative 
trend deviation indexes underlying the IDA scheme. As is to be expected, Graph A4.3 
and Table A4.1 show that the deviations from average nom inal grow th outstrip the 
constant LCU series both in term s of greater m agnitude and volatility over time. As 
a result, the U.S. Dollar index w ould lead to more frequent and substantial debt 
service revisions over time. Furthermore, the low correlation between the two 
indexes shows that deviations in terms of constant LCU GDP grow th are dom inated 













Appendix A4.2: Gilbert-Tabova Index vs. Standard TOT Index in the case of 
Zambia
Graph A4.4: Zambia - Standard Terms of Trade index vs. G ilbert-Tabova index
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5 Proposal for a State-Contingent Debt Sustainability  
Framework
5.1 Introduction
Our evaluations in Part II show the new  BWI Debt Sustainability Framework (BWI- 
DSF) and the W orld Bank approach to debt service m odulation schemes to be largely 
detached from the central tenets of the theoretical debt literature w ith regard to the 
optimal definition of ex-ante state-contingent debt contracts. Indeed, Part I of this 
study has laid out the rationale for the introduction of contingent financial 
instrum ents to assist low-income countries on an ex-ante basis in coping with 
exogenous shocks to their balance of paym ents and external debt sustainability. In 
line w ith the established insights of the substantial body of sovereign debt and 
contract theory literature, we concluded that the orderly solution to LICs' debt 
overhang w ould have to involve a combination of state-contingent mechanisms, 
capturing a debtor country's repaym ent capacity according to observable and 
verifiable states of nature, and also to allow for periodical contract renegotiation in 
relation to the residual factors influencing the debt contract's outcome.
Clearly, these requirem ents on state-contingent financing are broader than those 
envisaged by the BWI in relation to their own concept of ex-ante instrum ents, which 
merely establishes a contractual basis of the rules for a pre-determ ined response 
regarding the am ount and terms of assistance before the contingency occurs.1 This 
definition of ex-ante instrum ents significantly downplays their posited supremacy 
over ex-post responses, by essentially reducing it to the avoidance of delays and 
uncertainty with regard to the response by the donor community. Based on such a 
premise, the key policy issue in relation to ex-ante instrum ents becomes merely the 
shortening of the time-lag between the occurrence of a shock and the provision of 
foreign assistance2, which is not necessarily seen as a sufficient justification for the
1 For a comparative classification of the characteristics distinguishing ex-ante from ex-post mechanisms 
according to the BWI interpretation, see IDA (2005b: 9).
2 As well as the provision of a risk-sharing mechanism to creditors, as outlined in Chapter 4.
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introduction of ex-ante financing, as the problem could also be addressed by more 
efficient decision-making processes in relation to ex-post approaches.
In light of all the shortcomings of the BWI approach, this chapter moves on to 
defining the basic elements of an encompassing proposal for a so-called Contingency 
Debt Sustainability Framework (CDSF), representing an attem pt to tackle the major 
challenges posed by the actual im plem entation of state-contingent debt contracts 
according to the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2. We begin by noting that, from an 
operational perspective, any debt sustainability framework faces a trade-off between 
its suitability for standardisation across countries and its capacity to capture country- 
specific circumstances determ ining debt sustainability. To be operationally viable on 
an ex-ante basis, a DSF has to inform the borrowing and lending process on the basis 
of a parsim onious set of observable indicators, applicable across debtor countries. To 
be effective, a DSF m ust ensure equitable and fair treatm ent across countries, while 
also taking into account those country-specific factors that significantly affect debt 
sustainability in an individual country, but not in others. In an attem pt to strike a 
balance between these overarching requirements, our proposal for a CDSF is based 
on an analytical framework that distinguishes exogenous from endogenous factors 
determ ining a country's need for financial assistance and its debt stock developm ent 
over time. We define as mixed-endogenous all those factors affecting a debtor 
country's balance of paym ents (BOP) that are attributable, at least in part, to policy 
measures under the direct control of its authorities, and which are enacted during the 
period under consideration. In contrast, we define as exogenous effects on the 
balance of paym ents all factors outside the realm of governm ent control. However, 
with the exception of a num ber of well-defined shocks, it is usually not possible to 
clearly distinguish, ex-post, between the exogenous and endogenous variables 
determ ining a country's balance of payments. Therefore, any ex-ante scheme is 
bound to introduce some degree of distortion in a debtor country's incentive with 
regard to the endogenous factors maximising the BOP outcome. To minimise 
negative incentive effects, the proposed CDSF thus introduces a performance 
assessment mechanism, classifying a debtor country's actual policy actions according 
to its compliance w ith policy program m es set out in agreement w ith the lenders.
After controlling for contractual policy compliance, the CDSF accounting method 
allows for a useful identification of exogenous shock and trend factors, determining 
the sign and am ounts of automatic adjustments to the volum e and grant share of 
official developm ent finance. It will be shown that by adjusting aid flows to a 
debtor's exposure to external shocks, and by alleviating the debt burden in light of 
unfavourable trend factors, the proposed debt sustainability fram ework constitutes 
an effective tool for defining the donor communities' ex-ante policy response to the 
key factors underm ining sustainability of low-income countries' external debt flows 
and stocks.
The rem ainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 outlines the overall 
features and specific instrum ents of the state-contingent debt sustainability 
framework; section 5.3 derives an accounting methodology suitable for 
distinguishing between the exogenous and endogenous factors affecting a debtor 
country's balance of paym ents; section 5.4 draws the conclusions.
5.2 Proposal for a Contingency Debt Sustainability Framework
Chapter 3 has extensively discussed the shortcomings of the W orld Bank and IMF's 
debt sustainability fram ework and debt service m odulation schemes, particularly 
with regard to their inability to deal comprehensively w ith  low-income countries' 
pronounced vulnerability to exogenous shocks. Against the background of the 
foregoing discussion, and in contrast to the CPIA bias characterising the existing 
framework, the outline of our proposal for a Contingency Debt Sustainability 
Framework is centred on the concepts of external vulnerability and exogenous 
shocks.
Chart 5.1 stylises the main functions of and relationships betw een the elements 
constituting the CDSF. The key operational features of the scheme are divided into 
two areas, in abstract relation to their reference to two distinct time periods. Period t 
should be thought of as referring to a time span long enough to allow for the 
collection and analysis of the relevant information of factors affecting a debtor 
country's balance of paym ents during its course. Conditional upon sufficient 
inform ation becoming available by the time it ends, the exact duration of the 
reference period will be established in relation to the specific circumstances faced by
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a debtor country. For example, it will correspond to the yearly auditing of the 
country balance of paym ent statistics, or to the periodic conclusion of broader 
economic review assessments, such as those that low-income countries undergo 
every six m onths by virtue of their involvement in three-year arrangem ents with the 
IMF Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF). W hatever its length, period t 
constitutes the time frame w ithin which the CDSF operates as an ex-ante contingency 
mechanism, i.e. as a contractual arrangem ent for compensation in the event that pre­
defined criteria are met. In contrast, period t+1 refers to the CDSF implications 
relating to subsequent periods, which are not based on an ex-ante arrangement, and 
thus require either negotiations between the donor and the recipient, or are 
discretionary to the donor community alone.
The focus of the CDSF is on low-income countries' external aspects of debt 
sustainability, as resulting from their balance of payments. O ther factors affecting a 
borrowing country's debt sustainability, most notably the fiscal aspects relating to 
foreign aid dependency, are not directly addressed by the scheme, and remain in the 
background of the analysis. However, similarly to the IMF and W orld Bank debt 
sustainability analyses, a more encompassing CDSF should be thought of as 
comprising two complementary and interrelated assessment processes, addressing 
both a borrow er's external and fiscal sustainability.
The CDSF envisages a typical sovereign borrower-sovereign lender relationship, in 
relation to official financial assistance. If the relationship is assum ed to involve only 
one multilateral lender, the main implications of the CDSF are suitable for direct 
comparison w ith the IDA aid allocation framework outlined above. However, the 
sovereign lender party to the contract would more appropriately be viewed as 
representing the entire donor community, so as to confer on the scheme the potential 
to effectively address LICs' broader debt sustainability concerns, relating to their 
entire outstanding official debt. Similarly to the HIPC Initiative, the donor 
community can thus be thought of as involving mainly the m ultilateral and bilateral 
entities, to w hom  the bulk of LIC debt stock is owed. In that case, the scheme 
conveniently presupposes that the donor community manages to overcome all 
coordination problems, and that a representative body (e.g. the IDA, Paris Club or an
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entity constituted ad-hoc) be invested with the power to act on behalf of all its 
members.
Finally, the CDSF is envisaged to represent a special regime, applicable to those LICs 
deem ed eligible for qualification and which are willing to participate. Although not 
further specified here, the criteria for eligibility could involve a pre-qualification 
period, involving both structural and policy benchmarks along the lines of the 
performance assessment outlined below. For example, eligibility could be made 
dependent on LICs matching a defined set of structural characteristics, such as their 
exposure to exogenous shock and trend factors deriving from the particular 
composition of exports and im ports baskets. However specified, any restriction on 
eligibility presupposes the existence of an alternative regime, applicable to all the 
countries that are excluded, w hether willingly or not. For convenience of exposition, 
we make the simplifying assumption that the alternative regime is represented by the 
current aid allocation and debt sustainability mechanisms, although the broader 
implications of the CDSF proposal w ould have the effect of replacing, rather than 
complementing, the existing regime, since the two are broadly incompatible.
With these qualifications in mind, the key components of the proposal are now 
discussed in turn.
5.2.1 Endogenous vs. exogenous balance of payments determinants
The central building block of the CDSF is constructed on the bases of the distinction 
between the factors affecting a debtor country's balance of paym ents. By applying the 
accounting m ethodology outlined below, on the basis of consolidated BOP data at the 
end of each period t, a crucial distinction is draw n between factors of exogenous and 
endogenous nature: exogenous factors are defined as being beyond the influence of 
the debtor country, such as the w orld dem and and prices facing a small country, 
while endogenous factors are at least in part, or potentially, subject to the country's 
control.
The lower left-side of Chart 5.1 shows the CDSF to further disaggregate exogenous 
factors into trend and shock components. While both components are externally 
determ ined variables, insofar as they lie outside the country's sphere of influence, 
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regarding future BOP realisations, while shocks are not. That is, the country is 
assum ed to formulate its economic policies according to trend expectations, thereby 
internalising historical trends of exogenous BOP effects in its policy decisions. For 
example, the am ounts of a particular crop produced and exported may be adjusted as 
a deliberate policy choice in the face of an observable price trend. Therefore, export 
earnings from that particular crop are exogenous only with regard to the actual price 
trend and the effects of natural factors on yields, but not w ith regard to volume 
adjustments m ade in response to those external forces. Exogenous shocks, in contrast, 
are defined as random  realisations around trend and are, as such, unforeseeable. It 
will be argued below, in relation to the CDSF performance assessment, that it is 
crucial for such a distinction to be m ade in the context of a contingency scheme, for it 
not to distort a L IC s incentives towards emancipation from a condition of 
vulnerability to exogenous shocks.
The upper left-side box of chart 5.1 represents all non-exogenous determ inants of the 
balance of payments. These include fully endogenous factors, which are entirely 
under governm ent control, as well as all the BOP effects resulting from the complex 
interrelations between external shocks and policy reactions to the latter. We call the 
latter mixed, or indeterminate, effects. The multitude of back and forward linkages 
between external factors and internal policy measures makes it difficult to identify 
clear-cut causal relationships, or to disentangle and m easure the single forces 
constituting mixed effects. Despite the difficulties implicit in any such identification 
exercise, the accounting methodology underlying the CDSF allows for a sufficiently 
accurate ex-post extrapolation3 of all the balance of paym ents determ inants that can 
be clearly qualified as exogenous price shock or trend factors, on the basis of 
consolidated data observable by both the borrower and the lenders at the end of 
period t. By contrast, all the other BOP effects, whether endogenous or mixed, are 
dealt w ith as a residual.
3 The ex-post nature of the CDSF assessment is not to be confused with the ex-ante nature of its 
compensatory function.
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5.2.2 The contingent credit line
The contingent credit line constitutes the CDSF instrum ent to adjust a L IC s BOP 
cash-flow to the occurrence of exogenous shocks, by m odulating net official transfers. 
U pon identification and m easurem ent of the realised effects of shocks on a debtor 
country's balance of paym ents, the contingency mechanism involves the automatic 
disbursem ent or am ortisation of interest-free top-up funds in proportion to their net 
overall direction and m agnitude. In order to be effective in filling the liquidity gap 
ensuing from negative shocks, such disbursements are to occur periodically, at the 
end of period t, or w ith higher frequency, depending on the feasibility of conducting 
an im m ediate im pact assessment. By definition, shocks are identified as random  
realisations around trend and should, as such, be mean-reverting. Hence, there is no 
particular justification for the contingency mechanism to disburse grants, instead of 
credits. Nevertheless, the scheme should be m ade flexible to include periodic grant- 
conversions of debts accumulated by the credit line, to the extent that the cumulative 
effects of these events over the longer term should not revert to trend, or should have 
resulted from large real shocks, such as natural disasters.4
It should be noted that the CDSF compensation mechanism contrasts w ith the debt 
service m odulation schemes envisaged by the World Bank. For, in terms of insulation 
against external factors, the CDSF offers comprehensive protection against all 
identifiable exogenous factors affecting a debtor's balance of paym ents, in contrast to 
the W orld Bank's reliance on a narrow  set of single indices, such as real GDP growth, 
exchange rate or export prices. However, w ith the exception of w orld prices, such 
indices are not suitable for distinguishing exogenous from endogenous factors. As 
has been argued above, it is essentially these schemes' failure to solve the central 
identification problem  which underm ines their own potential to operate as ex-ante 
contingency mechanisms, as well as underlying the W orld Bank's misplaced 
scepticism concerning their desirability on the grounds of moral hazard  implications.
4 It is unlikely that the occurrence of real volume shocks due to natural disasters would be offset by the 
occurrence of positive real shocks. Of course, the events referred to in the text relate to the exceptional 
occurrence of disasters with significant impact, and not to the experience of more or less favourable 
climatic conditions, which should, at least in principle, average out.
-190-
A second point of contrast w ith the World Bank schemes relates to the CDSF's 
operation of a contingent credit line, rather than the m odulation of debt service alone. 
To the extent that LICs' present and future debt service ratios have been significantly 
reduced by a combination of HIPC debt relief and the higher degree of 
concessionality of new debt, a yearly contingency window  limited to the m agnitude 
of debt service is unlikely to offer sufficient coverage in the face of sustained 
vulnerability. This strategy only achieves a temporary closure of the gap relating to 
the liquidity needs resulting from debt service due, while neglecting the typically 
broader BOP gap caused by the exogenous factors. Of course, only after the closure of 
the BOP gap can a debtor's actual debt sustainability be established, and a focus on 
debt service alone is thus widely meaningless and bound to be ineffective. Put 
differently, in contrast to the CDSF, the World Bank debt service schemes appear to 
be ham pered by a narrow  focus on the debt dynamics per se, rather than effectively 
addressing the broader BOP implications of shocks determining a debtor's overall 
sustainability. Clearly, if such sustainability is to be achieved, modulation of net 
official transfers needs to occur through a flexible disbursem ent facility involving 
fresh credits, rather than debt service modulation alone, and to amounts suitable for 
filling the ensuing BOP liquidity gap.5
5.2.3 Performance assessment against contractual obligations
The upper central box of Chart 5,1 represents the central mechanism of the CDSF in 
relation to the treatm ent of non-shock factors determining a country's balance of 
paym ents during t. According to the above definition, both exogenous trend and 
mixed endogenous components are to some degree under the control of the debtor 
country, or are at least in principle amenable to the effect of deliberate policy choices. 
Therefore, a compensatory mechanism that extended also to these factors the 
treatm ent accorded to fully exogenous shocks would introduce the potential for
5 Assuming, of course, that debt service cannot be negative, as is done in the World Bank proposals. 
Otherwise, a distinction between disbursements and service would be spurious. Clearly, any 
contingency scheme's ultimate focus would have to be on net transfers, and the World Bank's restriction 
to positive debt service modulation can only be explained by its stated reluctance to consider any 
proposal that would have ex-ante implications on donors' commitments for additional financial 
disbursements.
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incentive distortions affecting a recipient's efforts aimed at reinforcing its balance of 
paym ents position over tim e.6
It remains debatable under w hat conditions such moral hazard implications w ould 
be severe enough to underm ine the broader development efforts of a low-income 
country authority w ith a genuine interest in overcoming a situation of degradation 
and poverty. W ithout formally stating the assumptions under which negative 
incentive factors w ould actually dominate a debtor's broader development 
objectives, the BWI simply take the moral hazard implications of ex-ante instrum ents 
as a given.7 They thus point to moral hazard issues on the grounds of outright 
incompatibility between the ex-ante effects of a contingency mechanism and the 
CPIA-centred incentive structure of the IDA allocation mechanism, whereby the 
introduction of state-contingency is thought to be lowering the positive incentive 
effects of selectivity-based aid allocation. Quite to the contrary, we argue that in 
order to be compatible w ith LICs' broader development incentives, a contingency 
framework will first have to remove the severe distortions intrinsic to the CPIA- 
based debt sustainability and aid allocation frameworks themselves. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, these distortions mainly result from the CPIA's reliance on a set of 
assessment criteria that are indiscriminately applied to all the developing countries, 
and which fail to distinguish between the causal nature of the factors affecting the 
assessment. To the extent that LICs feel unduly punished by the allocation and relief 
effects of the CPIA-centred framework, their incentive distortions from the latter will 
be higher than the CDSF's.
We envisage the CDSF to include a domestic policy performance assessment against 
pre-defined country-specific benchmarks. The latter should be set in relation to each 
period f and define a detailed country policy agenda, in lieu of an underlying 
contract between the country authorities and the donor community. Ideally, the
G It should be noted that, as is implicit in any insurance mechanism, the contingent credit line may also 
reduce a country's incentive to improve its vulnerability to exogenous shocks over time. However, in the 
case of trend and other BOP factors, the risk factor of moral hazard mainly relates to the debtor's 
attempt to increase the actual amount of compensation in any period t at the cost of its longer-term 
development plans. For example, it cannot be excluded that the country authorities would have an 
incentive to cheat and reap higher compensation in period /, if, for some reason, they were to place a 
higher value on the maximisation of short-term benefits than on the discounted value of the long-term 
benefits resulting from alternative policy actions leading to emancipation from vulnerability.
7 See, for example, IDA (2004b, 2005b) and IMF and IDA (2004b, 2005a).
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contract will be the expression of a genuinely cooperative approach between the 
parties to the contract, rather than the imposition of a particular set of policies by 
donors. At the end of each period t, the CDSF assesses a country's compliance with 
regard to the actual enactment of planned policies during the period under analysis, 
bu t not on the basis of their outcomes. To the extent that domestic policy 
implem entation relates to observable actions, such as decrees and laws, the CDSF 
thereby avoids the problem of identifying policy effects and sets the pre-condition for 
the scheme to operate on an ex-ante basis, i.e. regulated by the terms set out in the 
underlying contract. In practice, such an assessment could be conducted in a similar 
way to the periodic reviews of LICs' IMF PRGF arrangements, which already include 
close monitoring of governments' compliance with IMF policy conditionality.8 
However, in contrast to the PRGF review, which makes the periodic disbursement of 
IMF credit-tranches conditional upon a recipient country's meeting quantitative 
performance criteria and benchmarks relating to policy results, we propose the CDSF 
to assert a country's qualification for continued support on the basis of policy- 
enactment alone. Therefore, the CDSF avoids both a performance assessment being 
distorted by exogenous factors affecting outcomes, and borrowers being unduly held 
accountable for either exogenous factors or the actual developm ent effectiveness of 
agreed-upon policies. At the same time, however, the CDSF performance assessment 
controls for recipient's moral hazard implications, by effectively providing the donor 
community with the enforcement instrum ent necessary to hold countries accountable 
for their policy commitments.
The performance assessment has different implications w ith regard to the various 
components of the CDSF. In relation to a country's overall qualification for the CDSF, 
including the contingent credit line, a severe breach of policy commitments, or 
incompatible actions such as fraudulent reporting, would necessarily have to lead to 
a country's suspension or indefinite exclusion from the scheme's benefits. The exact 
procedure and criteria underlying such a decision w ould have to be anchored in the 
terms of the contractual agreement, and optimally involve a body including members 
of both the lending and borrowing communities. Furthermore, the potential for
8 For a detailed description of the IMF PRGF, see http://www.imf.org/externfll/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm and 
related pages.
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exclusion from the CDSF w ould necessarily presuppose the existence of a fall-back 
solution, which w ould naturally be the regime applied to all the LICs that are either 
not eligible or are unwilling to participate. As mentioned above, we make the 
simplifying assumption that the current aid allocation and DSF regimes w ould 
remain in place after the introduction of the CDSF, and apply to all the LICs not 
involved in the scheme.9
In relation to both the category of mixed-endogenous and trend BOP factors, the 
performance assessment ascertains a L IC s fulfilment of policy conditions during 
period t, as one input informing the lenders' decision concerning the volume of aid 
allocation in period t+1. Similarly to the current IDA allocation process, such a 
decision w ould ultimately have to rely on a broad assessment of any LIC's specific 
needs for official development assistance, with particular focus on the requirements 
resulting from the fiscal accounts and from ongoing and planned development 
projects supported by foreign aid. However, in contrast to the CPIA-based allocation 
process determining the distribution of aid mainly according to countries' CPIA 
performance, qualification for continued aid disbursements w ould depend on actual 
policy compliance, w ith balance of paym ents volatility being one of the criteria 
informing aid allocation among eligible countries. Since the implications of the CDSF 
for future aid allocations cannot be fully established ex-ante, it will essentially have 
to rely on the donor com munity's assessment concerning a country's future need for 
aid and the debt sustainability implications. Such judgem ent w ould ideally be the 
result of a cooperative exercise w ith the authorities of the recipient country, 
particular w ith regard to the specification of scenarios underlying macroeconomic, 
fiscal and balance of paym ents forecasting exercises.
5.2.4 The debt relief m echanism
Only with regard to the category of BOP trend factors has the CDSF performance 
assessment ex-ante implications on the grant share of aid allocation in period t. It will 
be recalled from the above discussion, that BOP trend factors are identified as 
originating from causes exogenous to the country, bu t that their m agnitude is
9 Of course, by making such assumption we implicitly disregard the broad incompatibility between the 
two alternative regimes, particularly with regard to the net distributional effects of aid allocation, as well 
as the adverse selection implications that would derive from the two regimes combined.
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susceptible to the effects of deliberate policy reactions. By classifying policy actions 
according to their contractual legitimacy, the performance assessment validates the 
component of trend factors that is (potentially) under governm ent control. Hence, to 
the extent that a LIC is found to be in compliance with policy obligations, the CDSF 
provides distinct treatm ent for the category of trend effects, and yet avoids 
introducing incentive distortions. More specifically, we envisage the CDSF as 
converting official credit flows automatically into grants, i.e. to relieve debt in 
proportion to the unfavourable trend factors faced by the country during period t. 
The rationale for such a debt relief operation is that LICs typically face negative trend 
factors -  most notably in the form of deteriorating terms of trade -  as a reflection of 
underlying structural deficiencies, which cannot be overcome in the short- and 
medium-term by domestic policy alone. To the extent that such trend factors strongly 
influence LICs' need for official development assistance, the achievement of debt 
sustainability requires official financing not to be contributing tow ard the increased 
build-up of external debt, and to relieve it instead.
By providing ex-ante debt relief according to a country's observed degree of 
exposure to exogenous trend factors, the CDSF is in stark contrast to the BWI-DSF. 
For, the BWI-DSF predeterm ines a country's grant share according to the perceived 
risk of debt distress, and thus lacks the necessary flexibility to adjust the grant share 
of ODA to the actual circumstances affecting a debtor's balance of payments. 
However, to the extent that the debt distress forecasts w ithin the BWI-DSF only 
poorly reflect the actual BOP implications of unfavourable trends, and given the 
significant bearing trend factors have been demonstrated to have had on a debtor's 
overall risk of distress, the CDSF approach to ex-ante debt relief should constitute an 
essential component of plans for averting the occurrence of debt distress situations.
5.2.5 Debt sustainability analysis
To the extent that lenders' willingness to roll over existing debt and to supply fresh 
credits is informed by their own perceptions regarding a debtor's capacity to carry 
debt, debt sustainability may be considered a function of lenders' perceptions, rather 
than a characteristic intrinsic to a debtor country at any point in time. Put differently, 
a country's debt will be sustainable as long as lenders consider it to be so in their own
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assessment and correspondingly take the necessary lending decisions.10 It follows 
that a debt sustainability framework postulating vulnerability to exogenous factors as 
the central determ inant of financial distress will adopt vulnerability as the key 
measure against which to assess a country's debt sustainability, as much as the BWI- 
DSF concerns itself mainly with the CPIA and indicative policy-dependent 
indicators. It should thus be obvious that CDSF debt sustainability analysis would 
have to depart on several grounds from the DSA as currently conducted within the 
BWI-DSF.
In the contingent context of country-specific compensation of shock and trend effects 
the assessment of country debt ratios against indicative cross-country averages 
would be largely meaningless. The reason is that the BWI-DSF crucially relies on 
average CPIA-based debt indicators to predetermine the relative country aid 
allocation and grant share in any period t, as well as to assess the country's debt 
sustainability prospects in the face of changing circumstances during subsequent 
periods. Lacking any contingency mechanism, a LIC's debt sustainability assessment 
thus results from the estimated changes in future debt ratios against benchmarks, 
which stay unchanged except for occasional shifts of a country from one CPIA 
category to another. In contrast, the CDSF operates a country-specific contingent 
adjustm ent to the am ount and composition of aid flows in any period f, which not 
only rules out the significance of any cross-country benchm ark assessment, but also 
reduces the debt sustainability concerns to a projection of the future debt effects from 
those factors not dealt w ith by the contingency mechanisms.11 Consequently, Chart
5.1 shows the debt sustainability assessment exercise to be allocated outside the 
narrow  context of the contingency assessment and compensation mechanism of the 
CDSF. Instead, debt sustainability concerns will be internalised in the lending 
decisions relating to future periods t+1, in relation to the estim ated debt flow and 
stock effects resulting from endogenous and mixed BOP effects under the CDSF
10 Of course, this will only be the case if we assume that lenders fully coordinate through the CDSF 
contract. The self-fulfilling characteristic of lenders' attitude toward borrower's sustainability has been 
thoroughly discussed in our review of sovereign debt theory (Chapter 2).
11 We abstract here from any time-limits that may be attached to the application of the contingency 
mechanisms, including termination as a result of non-compliance. Otherwise, debt sustainability beyond 
the expiration of the contingency regime would also have to be assessed with regard to the country's 
capacity to cope with shock and trend factors.
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regime. The pre-determ ined volum e and grant mix of aid allocation relating to period 
t+1 will therefore be the result of the lender com munity's discretionary decision 
process involving the combined assessment of needs, sustainability and policy 
performance relating to a specific country.
It may well be the case that the debt sustainability assessment exercise highlights a 
particular need for specific am endm ents to the terms of coverage of the CDSF 
contract during future periods of application and as an outcome of negotiations 
between the donor com munity and the borrowing country. For example, it may be 
agreed that the ex-ante debt relief facility be temporarily expanded to include a 
specific num ber of mixed factors, if there were sufficient reasons for expecting such 
factors to substantially reduce a country's future debt sustainability, and provided 
that the beneficiary's policy actions affecting these particular policy outcomes could 
be effectively monitored.
Finally, it should be noted that the inapplicability of cross-country benchmark 
indicators does not completely contraindicate the reliance on debt ratios as useful 
indicators of the evolution of the debt burden over time. We thus envisage the 
sustainability analysis to compute also debt service and stock indicators as ratios of 
exports, GDP and other broad measures of a country's capacity to pay, and to track 
their evolution over time in relation to country-specific averages. As a result of the 
effect of CDSF compensation on debt flows and stocks in every period t, these ratios 
reflect the proportion of shocks and trend factors shaping a country's debt profile 
over time. In contrast to the strongly distorting effects im plied by the net present 
value ratios adopted by the BWI, the contingent debt ratios should represent a set of 
indicators that more accurately relate to a country's sustainability and notional 
creditworthiness under the CDSF regim e.12
12 The details relating to the calculation of these debt indicators are exemplified by the Uganda country 
study in Chapter 6 below.
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5.3 An accounting methodology to distinguish exogenous from mixed- 
endogenous balance of payments effects
The separation of endogenous from exogenous determinants of illiquidity constitutes 
the central analytical building block of the proposed CDSF, on which all its 
assessment and compensatory functions depend. To derive an accounting 
methodology suitable to the CDSF, we start with an external liquidity needs-based 
approach to developm ent finance, which is modelled according to a balance of 
paym ents framework of the supply and dem and for foreign financial assistance. 
Consider that, in any period f, a country's external dem and for new concessional 
loans is reflected in its balance of payments, which can be expressed in the following 
terms:
L f  = /,£>_, + p,D,_x + IMP, -  EXPt -  GR, -  WR, -  FDI, + A R t + Z , (1)
In identity (1), the dem and for loans ( L f , with inverted sign) is shown to derive from
the sum  of the trade balance (IMP, ~EXP,) ,  the payments of interest (i,D,_x) and
principal (p,D,_x) on existing debt, and net changes in the country's international
reserves (Aft,); m inus the sum of non-debt creating financial inflows, i.e. official
grants ( G R , ), net foreign direct investment inflows ( F D I , ) and workers' remittances
(WR,); plus a residual factor ( Z , ), aggregating all other BOP flows including errors
and omissions. The net sum of all these flows ( L f  ) represents a low-income country's
financial gap before concessional lending, which is typically negative, reflecting such 
a country's heavy dependence on aid to finance external deficits.
The supply of concessional loans is a function of the developm ent lenders' 
multifaceted assessment relating to a country's performance and needs relative to the 
other recipient countries. Beyond the determinants concerning the official lender- 
borrower relationship with regard to a recipient's socio-economic development as 
such, loan supply is also a function of political economy considerations, such as aid 
support on strategic grounds, and of random  factors relating to lenders' vagaries, 
misjudgements, or coordination failures.
Ls, = /{Per formance ,  Need,  Political, Random) (2)
-198-
Therefore, the supply of loans is largely unsuitable for deterministic modelling. 
Assuming that dem and for new  loans is insatiable, at least to the extent that it always 
outstrips supply, i.e.
the supply-constrained dem and identity for ex-post observed loan disbursements in 
any period t is given by:
This identity m ust always hold on an ex-post basis, in relation to the observed flows 
at the end of any period t. However, although the actual realisation of individual 
BOP items is observable ex-post, the interdependency and m ultitude of back-and-
causal relationships. Neither is it possible to precisely identify and measure the single 
causal factors determ ining the overall balance of paym ents. This indeterminacy 
mainly originates from the difficulty in distinguishing exogenous from endogenous 
determ inants of the balance of payments. Consider, for example, the effects of an 
external shock causing the world price of a country's key export item to suddenly 
plunge. Everything else being the same, the lower price will reduce the country's 
export earnings and increase its trade deficit. A lthough the price effect could in 
principal be m easured in terms of foregone export earnings, it will not be possible to 
isolate its direct effect from the effects of specific actions or policies enacted in 
response to the shock. The country may decide either to increase or decrease the 
export volum e of the item the price of which has fallen, or take alternative actions to 
compensate for the loss in revenue, say by adjusting buffer stocks and the 
composition of its exports and imports baskets. Also, the donors' perception of the 
effects of the shock and the appropriateness of the debtor country's policy response 
may affect their disbursem ent of loans and grants, which, in turn, may trigger further 
domestic policy adjustments affecting the balance of paym ents. Ultimately, to the 
extent that it is impossible to know w hat the debtor's and the lenders' actions would 
be in the absence of the price shock w ithout having complete information with 
regard to their objective functions, it will be equally impossible to fully isolate the 
shock's net effect on BOP.
(3)
(4)
forward linkages between these items makes it impossible to disentangle clear-cut
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Despite the intrinsic difficulty in exactly distinguishing betw een the various causes of 
variation in the BOP items of identity (4), a suitable accounting methodology can 
nevertheless be devised to allow for a useful distinction of exogenous factors to be 
made, to the extent that such factors can be clearly identified. Essentially, the
balance of paym ents as w ould have prevailed in the absence of certain exogenous 
events, and thus to deduce the effects of such events. This methodology was first 
introduced by Balassa (1982, 1984), in his studies analysing the difference in policy 
responses to external shock by outw ard- versus inw ard-oriented developing 
countries during the 1970s. Later, Solis and Zedillo (1985) applied a similar 
framework in their analysis of the causes underlying Mexico's debt build-up and 
subsequent crisis during the early 1980s.
In order to derive the specification m ost suitable to the purpose of the CDSF, we 
further break dow n the terms of identity (4) relating to the trade balance and debt 
flows, and derive trend deviations. Consider that net official transfers ( NTR t ) can be
expressed as the difference betw een disbursem ents of new loans ( i f )  and the service
of existing debt {it + p t )Dj_] in period t:
Splitting the values of exports and im ports into their price and volum e components, 
the balance of paym ents identity of period t can be expressed as:
w herep"‘a n d p* denotes the average price of im ports and exports, and M t and X t
the volume, or real value, of im ports and exports of goods and services. The same 
identity can be expressed in term s of trend values, signed by over-bars:
Trend values serve as benchm arks against which actual realisations of BOP items are 
measured, and are calculated as moving averages in period t. For example, the export 
price trend during the period t-k is com puted as:
methodology consists in postulating a counter-factual situation relating to a country's
(5)
(6)
NTR , s  p * M ,  ~ p < X t - G R ,  -  WRt - F D I ,  + AR, +Z< (7)
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The deviations of BOP items from trend levels are readily found by subtracting 
identity (7) from (6). For example, exports price trend deviations are com puted 
as (p'j -  p * ) , and real exports deviations as ( X , —X t ). In the case of prices, 
deviations of actual values from trend can be clearly classified as exogenous factors, 
to the extent that LICs are typically not in a position to influence w orld prices. In 
contrast, for the case of trade volumes, the identification of the exogenous component 
requires the introduction of so-called 'hypothetical' values.13 The latter simulate the 
scenario of unchanged external circumstances affecting a country's real trade balance, 
and are derived by filtering out the BOP effects resulting from real changes in the 
debtor country's exports due to fluctuations in world dem and, and from variations in 
im port volum e explained by changes in GDP growth. More specifically, trend and 
hypothetical exports volume are defined as:14
x !  = X (f (1 + gj, y  trend export volume (9)
r
+ £■;(,) hypothetical export volume t=l,2,..T (10)
i
Index j  denotes a specific commodity or category of commodities, g{, is the grow th 
rate in period t of w orld dem and for the country's export item j, and is the trend 
of w orld dem and. A ssum ing that a country's share in the w orld m arket of item j  
remains unchanged between periods, the difference between hypothetical and trend 
export values measures the real effects of exogenous changes in world dem and 
conditions. In conjunction with observed changes in export prices, it will thus be 
possible to gauge the degree to which exogenous shocks to export volum e and prices 
have affected a country's actual export receipts over the chosen period of 
observation.
Figure 5.1 further clarifies the conceptual distinction between actual, trend and 
hypothetical export volum e in relation to the CDSF. The trend volum e of exports
13 Adopting the terminology introduced by Belassa (1984).
14 Following Solis and Zedillo (1985).
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during the three periods of observation is established on the basis of average growth 
in world dem and over the three years prior to t  The hypothetical volume reflects the 
country's potential export quantity, given by the world dem and for its exports, 
observed in each period. The difference between trend and hypothetical exports 
measures the real im pact of trend deviations in the growth rate of world demand. For 
instance, in period t+1 the growth of w orld dem and is shown to fall short of average 
growth. The vertical distance between trend and hypothetical volume measures the 
shortfall of export quantity due to this negative exogenous shock. In the same period, 
however, actual export volume was substantially higher than w ould have been 
expected on the basis of developments in world dem and alone. Therefore, the 
difference between actual and hypothetical volume is only explainable by internally
Figure 5.1 -  Actual, Trend and Hypothetical Export Volumes
Export
Volume
t + 1 t + 3
(x,-x,)>o
Increase in export volumes 
due to domestic factors 
(mixed endogenous-exogenous)
Negative impact from change 
in world demand
determined factors affecting real exports, which, for example, could include a policy- 
induced increase in productivity, particularly favourable climatic conditions, or a 
combination of both. Usually, it will not be possible to clearly distinguish between 
the forces driving mixed effects. Only to the extent that the exogenous nature and the 
exact am ount by which a single factor has contributed to determ ining an internal
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change in volume can be clearly identified, can the corresponding proportion be 
disentangled from the mixed effects and added to the external shock factors, eligible 
for compensation by the CDSF contingent credit line. For example, suppose that a 
large proportion of the observed shortfall betw een actual and hypothetical volume in 
period t+3 of Figure 5.1 is the result of a clearly defined event, such as a natural 
disaster w iping out m ost of a country's seasonal harvest of its major agricultural 
export crop. In such case, the extent of dam age can be estim ated as a proportion of 
the distance (x, -  X t)/ which together w ith the observed fall in world dem and
growth (jy -  x t) will add up to an overall estimate of the exogenous shock factors
affecting real exports in f+3. However, w ith the exception of particularly severe 
disasters, it is not usually feasible to distinguish the effects of natural shocks to export 
volumes from all the other factors affecting internally determ ined deviations, 
including those that are purely policy-induced. To the extent that this is the case, 
their combined effect is to be allocated to the m ixed-endogenous category of the 
CDSF. On the other hand, insofar as it is possible to identify a m easurable factor that 
systematically determines a country's export volume, besides change in w orld 
dem and, it should be accounted for in the right-hand side of equations (9) and (10), 
and thus automatically qualify as an exogenous shock.
Turning now to the im ports side of the trade balance, trend and hypothetical im port 
series are calculated as follows:15
M \  = (1 + £'h g GDP)' trend im ports (11)
T
M /  = M I  J ”|  (1 + e JM g GDP ) hypothetical im ports t= l,2,.. .,T (12)
l
Where is the trend income elasticity of im port item /, g GDP is the debtor country's 
actual GDP grow th rate between period t-1 and t, and g GDP is the trend rate of the 
GDP growth. Assuming that im port elasticity remains constant over the period of 
analysis, the difference between trend and hypothetical im ports measures the 
volum e effects of the deviation of GDP grow th from its trend value. Of course, these
15 ibid.
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effects cannot be qualified as exogenous per se, GDP grow th being the expression of 
mixed-endogenous factors affecting a debtor's economy as a whole. Indeed, the full 
accounting framework outlined below classifies the differences between actual, trend 
and hypothetical flows of real im ports as mixed trade balance effects. Furthermore, 
similarly to the case of exports, any measurable factor that should be observed to be 
systematically affecting a specific country's im port volume over time, e.g. official 
grant disbursem ents in support of imports, ought to be included in the right-hand 
side of equations (11) and (12). Finally, it should be noted that to the extent that it 
should be possible to estimate the price elasticities of specific im port commodity 
items, these should be used to complement income elasticities in the calculation of 
overall im port elasticity.
The degree of agglomeration by export sectors in equations (9) and (10), and by 
im port sectors in equations (11) and (12), is reflected in the num ber of subcategories 
included in index /. Ideally, the categories would range from the largest aggregate of 
the country's total exports of goods and services, down to its single most im portant 
export sectors and items. In practice, the informational requirem ent for a 
comprehensive and detailed breakdow n of trade items is usually too large for low- 
income countries' limited institutional and operational capacity to cope with in a 
timely manner. Data collection and elaboration requires coordination between 
various line ministries, the country's central bank and its central statistics agency, 
leading to delays in the availability of consolidated data. To the extent that the timely 
availability of high-quality information, say by the end of period f, is required for an 
effective decision-making process underlying the contingency framework, there will 
be a trade-off between the quality and the degree of detail of information on the one 
hand, and the timing of its availability on the other. In the m edium  and longer term, 
such a trade-off can be narrow ed by effective international support aimed at 
increasing low-income countries' statistical and information m anagem ent 
capabilities. In the shorter term, however, the operational features of the CDSF could 
be adjusted to include a provisional assessment of volume and price effects, to the 
extent that these could be estimated at the time of its activation. Crucially, such early 
assessment w ould allow for a sufficiently rapid intervention by the contingency 
mechanism, so as to effectively counter the observed BOP trend and shock effects.
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Later, once consolidated data becomes available, a follow-up assessment would 
correct or fine-tune the disbursem ent and relief operations of the CDSF. However, 
the CDSF w ould have to control for the potential moral hazard problem  arising from 
the reliance on information provided by the beneficiary of the CDSF itself. With 
regard to trade volumes, this w ould require the cross-checking of customs data 
against those provided by the country's main trade partners, e.g. the European 
Union. With regard to prices, these w ould have to rely on a comparison between 
world prices and the actual prices applied to the country's export and imports. 
However, as Gilbert and Tabova (2004) note, because of transport costs and grade 
differentials, there may only be a m oderate degree of correlation between the two 
sets of prices. Therefore, although it w ould in principle be preferable to index the 
CDSF to w orld prices, which a small country has no pow er to influence and which 
are also known w ithout any time lag, the scheme's prim ary aim of effectiveness may 
ultimately require its reliance on the country's actual term s of trade.
Finally, similarly to the trade balance, a distinction between trend and hypothetical 
values could also be m ade for each of the other BOP items on the right-hand side of 
identity (6). For example, it w ould be possible to assess changes to the net flow of FDI 
against hypothetical FDI ( F D I 1/ ), defined as the flow consistent w ith the country's
share of FDI inflows in relation to its own specific FDI determ inants and those of 
neighbouring countries at a certain point in time: '<>
group of countries. Similarly, discrepancies between donor commitments and actual 
disbursements of official grants could enter the identity in the form of hypothetical 
grants, defined as the proportion of the overall shortfall that is not attributable to 
debtor's policy actions or its compliance w ith policy conditionality more generally.
(13)
w here F D I 1 s is net flows to country / and FDI[  is net FDI inflows to the reference
16 The data and forecasts necessary to derive country-specific and regional FDI series could be drawn 
from the annual World Investment Report and related publications (e.g. see UNCTAD, 2005).
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Box 5.1: Balance of Paym ents Effects
NTR, - N T R ,  = ( U )  1
(I) Exogenous shock effects to the trade balance:
<*<1in Volume change in exports dem and (a)
+ (_p? - I ) ( X , - X , ) Value effect of (a) (b)
Terms of trade effect (c)
-  ( p ' - p ^ X . - X , ) Price trend deviation of (g) (d)
-  - M , ) Price trend deviation of (i) (e)
-  {p : - p ;“)(m , - m , ) Price trend deviation of (k) (f)
(II) Volume and price trend effects to the trade balance (mixed effects):
I £ 1 Internal change in export volum e (g)
- ( p ; - i )(x , - x , ) Price trend effect of (g) (h)
1 1 Internal change in im port volume (i)
-  (p : - i )(m , - m ,) Price trend effect of (i) (j)
-  /(M , - M , ) Im port volume effect of GDP (k)
I 5g
!
1 1 Price trend effect of (k) (1)
(III) Deviations in financial flows (mixed effects):
1°=!1csef
O1 Deviation in grants (m )
-  IQVRt ~ WRt ) Deviation in workers7 remittances (n )
-  I  {FDI, - F D D ) Deviation in FDI inflows (o )
-  I{AR,  - A R i ) Deviation in reserves accumulation (P)
+ i{zt - z t) Other net debt-creating flows (q)
Note:
The symbol /  represents a sum vector across the total number of export and import agglomerates, j;
The sum of all exports effects is equal to the simple trend deviation: (a)+(b)+(d)+(g)+(h)+[(c)-
Similarly, with regard to import items: (e)+(f)+(i)+(j)+(k)+(l)+ [(c)+(p;v -p ' ) X,  ] -  (p;“ M, - ~p‘‘ ~M , ) ■
The basic structure of identity (14) is borrowed from Solis and Zedillo (1985), and has been substantially 
modified by the author.
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However, the actual setup of the CDSF accounting mechanism will depend on the 
specific characteristics of the debtor country involved, as well as the availability of a 
sufficiently comprehensive and reliable set of information relating to the main factors 
affecting its balance of payments. Limiting the distinction of hypothetical values to 
the trade balance alone, the full specification of balance of paym ents effects is 
obtained by subtracting identity (7) from (6), after substituting for trend and 
hypothetical imports and exports. By disaggregating value terms to reflect price and 
trend components, we obtain the set of expressions constituting the central 
accounting framework underlying the CDSF, which is outlined in Box 5.1. The 
balance of paym ent effects are grouped into three categories. The positive or negative 
sign w ith which the individual items enter identity (14) determ ine their effect on the 
country's dem and for additional net transfers. Put differently, from an ex-post 
perspective, those items entering the equations with a positive value are to be 
considered debt-inducing, to the extent that they explain a proportion of the positive 
deviation in net official transfers to the country. Conversely, all items taking a 
negative value are accounted for as having had a debt-deducing effect during the 
period of observation, since they lower the BOP gap to be filled by net official 
transfers. The first category of items contains all the debt-inducing trade balance 
effects, which are of purely exogenous nature. With the exception of item (a), 
m easuring the effect from volume changes in world dem and as outlined in Figure 5.1 
above, these are all price effects. Item (b) measures the price im pact of item (a), which 
together sum  up  to the value effect of the deviation of actual from hypothetical 
export volum e on the overall trade balance. Item (c) represents the terms of trade 
shock effect m easured as price variations with respect to their trend value, against 
trend im ports and exports volume. In contrast to a measure of the terms of trade in 
current terms, w hich is typically calculated on the basis of period t prices and 
volumes, item (c) captures the purely exogenous shock element of the terms of trade 
factor affecting the country's BOP in period t. Items (d), (e) and (f) represent the price 
trend deviation of exports volume, imports volume, and GDP growth, respectively. 
Only the price variation components of these three effects represent true shocks to 
the country's BOP management, while their overall effects are mixed and thus belong 
to category (II). The overall sum of items (a) to (f) constitutes the exogenously
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determined proportion of the overall trend deviation in the country's balance of 
paym ents during period t, excluding net official transfers. Depending on w hether it 
takes a positive or a negative sign, the overall shock component in t will be classified 
as unfavourable or favourable to the country, respectively. As has been discussed 
above (Chart 5.1), the contingent credit line of the CDSF triggers automatic credit 
adjustments at the end of period f, to compensate for the overall BOP shock 
component.
The second category of items in identity (14) contains all the trade balance effects, 
which cannot be classified as exogenous shocks. Item (g) measures the difference 
between actual and hypothetical exports, as visualised in Figure 5.1. Similarly to the 
other items in category (II), this effect enters identity (14) w ith a negative sign, 
because a positive difference between actual and hypothetical export volume reduces 
the country's need for net official transfers from the perspective of the overall 
deviations in its balance of payments. Item (h) represents the price trend effect of the 
deviation in export volume. Together w ith the corresponding shock component (d), 




- I ( X , - X , )  = (14.g)
“  p'i (X t — X t ) = Value effect
In contrast to item (d), neither (g) nor (h) qualify as purely exogenous effects, since 
change in export volume is deemed to be at least in part determ ined by factors under 
the control of the debtor country.
All rem aining items of category (II) are im port effects. Items (i) and (j) compute the
volume and price trend effects of ( M t —M t) ,  which is the deviation of actual
imports volume from the am ount of imports explained by the country's rate of 
growth of GDP and the income elasticity of imports. Items (k) and (I) compute the
volume and price trend effects of ( Mi  - M t ) ,  thus quantifying the imports effect of 
deviations in the GDP growth rate from its own trend. In contrast to the im port price
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shock component measured by item (f)r neither the im port volume nor the price 
trend effect can be considered as entirely exogenous to the country. For, according to 
the specification of equations (11) and (12), the difference in actual, trend and 
hypothetical im ports is attributable to changes in im port elasticity and/or GDP 
growth, which are both factors that are, at least in principle, susceptible to influence 
by the country authorities.
All items of category (II) typically pose difficulties in trying to fully distinguish their 
exogenous and endogenous origins. Nevertheless, as outlined above, the CDSF 
entails that conditional upon a country's policy performance, the price trend 
components of category (II) -  i.e. items (h), (j) and (I) -  qualify for an equivalent grant 
conversion of debt disbursed in period t. In contrast, the volume effects (g), (i) and (k) 
do not qualify for grant conversion. Rather, since real deviations are a prime 
indicator of the country's need for official assistance in the m edium  to longer term, 
the signs and m agnitudes of real effects inform the CDSF in relation to the volume of 
future aid allocation.
Finally, the third category of effects includes the trend deviations of the various non­
debt financial flows of the balance of payments. They take a negative sign in identity
(14), because positive trend deviations have a debt-deducing effect on the balance of 
payments. Item (rn) measures variation in official grant disbursements; item (n) in 
w orkers' remittances, or private current account transfers more generally17; item (o) 
in net FDI inflows to the country; item (p) in changes to the country's international 
reserve holdings. It should be noted that the reason for including disbursements of 
official grants (item m) in this category is that from the perspective of an ex-post 
assessment, the CDSF's emphasis is mainly placed on analysing and comparing of 
the debt-inducing effect of single BOP items. Since a positive trend deviation of 
official grant transfers has a lowering effect on the period's balance of paym ent gap, 
it explains part of the net deviation in official net transfers, as do the other effects. 
However, from the perspective of the CDSF's role in determining the optimal volume 
of overall aid disbursements in line w ith expectations relating to BOP trend
17 Workers' remittances is typically the most important item of private unrequited transfers to LICs, and 
explains the choice of labelling. Of course, the inclusion of specific items and exclusion of others will 
vary from country to country.
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developments during period t+1, the grants item would be more correctly moved to 
the left-hand side of identities (6) and (7) and (14), so as to reflect the total net official 
development assistance planned for period t+1, together w ith net transfers.
It should be noted that identity (14) includes category-III items as simple trend 
deviations. Alternatively, their hypothetical expressions could have been introduced, 
for example by equation (13) in the case of FDI. Although the separation of shocks 
and trends from real components w ould lead to a more detailed assessment with 
regard to these effects, as is done with the trade balance, it is not the purpose of the 
CDSF to directly compensate for their effects on the balance of payments. In contrast, 
the CDSF, as envisaged here, has the exclusive aim of rendering official debt flows 
supportive of a LIC's repaym ent capacity, as resulting from the structure of its 
foreign trade sector and the occurrence of exogenous shocks affecting its overall trade 
performance. The CDSF thus limits the inclusion of category III effects to an 
assessment of the conformity of underlying policy factors w ith contractual 
obligations. Typically, the contract w ould relate to long-term program m es with the 
aim of fostering a low-income country's business environment, exchange rate, capital 
account and international reserves management, in order to keep in check the main 
endogenous factors influencing deviations in FDI and private transfer inflows, as 
well as international reserves. Ascertained compliance w ith contractual terms, 
together w ith the signs and m agnitudes of single financial effects, will then serve as 
an input to the CDSF's assessment of overall BOP sustainability, and, together with a 
more comprehensive needs and sustainability assessment, guide the lending 
decisions relating to period t+1.
5.4 Potential costs and benefits of the CDSF
Any conjecture relating to the potential costs and benefits of the CDSF over a certain 
time horizon w ould necessarily have to rely on the estimation of trends and the 
likelihood of contingent events occurring across eligible countries, as well as the 
scheme's potential to effectively increase beneficiaries' balance of payments 
sustainability. While benefits are difficult to measure, the historical assessment of 
balance of paym ents determ inants across a large num ber of LICs, and in line w ith the 
methodology outlined in the previous section, would at least offer a rough indication
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of the likely range of costs involved. Although we deem it feasible on the basis of the 
comprehensive database underlying this study, such broad analysis would go 
beyond its limited scope of outlining the basic principles guiding a CDSF, and is thus 
left for further research. Instead, the country study presented in the next chapter 
simulates the CDSF implications in the representative case of Uganda. The results 
from such an analysis, in terms of estimated costs and benefits, are highly 
encouraging. For, at similar cost to those involve in the actual HIPC and Paris Club 
Initiatives over a 15-year period up to 2002, the CDSF is clearly shown to achieve an 
effective reversal in U ganda's accumulation of external debt together w ith substantial 
compensatory cash-flow effects, while the opposite holds true for the actual regimes. 
Although the results from a single country study cannot be generalised to the case of 
all LICs, they w ould support some degree of optimism w ith regard to the overall 
cost-benefit implications of the CDSF compared to those involved in the current BWI 
regime.
From a qualitative perspective, a few tentative conclusions can be reached in relation 
to the main implications for borrowers' prospects of balance of paym ent 
sustainability on the one hand, and the scheme's implications for lenders' overall aid 
disbursements on the other. W ith regard to LICs' benefits in terms of balance of 
paym ents sustainability, consider that the fundamental balance of paym ents identity 
underlying the CDSF accounting framework, identity (6), can be expressed in terms 
of expected values, where superscript e denotes country authorities' expectations 
with regard to the balance of paym ents in period t
N T R e, = p f M e, - p f x et - G R ct -  WRet - F D I e, + AR e, + Z e, (15)
Assume that the country holds rational expectations with regard to both the 
exogenous and endogenous factors affecting its balance of payments. That is, rather 
than formulating expectations statically around simple trend values of the BOP items 
in identity (15), the country planners also internalise the expected effects from the 
CDSF, in accordance with the terms set out in the underlying contract. Clearly then, 
the CDSF will not only have a stabilising effect through the adjustment of net 
transfers to exogenous shocks affecting the trade balance in period t, but the 
anticipation of its effects will also considerably facilitate the planning of policies in
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relation to external balances. It follows that the CDSF's benefits are increased by the 
extent to which the highly volatile and uncertain context characterising low-income 
income countries' balance of payments constitutes a major disruptive factor in their 
capacity to enact long-term development plans. Conversely, the largely discretional, 
ex-post, character of the current BWI-DSF regime fails to create a foreseeable link 
between the left- and right-hand sides of identity (15). For, aid disbursements are 
driven by country-rankings according to the CPIA criteria, which have little or no 
correlation to the actual balance of paym ents situation. In fact, rather than facilitating 
LICs' struggle against the disruptive effects of exogenously determined volatility and 
uncertainty, the BWI-DSF and aid allocation regimes can be thought of as 
exacerbating the potential for disruptions, by introducing an additional factor of 
uncertainty in relation to a country's expectations of aid allocation in any period L
Finally, turning to a brief consideration of the costs to lenders, which the CDSF 
would potentially entail, it should be noted that the framework proposed here does 
not have the prim ary aim of minimising such costs. Thus, it contrasts with the World 
Bank proposals for debt service modulation schemes, the effects of which were 
shown to be largely underm ined by the requirement not to cause losses in terms of 
creditors' overall reflows. Nevertheless, there is no reason to expect the cost 
implications of the CDSF's two central instruments to be of any significant 
m agnitude in terms of overall aid flows to LICs over the longer term. For, the 
contingent credit line mainly applies to both unfavourable and favourable price 
shocks, and, if not mean-reverting, should be expected to be accumulating deficits at 
a moderate pace. Moreover, the facility would offer lenders the opportunity to 
effectively pool price risks across countries, and thus would represent a relatively 
cost-effective solution.18 Of course, the contingency mechanism w ould become 
significantly more expensive if it were to compensate also for the m ultitude of real 
shocks facing LICs. In that case, however, its costs w ould have to be viewed in
18 This is the central argument of IDA (2005b) in relation to the benefits of ex-ante mechanisms.
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relation to those of the existing international facilities for dealing w ith low-income 
countries' natural disasters and real output shocks.19
With regard to the CDSF's debt relief according to trend factors, it is difficult to reach 
any conclusion as to its net effects on the overall grant share involving aid to low- 
income countries. For, the BWI-DSF already entails a grant share of 50 or 100 per cent 
of IDA disbursements, according to a LIC's likelihood of debt distress, and applies a 
discount factor lowering the overall volume of aid to countries qualifying for grant 
financing. W hether or not the CDSF w ould increase the overall grant share of aid 
allocation w ould thus depend on a comparison between the average incidence of 
trend factors across LICs, and the net grant implications of the BWI-DSF. W ithout the 
outcome of such an analysis, it can be reasonably expected that the CDSF w ould have 
only m oderate effects on the overall grant share of aid allocation across LICs, which 
is already very high, while it is likely to have relatively stronger implications for the 
grant share of those individual LICs facing trend factors m arkedly different to the 
average. Furtherm ore, it should be noted that there w ould be no substantial change 
in the allocation of bilateral ODA flows to LICs, which already account for almost 100 
per cent of grants.
5.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter's approach to defining a state-contingent debt sustainability framework 
stands out strongly against the ongoing attempts to rendering the current debt 
sustainability framework more responsive to the occurrence of exogenous shocks. It 
argues that only a bold attem pt to overcome the apparent shortcomings of the 
current aid allocation and debt sustainability paradigm  has the necessary potential to 
achieve the overarching aim of putting an end to low-income countries' continuing 
debt crises.
W ithout any presum ption of comprehensiveness, this chapter's schematic 
presentation of a contingency framework indicates the key elements of a new 
approach to contingent financing and debt relief, on the basis of which it is hoped 
that a more thorough discussion and elaboration of the analytical and operational
19 This facilities include, among others, the Humanitarian Assistance Programs of the United Nations 
and the European Commission, and the World Bank's Emergency Recovery Loans Program.
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challenges will ensue. Similarly, the accounting framework presented in this chapter 
serves as an indication, or example, illustrating the essential feasibility of developing 
a more comprehensive tool for assessment of low-income countries' balance of 
paym ent vulnerabilities, as a useful underpinning to the proposed contingency 
framework. Of course, much refinement w ould be needed to ensure its operational 
viability, which would presum e the solution of a num ber of caveats and technicalities 
that are insufficiently envisaged at this stage of abstraction.
Despite its relatively early stage of elaboration, the basic features and elements of the 
CDSF already provide a sufficiently defined analytical fram ework to be tested for its 
main implications against the historical experience of low-income countries. A whole 
range of empirical analyses involving individual case studies, as well as the category 
of low-income countries as whole, are currently being undertaken and will be the 
subject of subsequent endeavours in this line of research. However, the key insights 
from the empirical analysis are already apparent from the representative country 
study relating to Uganda, which is the focus of the subsequent chapter.
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6 Uganda Country Study
6.1 Introduction
The choice of Uganda for our representative case study of the proposed CDSF was 
mainly based on it representing a low-income country:
■ whose developm ent prospects have long been ham pered by a severe and 
persistent external debt problem relating to official development financing;
■ whose economic structure well reflects LICs' typical structural weakness, 
particularly w ith regard to vulnerability to exogenous shocks;
■ with a long-standing track record of excellence in the IMF and W orld Bank 
structural adjustment and policy reforms, hence earning the highest ratings in 
the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA);
■ which, as a result of compliance, has benefited from substantial flows of 
official financial assistance, and been a frontrunner in the im plem entation of 
the two HIPC Initiatives, receiving significant am ounts of debt relief since 
1996.
While the first two characteristics are common to most HIPCs, Uganda crucially 
outperforms other sub-Saharan LICs on the basis of its track record with the BWI. 
Indeed, the country has long been featured among the highest ranking group of 
countries (first quintile) of the CPIA, as well as having successfully completed a 
num ber of IMF programm es -  most recently the poverty reduction growth facility -  
the reviews of which generally awarded Uganda the highest performance and 
compliance ra tings.1 More generally, Uganda has long been considered a darling of 
the international financial institutions, having a performance record which was
1 For a list of recently published CPIA rankings of LICs, see http://siteresources.worldbank.org 
/IDA/Resources/2004CPIAwebl.pdf (accessed in June 2006). For the 2005 and 2006 reviews of Uganda's 
PRGF, see IMF (2005b) and IMF (2006).
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cham pioned as a role model for other sub-Saharan HIPCs. As a result, bilateral and 
multilateral aid has been particularly forthcoming for Uganda.
In the narrow  context of this case study, Uganda's record of conformity with BWI 
policy conditionality is particularly convenient, for two main reasons. First, U ganda's 
high performance ratings over the entire period of analysis is well suited to the 
simulation context of the contingency scheme, which establishes that in order for it to 
be im plem ented continuously over a period of time, the debtor country m ust be in 
compliance w ith the policy obligations set out in the underlying contract. While 
Uganda suits this scenario well, any simulations involving a country w ith a more 
ambiguous performance record w ould require the potentially awkw ard task of 
simulating the CSDF effects of non-compliance.2 Secondly, it allows ruling out a priori 
the hypothesis that the country's persistent debt crisis has prim arily been the result of 
its failure to comply w ith BWI's policy advice, and thus could have been avoided or 
alleviated by im proving compliance. Therefore, it will be possible to compare the 
simulated effects of the CDSF with those historically observed during the same 
period of analysis, and reach meaningful conclusions w ith regard to the comparative 
performance of each scheme under conditions of full compliance. Furthermore, since 
this scenario does not touch upon the fundamental question of the degree to which 
U ganda's debt crisis is the outcome of flawed policy conditionality im posed by the 
BWI and closely adhered to by the country authorities, it suits the context of the 
following simulations, which will be shown to have no bearing on answering this 
question.
The analysis of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 outlines the main 
characteristics of U ganda's balance of payments vulnerability and external debt 
problems over time. Section 6.3 applies the CDSF accounting methodology to 
Uganda during the period 1988-2002, and discusses the main results from alternative 
simulation scenarios implem enting the scheme's contingency mechanisms. Section
6.4 concludes.
2 This would involve the definition of compliance indices other than the CPIA, and of a set of actions to 
be performed in the face of different degrees of non-compliance.
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6.2 Uganda's balance of payments and external debt evolution
6.2.1 Historical overview
For most of the time between 1962, the year it gained its independence, and the late 
1980s, Uganda suffered from political turm oil and civil war, which plunged the 
country into a status of social, economic and institutional disarray. Idi Amin's 
military regime of 1971-1979 was followed by a short-lived successor government 
that attem pted recovery and stabilisation with the support of IMF and World Bank 
loans. However, all efforts were soon to be underm ined by further instability and 
war. Only in 1986 did U ganda progress towards a situation of relative social and 
political stability, w hen the National Resistance Movement took pow er and installed 
its leader, Yoweri Museveni, as the country's president.3
By 1986, U ganda's per capita GDP had fallen by nearly 40 per cent from its level in 
1970, its exports base had virtually vanished, while m uch of the British colonial 
legacy of basic infrastructure had been left to deteriorate.4 The new government 
inherited an agricultural subsistence economy absorbing over 80 per cent of the 
workforce; cash crops represented only five per cent of GDP.5 In 1986, the external 
debt stock stood at US$ 1.4 billion (36 per cent of GDP), most of which had been 
contracted at unfavourable terms from private creditors to finance w ar expenses. As 
a result, debt service obligations exceeded an average 12 per cent per annum  of 
outstanding debt (US$ 172 million in 1986).6
Lacking the domestic revenue base to finance economic recovery, the government 
had to rely on donor assistance. This was forthcoming from the W orld Bank and IMF, 
as Uganda subscribed to their package of prescriptions involving economic recovery, 
stabilisation and reform programmes. During 1986-1992, implem entation of reforms 
progressed swiftly, and per capita GDP growth averaged about five per cent.
3 At the time of writing, Mr. Museveni is still holding on to the country's presidency.
4 Collier (1997) and Gautam and Marcos (2002)
5 Collier (1997: 651)
6 Gautam and Marcos (2002: 4)
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Recovery and growth, however, were mostly the result of restoration of domestic 
consumption and fiscal expenditure financed by foreign aid, rather than of reforms.7
ODA was increasingly replacing external private financial transfers, and the build-up 
of multilateral debt rapidly gained momentum. By 1991, the external debt stock had 
risen to US$ 2.6 billion (84 per cent of GDP), while higher concessionality had 
lowered debt service to a nominal US$ 147 million, or half the service rate compared 
to 1986. Nevertheless, the country's ability to stay current on debt obligations was 
severely underm ined by a sharp deterioration in its terms of trade. During 1986-1991, 
the w orld price of coffee, U ganda's predom inant export commodity, collapsed, 
causing total export revenues to plunge by 65 per cent and the ratio of debt service to 
exports to increase from 41 to 75 per cent. As a result, by the early 1990s, the country 
found itself increasingly unable to service its debt. Despite substantial official net 
resource transfers, foreign exchange had to be rationed to repay priority creditors, 
while arrears on the remaining debt were left accumulating.8
In 1992, U ganda em barked on a second tier of structural adjustm ent programmes, 
including the liberalisation of the trade and foreign exchange regimes; the 
privatisation of public enterprises; and reforms of the financial sector, tax 
adm inistration and the civil service. By continuing to fulfil closely the conditions 
attached to the financial support from the IMF and World Bank, Uganda m anaged to 
build up a solid reputation w ith regard to its policy performance and also w hat the 
BWI considered as falling under the realm of 'good governance'. As a result, the BWI 
continued to finance U ganda's reform efforts and balance of paym ents deficits with 
ever-increasing concessional loans. The sheer magnitude of external financial support 
not only allowed Uganda to roll over and service existing debt, bu t also fuelled its 
economic expansion: during 1992-2002, U ganda's GDP grow th averaged 6.7 per cent 
in real term s9. The extent to which economic expansion is to be ascribed to the effects 
of the reforms and policies implemented, rather than to reflect aid inflows per se, 
remains a m atter of debate.10 However, less controversial is the country's
7 Collier (1997)
8 Ibid (p.6), as well as drawing from the Global Development Finance CD-ROM (2005).
9 Data from the World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2005).
10 For two differing accounts, see Collier (1997) and Morrissey and Rudaheranwa (1998).
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achievement in channelling a large share of resources to the social sector, and in 
putting into existence effective poverty alleviation plans. Between 1992 and 2000, the 
incidence of poverty in Uganda fell remarkably, from 56 to 35 per cent.11
Despite its achievements in translating official developm ent assistance into sustained 
rates of economic growth, as well as social and institutional progress, Uganda never 
m anaged to resolve the official external debt crisis it had been facing since the early 
1990s. For, the debt service obligations ensuing from the m ounting debt stock owed 
to the official creditors represented an increasing drain on U ganda's economy, while 
the BWI's reform program m es failed to overcome the econom y's structural 
deficiencies. Instead, U ganda's repaym ent capacity continued to be ham pered by its 
reliance on an extremely fragile and narrow export basket of cash crops. 
Vulnerability to external shocks, particularly in the form of pronounced fluctuations 
in the w orld prices of export commodities, made repaym ent crises and arrears 
accumulation the recurrent symptom s of a deepening crisis.
As the key bastion of BWI's paradigm  of aid-driven reform in Africa, it has long been 
clear that U ganda's failure to succeed w ould have had w ide-ranging implications for 
the perceptions of the current approach to conditionality-tied aid. Arguably, the BWI 
thus had a strong incentive to preserve their proclaimed trust in an eventual 
realisation of the benefits from the im plem entation of U ganda's reform packages, and 
a future im provem ent in the country's external debt position. Hence, until the mid 
1990s, the IMF and W orld Bank continued to support positive net resource flows, 
high enough to roll over multilateral debt, as well as financing the county's current 
account and fiscal gaps after im ports and social spending. While the multilateral debt 
problem was thereby relegated to the future, U ganda's bilateral lenders started 
holding back disbursem ents of new loans, and existing debt was increasingly dealt 
w ith by Paris Club relief operations. Only in 1996, did the BWI move away from 
defensive lending, tow ards dealing with U ganda's stock problem. As a frontrunner 
to the HIPC Initiative, the country saw its external debt stock restructured and
11 Ibid. However, a contentious issue among policy practitioners and scholars alike remains with regard 
to the relative long-term poverty effects from Uganda's high social sector spending, to the disadvantage 
of increased investment in physical capital and infrastructure more generally.
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reduced, w ith the proclaimed aim of rendering the ensuing debt service schedule 
sustainable over time.
As an inevitable result of the HIPC Initiative's lack of mechanisms to counter 
effectively the debt effects of exogenous shocks, recent history has unfortunately 
confirmed that it w ould not provide Uganda a perm anent escape from crisis. Rather, 
the plunge in export prices during 1995-2000 proved, once again, U ganda's debt 
position to be unsustainable despite substantial relief. As a result of the increased 
requirem ent for external loans to fill the widening trade deficit, the country's external 
debt stock started soaring again, making it all too evident that the current approach 
w ould not suffice to resolve U ganda's continuing debt crises.
U ganda's history of commodity and aid dependence, combined with a marked 
vulnerability to exogenous shocks, well exemplifies the key factors explaining low- 
income countries' debt crisis, as well as the intrinsic inaptitude of extant and past 
approaches to effectively address the debt problem. Against this background, it is to 
be expected that the contingency instrum ents of the sustainability framework 
proposed in Chapter 5 w ould have a strong potential for ameliorating the country's 
external debt position. However, in order to be able to evaluate the simulated effects 
of the CDSF in the specific historical context of Uganda, it is first essential to examine 
more closely the relevant factors affecting the country's balance of paym ents and 
debt sustainability.
6.2.2 The balance of payments
Table 6.1 summarises U ganda's balance of paym ents (BOP) flows during 1980-2003, 
and Graph 6.1 displays the main BOP aggregates.12 N oting that outflows enter the 
BOP w ith a negative sign, while inflows are recorded positively, the zero line in the 
graph below can be seen to roughly separate the supply and dem and factors of 
U ganda's external financial flows. On the dem and side, a steeply declining trend 
balance in goods and services from 1986 onw ards reflects grant-supported im port 
growth that more than outstripped the rather sluggish expansion of U ganda's 
exports (Table 6.1). On the supply side, a persistently high level of official
12 Note that Uganda gained its independence from Britain in 1962, but economic data on Uganda prior to 
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developm ent assistance (ODA) flows reflect the country's close adherence to donor 
reform and stabilisation program m es since 1986. Hence, as noted above, U ganda was 
able to benefit from substantial aid inflows, whereby the share of grants persistently
Graph 6.1: Uganda Balance of Payments Aggregates (1980-2003)
Millions of U .S . Dollars
S-
1960 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 19M 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
------•------  T ra d e  B alance, G cods& Ser vices ----- ■-----  ODA; Official G rants and Loans (N T R )
— * —  FOI an d  Portfolio Flow s, net — O—  W orkers' R em ittances
....... k......  R esidual T ra n sfe rs ------ 1------ C h a n g e s  Int'i R eserv e  H old ings
D ia  Sources: IMF Bcknce of Payments Statistics (2005); World Bail; Globd Development Finance (2005)
exceeded that of loans in the country's overall ODA envelope (Table 6.1). From the 
early 1990s onwards, growing confidence in the country's economic performance 
triggered m odest inflows of private capital to Uganda, mainly in the form of foreign 
direct investm ent (FDI).13 Although after the liberalisation of the capital account, in 
1997, w orkers' remittances further added to U ganda's overall private financial flows, 
they continued to be dw arfed by the sheer m agnitude of official development 
assistance flowing into the country.
Graph 6.1 displays an episode of exceptionally high residual BOP transfers during 
1994-1998. A part from m oderate amounts of private current transfers,14 these 
transfers merely reflect a change in accounting within the underlying IFS BOPS 
dataset. While this leaves the overall BOP pattern of Uganda largely unchanged, it 
should be noted that the dow nw ard acceleration in the trade deficit evident in Graph
13 Direct investors mostly avoided the country during 1971-1986, when net FDI flows actually turned 
negative. The crucial steps to restore investor confidence, against the background of increasing social, 
political and macroeconomic stability, included the introduction of the Investment Code in 1991 and a 
number of incentive measures to promote Uganda as an investment location (e.g. see Obwona, 1996).
14 Private current transfers have mainly been project-related transfers from non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) (see Bank of Uganda: Annual Report, various issues).
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6.1, as well as the m arked kink in the trade deficit line between 1998 and 1999, are in 
part exacerbated by this accounting effect.15
In sum, U ganda's im ports and growth expansion since 1986 has been almost 
exclusively reliant on foreign developm ent assistance, thus representing the typical 
characteristics of a heavily aid-driven economy. To gauge the causal relationships 
driving U ganda's BOP gaps, aid financing and official external debt, we first analyse 
the evolution of its exports-imports structure over time, and then turn to a closer 
assessment of the foreign aid composition.
6.2.3 The trade balance and the terms of trade
Since independence, U ganda's trade structure has been geared tow ards the export of 
agricultural products and the im port of m anufactured and capital goods. The country 
inherited an export structure from colonial dependence, which was based on a few 
traditional agricultural commodities. This became further concentrated during the 
1970s as the result of the military regim e's trade policy. Prohibitively high taxes, both 
through direct levies and a highly overvalued exchange rate, caused production and 
exports of traditional crops to collapse. Between the early 1970s and the 1980s, tea 
production plunged from 20,000 to 2,000 metric tonnes (mt), and cotton production 
fell from 87,000 to 2,000 mt. Among the traditional export crops, only coffee 
production survived relatively unscathed, due to a favourable combination of 
production characteristics (low annual depreciation of coffee trees and input 
requirements) and the access to m arket outlets through substantial sm uggling.16 As a 
result, U gandan exports came to rely almost exclusively on coffee, which accounted 
for 87 per cent of export revenue in 1985.17 The dependence on coffee rendered 
U ganda's export earnings highly vulnerable to fluctuations both in the world price 
for coffee and in climatic conditions determ ining coffee yields.
In 1987, the governm ent adopted the Economic Recovery Program  (ERP) under the 
aegis of the IMF and W orld Bank. W ith regard to the trade regime, the ambitious
15 The data issue relates to the ex-post reconciliation of the IFS data with a change in the valuation 
practise of Uganda BOPS imports (services) data. For a more detailed discussion of the implications of 
that revision, see Appendix A6.1.
16 Collier (1997: 650)
17 According to the data drawn front the World Trade Analyzer CD-ROM (2005).
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reform agenda was mainly centred on the privatisation of previously nationalised 
enterprises and m arketing boards, the liberalisation of foreign exchange, and the 
reduction of trade barriers. Between 1986 and 1998, average nominal tariffs declined 
from 30 to 10 per cent, non-tariff barriers were removed, and export taxation was 
abolished.18 According to the BWI's expectations, U ganda's orthodox trade reform 
was well-suited to bringing about an eventual reversal of U ganda's trade deficit by a 
combination of higher export receipts and a dam pening effect on imports demand. 
Furthermore, a liberal exchange rate policy, combined w ith an overall market- 
friendly production environment, was thought to create the right incentives to 
encourage export-oriented expansion by both the traditional and non-traditional 
agricultural sectors.19
In retrospect, this was mostly wishful thinking on the part of the BWI. U ganda's 
reforms failed to diversify the country's export base effectively, and deteriorating 
terms of trade exacerbated the trade deficits ensuing from export revenues falling 
consistently short of growing im port bills. That trade reforms had only limited effects 
on U ganda's export diversification and overall trade performance is clearly borne out 
by the data. Table 6.2 lists U ganda's ten key export items during 1985-2002, and 
shows export concentration to have decreased only slightly during that period. 
Although coffee's share of overall merchandise export value was drastically reduced 
over this period, from 87 to 22 per cent, the country's dependence on coffee exports 
remains high. For, m ost of the reduction in coffee's share of export value is accounted 
for by the sharp decline in the w orld coffee prices, rather than export volumes: by 
2002 the coffee price had plum m eted to one quarter of its level in 1985 (Graph 6.2). 
Between 1985 and 1990 alone, while Ugandan exports were reliant on coffee to more 
than 80 per cent, its price fell by 55 per cent, thereby reducing the overall export 
revenue from US$ 410 to 215 million (Table 6.2).
Despite its rapid price decline, no other agricultural commodity has yet managed to 
take over from coffee as U ganda's predom inant export crop. Among the traditional 
production sectors, cotton, tea and tobacco did increase over time in terms of export
18 von Uexklill (2006: 9). Also see Collier (1997) and WTO (1995, 2001).
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value share, but not even their combined value has ever reached that of coffee alone 
(Table 6.2). Despite the im provem ents in productivity of some of U ganda's 
traditional agricultural sectors, their overall expansion and the investm ent efforts to 
foster agricultural output have been underm ined by the frequent occurrence of 
climatic shocks, particularly in the form of droughts.20 For example, between 1997 
and 1998 alone, total merchandise export earnings declined by 33 per cent due to 
torrential rains -  know n as the El Nino phenom enon -  as the combined result of a 34 
and a 38 per cent fall in export volum e of the non-coffee traditional sectors and 
coffee, respectively (Table 6.2).21
Uganda has been more successful in developing substantial export capacity in a few 
single non-traditional crops, most notably through commercial fishing of Nile perch 
fish in Lake Victoria. Indeed, in 2001 and 2002, the export value of fish was close to 
overtaking coffee as the prime export item. O ther major non-traditional export 
sectors which Uganda has managed to develop include cut flowers, sold to the 
European market, and electric current, exported to the neighbouring African 
countries. Furthermore, increased investm ent in the extraction industry has increased 
exports of non-monetary gold, mainly to Europe. A lthough combined earnings from 
non-traditional exports did grow over the years, these have not been sufficient to 
compensate for U ganda's price-induced loss of coffee revenue. Furthermore, the non-
20 Particularly significant productivity increases occurred in the tobacco sector. On the role of FDI in 
Uganda's increase in tobacco production, see Ferrarini (2005),
21 Also see Gautam and Marcos (2002: 14).
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traditional sectors have suffered from pronounced fluctuations in production yields,, 
as well as high price volatility, similar to those experienced by the traditional sectors. 
As a result, U ganda's diversification efforts had little effect on its overall 
vulnerability to exogenous shocks.
Table 6.3 assesses U ganda's exposure to export volatility on the basis of two volatility 
measures calculated for the country's total exports, agricultural exports, and a 
num ber of selected export items for which consistent data are available. The 
coefficient of variation (CoV) is com puted as the percentage ratio of the standard 
deviation to the 1988-2002 period average. Since the presence of pronounced trend 
factors risks largely invalidating the significance of CoV measures over an extended 
time period, we de-trend the series to calculate an alternative volatility index for the 
longer period 1970-2004.22
The two indices yield a broadly similar picture of extremely high variations in 
U ganda's export earnings. Moreover, fluctuations in yearly earnings seem to be 
caused by variations in both volume and price. While all commodities display 
pronounced real volatility, in the case of cotton, tobacco and tea, volume shocks 
appear to have been the prim ary cause of fluctuations in export earnings. Coffee and 
fish, on the other hand, show a slightly more stable export volume, w ith a relatively 
higher incidence of prices on earnings fluctuations. Among single export items, a 
generally highly positive volume-price correlation points tow ards a reinforcing effect 
of price and quantity volatility combined. In contrast, at the aggregate level, exports 
display a highly negative correlation between volume and price, and thus lower 
fluctuations in earnings. Finally, the volatility index is lowest for overall exports of 
goods and services, reflecting the relatively more stable nature of U ganda's services 
exports. In this respect, the CoV overestimates the volatility of overall exports, which, 
however, merely reflects its shortcomings to account for the strongly growing real 
trend in services during the period 1988-2002 (Table 6.1).
22 Roughly following the methodology applied in Osei, Morrissey and Lensink (2002), the index is 
computed by fitting a quadratic trend to each export item's time series. The index is then calculated by 
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Of course, no causal relationships between the factors of variation can be inferred on 
the basis of simple correlation analysis. Nevertheless, this approach lends itself to 
two more observations relevant to the context of the CDSF simulations below. First, 
U ganda's high degree of volatility in real exports (or export volume) is not accounted 
for as exogenous shock by the CDSF, since it reflects mixed-endogenous factors, as 
outlined in Chapter 5. Therefore, the CDSF compensatory instrum ents will provide 
only partial coverage of U ganda's export fluctuations, while real shocks are 
subsum ed in the mixed-endogenous category of effects. To the extent that 
information conform to the CDSF requirements with regard to the m easurement of 
export effects of real shocks w ould be available, these effects w ould have to be 
im puted to the exogenous category.23 Second, the offsetting effect of volatility across 
U ganda's total exports of goods and services suggests that CDSF compensation 
would best be indexed to this broad category of exports. In other words, although the 
accounting of single trade balance items remains im portant in relation to a more 
detailed identification of causal factors affecting BOP sustainability, such detailed 
accounting is not essential for the operation of CDSF compensatory mechanisms, 
which necessarily have to focus on the most aggregate level of net effects instead. 
Therefore, the requirem ent for informational content necessary to the 
im plem entation of the CDSF instrum ents is minimal, and can be met by the 
consolidated data represented by Uganda's balance of paym ents statistics.
In contrast to volumes, the observed volatility in U ganda's export prices is fully 
exogenous to the country and thus an expression of genuine shocks, which will be 
fully accounted for by the CDSF. Graphs 6.3(a) to 6.3(d) display the price pattern of 
four of U ganda's main non-coffee crops over time, m easured as export unit values. It 
is evident that, in contrast to green coffee, some of U ganda's key export items show 
fairly steep upw ard sloping trends in unit values. However, the potential BOP 
benefits from increasing price trends were strongly underm ined by the sheer degree 
of price volatility around trend. For example, the unit value of fish exports increased 
by a factor of seven between 1990 and 2002, but almost halved between 1998 and 
1999 alone. A similar degree of extreme price variability can be observed for tobacco,
23 No such information is available supplying the necessary level of detail from the data sources 
underlying this analysis.
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tea, cotton, as well as m ost of the other agricultural commodities Uganda exports (not 
reported here).
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Against the background of falling coffee prices, such m arked price volatility in 
U ganda's main export crops has had deleterious effects on the sustainability of 
agricultural reform policies in the affected sectors, thereby significantly underm ining 
the country's longer-term diversification efforts.24 At the same time, however, export 
price fluctuations have severely curtailed U ganda's capacity to rely on export
24 See the Bank of Uganda Quarterly Economic Report (various issues) for a description of several 
instances when agricultural sectors most severely hit by price shocks found it difficult to finance their 
production inputs in subsequent years.
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earnings for narrow ing its current account deficits, as well as financing the cash-flow 
requirem ents from outstanding debt obligations.
In sum, U ganda's post-reform export performance since the mid-1980s has not been 
impressive. The value of overall merchandise exports still depends to a 
disproportional extent on world coffee prices. U ganda's five top export commodities 
together still account for 68 per cent of total commodity exports, dow n from 86 per 
cent in 1985, and the overall num ber of large export items has increased only 
marginally (Table 6.2). The efforts to expand traditional commodity production and 
to diversify into non-coffee commodity exports were only partially successful in 
countering the declining trend in coffee prices since 1986. As a result, the value of 
total merchandise exports was stagnating, from US$ 410 million in 1985, to US$ 388 
in 2001, and to US$ 488 in 2002 (Table 6.2). Only on the services front did Uganda 
manage to establish a growing export industry -  mainly tourism -  which during the 
early 2000s grew to represent almost half the value of total goods exports.25
With regard to the imports side of the trade balance, U ganda displays the 
characteristic im port composition of a low-income country w ith little or no domestic 
manufacturing capacity. Indeed, Table 6.4 shows that Uganda has been 
predom inantly reliant on imports of m anufactured goods, equipm ent, machinery, 
chemicals and fuels (petrol). While there has been no substantial change in the 
composition of imports between 1985 and 2002, reflecting the country's failure to 
significantly improve its domestic manufacturing capacity, increasing amounts of 
im ported inputs and capital goods were required over time to sustain domestic 
recovery and output growth. As a result, the nominal value of merchandise imports 
increased fourfold during the observed period, from US$ 263 to US$ 1,052, against 
stagnating exports.
In contrast to export prices, which continued their decline, U ganda's im port prices 
rem ained fairly stable during the 1990s. The ensuing fall in U ganda's (barter) terms 
of trade is depicted in Graph 6.4, for total goods and services. Essentially, the 
country's deteriorating terms of trade reflects the different composition of its export
25 In 2000, 88 per cent of services exports came from tourism (Bank of Uganda -  Annual Report 2000).
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and im port baskets, which, in turn, has mainly been the result of the country's 
inability to free itself from its dependency on a narrow  range of agricultural export 
crops. The terms of trade effect has thus been a crucial factor underlying Uganda's 
stagnating export earnings, against rapidly growing imports. The cumulative effect 
of the terms of trade has been enormous: during 1985-2002 it deteriorated by more 
than 100 per cent. Hence, U ganda's trade deficit has more than doubled because of 
relative price changes alone, which the country had no influence upon.
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In sum, the terms of trade factor is both the result and the manifestation of Uganda's 
failed export diversification. It thus represents the ultimate synthesises of the causal 
determ inants underlying the country's worsening trade deficits, which in turn has 
been identified as the prim e cause of its growing dem and for official development 
financing (Graph 6.1). The evolution of debt financing over time, in particular with 
regard to the build-up of excessive external debt stocks, is the next and last step of 
analysis preparing the ground for the CDSF simulations.
6.2.4 The evolution of Uganda's external debt stock
Table 6.5 summarises the relevant data describing U ganda's external debt evolution 
during 1970-2003. In the years following its independence, U ganda borrowed mainly 
from the United Kingdom and the World Bank to finance its investments. During the 
1970s military regime, as resources were mostly being diverted to finance defence 
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Graph 6.5: Total Loan Disbursements (1970-2003)
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Graph 6.6: Total Debt Service Paid( 1970-2003) 
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Millions of U .S . Dollars
f  r i | •
a  n n 0 d Q tl C 4
|C  I G ran ts, excl. technical cooperation  L . I ' I I Z j  Total net tran sfe rs  on d eb t |
S o ice : G fcbal Ctevctopmeit Finance (2005)
Graph 6.9: Total Debt Stock (1970-2003)
Millions of U .S . Dollars
8 -
P P G , multilateral (D O D , U S$) PPG , bilateral (D O D , US$)
P PG . private c red ito rs  (D O D , US$) j p n a i f  P N G , total private non g u aran teed  (D O D , US$)
U s e  of IMF cred it (D O D , U S$)__________ n  ~ r :  i t  Short-term  debt ou tstanding (D O D , US$)
Source: Global Ctevdopmcrt Finance (2005)
Graph 6.10: Total Debt Service - Exports Ratio (percent)




















Graph 6.11: Accumulation of Arrears (1970-2003)
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com munity and the multilateral institutions, and had to rely on domestic borrow ing 
and a few single bilateral creditors, w ith high risk prem ium s attached.
Access to m ultilateral finance was restored in 1980, as a new  governm ent engaged in 
a recovery program m e supported by the IMF and the W orld Bank. As shown in 
Graphs 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7, between 1980 and 1986, loan disbursem ents from these 
institutions were substantial. However, the IMF soon had its funds repurchased, as 
political instability and civil unrest w ere exacerbated, and the governm ent continued 
to borrow  from private creditors. Due to the high country risk perceived, single 
private m arket loans were obtainable only on highly unfavourable term s and then 
only w ith public guarantees (PPG loans). U ganda was in fact excluded from 
accessing the international commercial loan markets, and it rem ained so over the 
whole period of observation (note that G raph 6.5 shows private non-guaranteed loan 
disbursem ents -PN G  -  to have been virtually non-existent). By the m id 1980s, 
U ganda debt stock had  risen to US$ 1.4 billion, w ith an increasing share of debt owed 
to the m ultilateral donors (Graph 6.9). However, given the high servicing costs 
arising from U ganda's non-concessional debt stock, total debt service started to soar, 
causing net transfers on debt to drop to almost zero in 1985.
In 1986, the National Resistance M ovement took pow er and signed up, a year later, to 
the Economic Recovery Program under the BWI's guidance. The period until the late 
1980s was thus characterised by growing multilateral disbursements, mainly from 
the International D evelopm ent Association (IDA) and the African Developm ent Bank 
(ADB). In addition, U ganda was receiving sporadic disbursem ents of bilateral official 
loans and a fairly stable supply of private publicly guaranteed debt (Graph 6.5). 
Despite accelerating debt service paym ents, mainly in form of repurchases and 
charges by the IMF, increasing disbursem ents by the IDA and ADB kept net transfers 
positive and rising. As a result, by the late 1980s, U ganda's debt stock already 
exceeded US$ 2 billion.
Concurrently w ith the loan transfers, U ganda benefited from increasing grant 
disbursem ents by the official donors, mainly to finance its growing im port 
requirements. Graph 6.8 shows that after 1986, growth in official net transfers was 
mainly driven by increasing shares of grant financing. Nevertheless, loan
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disbursem ents continued to be substantial, while both the official donors and the 
U gandan governm ent failed to impose any kind of debt m anagem ent strategy linking 
the am ount and term s of lending (borrowing) to the econom y's capacity to pay 
(World Bank, 2002). As U ganda's export prices dropped by 54 per cent between 1986 
and 1991 (Graph 6.4), the debt service to exports ratio jum ped from 41 to 76 per cent 
(Graph 6.10). Unable to stay current on its debt obligations, despite the continuing 
massive inflows of official disbursements, Uganda was facing its first outright debt 
crisis and defaults. Scarce foreign exchange had to be rationed to service debts owed 
to the priority multilateral and bilateral official creditors26, for them to continue to 
m aintain positive net transfers while the crisis was unfolding. By 1991, total debt 
service paid had already shrunk, reflecting the country's absolute inability to pay 
(Graph 6.6), while arrears had accumulated to US$ 400 million, more than four times 
the am ount in 1986 (Graph 6.11).27
The debt crisis led the government, pressured by its concessional creditors, to 
embrace a broad reform package involving debt reduction and m anagem ent 
strategies, first in 1991 and later in 1995, w ith the aim of reducing the external debt to 
levels compatible w ith the country's ability to pay. Existing commercial debt was to 
be eliminated, accum ulated arrears cleared, and future debt contracted exclusively at 
highly concessional terms. Furtherm ore, Uganda was to p u t in place the necessary 
domestic capacity to effectively m onitor and manage the country's external debt.28 
A lthough these initiatives were successful on many fronts, they ultimately failed to 
tackle U ganda's longer term  debt problem.
Among the key achievements of the 1990s debt reforms is the governm ent's success 
in achieving the institutional capacity and coordination necessary to 
comprehensively record and m onitor the m ultitude of external debt obligations, as 
well as to effectively enforce borrow ing discipline on line ministries. Besides 
representing a drastic qualitative im provem ent in U ganda's overall accountability, 
these measures prepared the necessary environm ent for a successful implem entation
26 In the early 1990s, the central bank's foreign exchange reserves were as low as 0.5 per cent of monthly 
imports (Gautam and Marcos, 2002: 6).
27 Arrears were mostly accumulated on non-Paris Club official debt, as well as private debt,
28 See Gautam and Marcos (2002) for a more detailed account of Uganda's post-1991 debt strategy.
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of the so-called 'new  debt policy', which restricted new borrow ing to concessional 
loans. Furtherm ore, debt service paym ents remained fairly stable during most of the 
1990s, as the combined result of substantial Paris Club debt relief operations (Table
6.5 and G raph 6.12), longer grace periods conceded on newly contracted debt, and 
increasing shares of grant financing (Graph 6.8). By 1995, the debt service to exports 
ratio had dropped to 20 per cent (Graph 6.10), favoured by an exceptional rebound in 
the term s of trade following a boom in the world coffee price. A lthough coffee prices 
soon resum ed their dow nw ard trend, the debt service ratio increased only slightly in 
the subsequent years, due to the offsetting effect of higher services exports (tourism). 
Finally, arrears w ith  Paris Club and multilateral creditors w ere totally cleared, and 
those in relation to the remaining debt rem ained fairly stable (Graph 6.11).
A lthough U ganda managed to overcome the full-blown debt crisis of the early 1990s 
and to significantly lower its debt burden  both in terms of stock and flows, the debt 
reforms and Paris Club relief operations largely failed to resolve U ganda's longer- 
term debt stock problem. Fuelled by large capital inflows, including official 
developm ent grants, the GDP growth rate more than outstripped that of the external 
debt stock, which w as lowered by the debt relief operations. Therefore, the ratio of 
debt stock to GDP dropped from a high of 102 per cent in 1992 to around 60 per cent 
during the late 1990s, and a similar plunge could be observed for the debt-to-exports 
ratio (Table 6.5). However, as has been noted above, the broader economic reforms 
had no bearing on resolving the causes of U ganda's broadening trade deficits. The 
latter continued to require massive financing by increasing am ounts of new 
borrowing, which caused U ganda's nominal external debt stock to soar unabated. By 
the mid-1990s, it was thus becoming increasingly evident that the rising trend in 
U ganda's debt stock w ould have required further interventions by the international 
community in  order to avoid an inevitable return to a situation of outright distress 
and possible defaults.
In 1996, virtually all of U ganda's external debt was owed to the multilateral
institutions (IDA, ADB, IMF) and, to a lesser extent, to bilateral creditors. Against the
background of the country's increasing share of indebtedness to the multilateral
donors and its strong record of compliance with BWI policy prescriptions, Uganda
was the first country to qualify for comprehensive debt relief under both the original
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(1996) and enhanced (1999) HIPC Initiatives. Despite the BWI's optim ism 29, the 
Initiatives' aim to bring about U ganda's full debt sustainability and to provide a 
definitive exit from repeated rescheduling and piecemeal Paris Club relief operations 
has failed to materialise. Upon reaching the Initiatives' completion points, Uganda 
was granted debt relief am ounting to US$ 650 million in 1998 and a further US$ 1.3 
billion in 2000, to be delivered over a period of 30 and 20 years, respectively.30 More 
than 80 per cent of overall relief was to be provided by the main multilateral 
creditors, i.e. the IDA, ADB and the IMF.
G raph 6.12 shows the am ounts of debt relief actually delivered up to 2003, as a 
combination of debt rescheduling31, forgiveness32 and reduction.33 The data show a 
surge of debt relief in 1998, and to a lesser extent in 2000, upon U ganda reaching its 
first and second completion points, and relatively little relief in between or since. The 
considerable am ount of debt forgiveness during the year 1998 resulted in both a 
tem porary reduction in arrears outstanding and debt service paid during the 
subsequent years (Graph 6.6 and Graph 6.11). By the year 2000, the debt service- 
exports ratio had dropped to 11 per cent, or half its level in 1998. As a result, 
U ganda's debt repaym ent capacity rem ained fairly stable, despite stagnating or 
falling export revenues. However, by 2002, U ganda's debt sustainability again started 
to be increasingly underm ined by further terms of trade erosion, causing a reversal in 
the ratio of debt service to exports. Unable to service its debts, Uganda was again left 
w ith no choice but to accumulate further arrears (Graph 6.11).
The insufficiency of HIPC relief in the face of U ganda's term s of trade deterioration is 
most clearly borne out by the balance of paym ents data. Graph 6.13 shows the actual 
cash-flow benefits from debt relief operations, as recorded in U ganda's balance of
29 The optimistic expectations about Uganda's prospects after HIPC relief were expressed by the IDA 
and IMF in Uganda's decision and completion point documents. See, for instance, IMF and IDA (1998: 
11 ).
30 In nominal terms. IMF and IDA (2006b: 10, Table 1).
31 Total debt forgiven is the amount of principal and interest due or in arrears that was written off or 
forgiven in any given year.
32 Total debt rescheduled includes restructurings in the context of the Paris Club, commercial banks, 
debt-equity swaps, buybacks, and bond exchanges.
33 Debt stock reductions show the amount that has been netted out of the stock of debt using debt 
conversion schemes such as buybacks and equity swaps or the discounted value of long-term bonds that 
were issued in exchange for outstanding debt.
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payments. Between 1998 and 2002, yearly BOP relief inflows averaged US$ 57 
million. D uring the same period, however, U ganda's terms of trade deteriorated by 
34 per cent, curtailing U ganda's trade balance by an average of US$ 131 million each 
year. Since the negative term s of trade factor was not offset by otherwise favourable 
developments in U ganda's overall balance of payments, the inadequacy of the HIPC 
mechanism to provide contingent relief forced the country to rely on additional 
external finance to cover the BOP gaps. As a result, the accumulation of U ganda's 
debt stock accelerated again, and by 2002 the HIPC debt stock reductions had already 
been w iped out by the debt stock increases due to new  borrow ing.34 In 2003, the 
external debt stock exceeded US$ 4.5 billion, the highest level ever in U ganda's 
history.
6.2.5 Uganda's balance of payments and external debt -  summary conclusions
From the above exposition of U ganda's recent balance of paym ents and external debt 
history, the following conclusions may be drawn;
• Unfavourable term s of trade and an extreme degree of exports volatility have 
repeatedly underm ined U ganda's debt carrying capacity.
• Repeated debt relief initiatives have not solved U ganda's external debt 
problem, because they have failed to address the country's sources of 
vulnerability and merely focussed on lowering the repaym ent schedule 
instead.
• Substantial am ounts of official financial capital inflows, legitimised by 
U ganda's high performance rankings under the currently applied CPIA-based 
aid allocation framework, have at times provided the appearance of debt 
sustainability in term s of debt flows. At the same time, however, the lack of 
indexation of aid and debt relief provisions to the country's actual debt 
sustainability determ inants have inevitably led to the w orsening of debt 
stocks and the longer-term sustainability prospects.
34 It should be noted however, that besides increasing net flows on debt, it was also stock/flow  
revaluation issues, and in particular changes in cross-currency valuations, that contributed to the rapid 
hike in Uganda's debt stock evidenced by Graph 6.9.
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In light of these considerations, there appears to be considerable scope for 
im provem ent in the international donor com m unity's approach to dealing with 
U ganda's unresolved debt crisis. To w hat extent such im provem ent could have 
ensued from the im plem entation of the CDSF to the historical context of U ganda 
during 1988-2002 is analysed next.
6.3 Application of the Contingency Debt Sustainability Framework
Building upon the background laid out in the previous sections, we now  apply the 
proposed CDSF accounting m ethodology and compensatory instrum ents to the case 
of U ganda during the period 1988-2002. O ur choice of a historical, backward-looking 
approach allows for a direct comparison between the actual and sim ulated debt 
sustainability implications, against the background of U ganda's actual exogenous 
shock and trend factors. In contrast, forward-looking stochastic sim ulation exercises 
w ould render such comparison less reliable and largely detached from the actual 
circumstances faced by the country. For, they w ould necessarily have to rely on 
assum ptions w ith regard to the sim ulated frequency and m agnitude of future shocks, 
and also involve conjectures in relation to the likely aid allocation and debt relief 
implications under the extant framework.
Furtherm ore, simulation of future balance of paym ents shocks w ould require the 
definition of a suitable model to generate a consistent set of variables explaining 
U ganda's BOP evolution over time. Since any attem pt to define a suitable 
specification explaining the country-specific direct and indirect effects of the various 
balance of paym ents determ inants is inevitably fraught w ith a significant degree of 
indeterminacy, any such exercise w ould typically have a w ide scope for forecasting 
errors.35 However, while the deterministic approach followed here has the 
advantages of both simplicity and anchorage to U ganda's historically observed 
vulnerability, it comes at the cost of excluding a priori any possibility of assessing the 
feedback mechanism of the scheme's effects on the country's BOP determ inants.36 
With the exception of official developm ent assistance flows, the balance of paym ents
35 For example, see the simple model deployed in Gilbert and Tabova (2005).
36 For future research, we propose to model these effects in a structuralist CGE framework (see our 
discussion in Chapter 7).
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-  and the trade balance in particular -  is thus assumed to be entirely unaffected by 
the effects of the CDSF contingency and debt relief instrum ents on its key 
determinants, such as the country's economic growth, export and im port flows, FDI, 
etc.37
Nevertheless, the static approach applied in this section is well-suited to the CDSF's 
emphasis on exogenous factors as the main causation of low-income countries' 
balance of paym ents trend deviations, and also offers an ideal evaluation background 
for the application of the CDSF accounting m ethodology to U ganda's historical 
context. W ith these caveats in mind, the following sections discuss the simulation 
m ethod in more detail and evaluate the main results.
6.3.1 Data sources and computations
The CDSF accounting m ethodology is im plem ented in the form of identity (14), Box
5.1 of Chapter 5. All effects are calculated over the time period 1988-2002, for which a 
consistent and complete set of data is available. The data underlying the com putation 
of the trade balance effects appertaining to categories (I) and (II) are draw n from the 
online versions38 of the Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS) and the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF, the W orld Developm ent Indicators (WDI) of the 
World Bank, the Statistical Database of the Food and A griculture Organization 
(FAOSTAT), the H andbook of Statistics (HOS) of UNCTAD, and the World Trade 
Analyzer (WTA) of Statistics Canada on CD-ROM (STATCAN, 2005 issue). Data for 
BOP effects belonging to category (III) are draw n from the BOPS, and data on official 
net transfers are from the W orld Bank Global Development Finance online database 
(GDF).
With regard to specific effects, com putations involved the following steps:
a) Exports of Goods and Services:
Nominal export values are the sum  of the BOPS series of goods and services exports. 
The latter are split into real ( X t ) and price ( p 4) com ponents on the basis of export 
price deflators calculated as the ratio of nominal to real export value series of the
37 This applies both in terms of the scheme's actual implication in period I and the expectations relating 
to its broader BOP implications during future periods t+i.
38 Institutional subscribers' subscription, accessed between January and March 2005.
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national statistics, draw ing from WDI data. Prices are the unit values of overall 
exports of goods and services, and have been positively checked for correspondence 
with the un it values available from the HOS database.39 Trend ( X t ) and hypothetical
( X t ) export volum es are calculated in line w ith equations (9) and (10) of Chapter 5. 
The annual grow th rate of w orld dem and for U ganda's total exports in any period t, 
( g  v ), is com puted as the w eighted grow th rate of those markets absorbing the bulk 
of the country's exports. These markets are identified on the basis of WTA data over 
alternative period averages, depending on the reference periods as applied by the 
alternative im plem entation variants described below. For example, Table 6.6 
identifies the principal export destinations during the period 1996-2002. It shows that 
the bulk of U ganda's exports of goods, in nominal value terms, were absorbed by 
Europe (mainly agricultural exports) and Africa (some agricultural exports for first 
processing, such as tea and cotton, and virtually all manufactures) and to a lesser 
extent Asia (mainly frozen fish and animal hides).
Table 6.6: Uganda Export Destinations 1996-2002
___________ (Average Percentage of Total Goods Exports Value)
Export Item  (SITC code) Europe Africa A sia/O ceania Total
All Export Com m odities (S1TC0) 58 24 11 93
Coffee(0711) 74 14 7 96
Fish (03) 61 2 30 93
Gold, nan-m onetary (9710) 63 34 1 97
Tobacco,unm anufactured (121) 81 12 6 99
Tea (0741) 18 67 14 98
Hides, skins (21) 18 2 80 99
Electric current (3510) 0 100 0 100
C ut flowers and foliage (2927) 99 0 0 100
C rude anim al m aterials (291) 29 0 70 99
Cotton (263) 37 40 18 96
Source: W orld Trade Analyzer, STATCAN, CD-ROM (2005); au thor's ow n calculations.
Together, these three regions absorbed more than 90 per cent of U ganda's exports, 
while exports to any other single region were mostly irrelevant. Having identified the 
relevant markets for U ganda's exports, total growth in w orld dem and for Ugandan 
exports is proxied by the w eighted average of European, African and Asian dem and
39 In contrast to the series derived from WDT data, the HOS data for Uganda are not available for the 
entire period of analysis.
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for agricultural commodities, and African dem and for m anufactured goods. More 
specifically, the real im port grow th rates in the agricultural and m anufactured goods 
markets are calculated on the basis of available volume data, and weighted for 
relative im portance to U ganda's overall exports value. Am ong the public sources 
available, FAOSTAT contains the most comprehensive data on real im ports (metric 
tonnes) relating to European, African and Asian dem and for green coffee, tobacco 
leaves, tea, hides and skins, and fish. In addition, grow th in African dem and for 
m anufactures is com puted as the ratio of merchandise im ports to total imports to the 
region, draw ing from WDI data. Appendix A6.2 describes the basic computation 
results.
b) Imports of Goods and Services:
Similarly to the case of exports, nominal data on im port values are draw n from 
U ganda's annual IMF-BOPS, and divided into price ( p '") and real ( M t ) components 
on the basis of the implicit im port price deflator calculated from WDI data. Trend 
( M , ) and hypothetical ( M t ) im port volumes are calculated in line w ith equations
(11) and (12) of chapter 5, assuming real GDP growth and income elasticity as the 
determ inants of im port growth. The real GDP growth rate is calculated from WDI 
data, while income elasticity is estimated by simple OLS regression of the natural 
logarithm of im ports on the natural logarithm of GDP. Alternative specifications, e.g. 
by including official grants as an additional regressor, are reported in Appendix 
A6.3. Overall, the regression results lead to the adoption of U ganda's im port 
elasticity at unit value as our best estimate for CDSF im port grow th com putations.40
c) Other effects
Category (III) items of identity (14) are calculated as deviations from moving average. 
Effect (m) includes official grants and debt forgiveness, as recorded in the BOPS. 
Effect (n) includes workers' remittances and non-governmental current transfers of 
the current account. Effect (o) is calculated as net FDI and portfolio inflows to 
Uganda, net of profit remittances on FDI. Effect (p) is based on yearly changes in net
40 Our unit value estimate of import elasticity is broadly in line with the IMF's. Indeed, in its final 
Uganda DSA analysis underlying the HIPC Initiative, the IMF assumes the country's import elasticity to 
be of unit value between 1997 and 1998, and to take a value of 0.95 thereafter (IMF and IDA 1997: 4).
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international reserve holdings. Effect (o) is com puted as a residual, after accounting 
for all the other balance of paym ents flows, and also includes the BOP net errors and 
omissions.
6.3.2 On the choice between alternative implementation variants
The simulation analysis underlying this study has involved a num ber of alternative 
specifications of the CDSF accounting mechanism, which m ainly differed in the 
definition of reference periods underlying trend calculations. Among the two 
variants reported here41, the first involves the definition of ad-hoc base years for the 
calculation of trend and hypothetical values over several subsequent periods. It is 
presented here mainly for the purpose of dem onstrating the accounting 
m ethodology's sensitivity to the choice of specific base years. The second, more 
favoured, possibility for im plem enting the CDSF relies instead on trend values 
calculated as moving averages for all the effects in each single period, thus avoiding 
the inertia associated with relating balance of paym ents trends to a specific base year 
over a longer time.
To see the complications involved in the first approach, we refer back to the 
illustration of actual, trend and hypothetical export volumes in G raph 5.1, Chapter 5. 
Similarly to the exemplification of G raph 5.1, it could be envisaged that CDSF 
accounting be anchored onto a specific set of reference values observed at the base 
period, and then applied over a certain num ber of subsequent periods in relation to 
the same base.42 For example, a LIC's contingent balance of paym ents effects and 
policy performance during subsequent periods t+l+i could be m onitored against the 
specific benchm arks set in period f, such as the average export volum e observed 
during the period t-i (where i=0,l,2,...,n). However, in order to be feasible w ithin the 
CDSF context, the shared perception of such a simple approach by the parties 
involved w ould have to be that the trend reference values typify some sort of
41 Only two out of the six simulations are discussed in this chapter. A full set of simulation results and 
generating codes in Stata 9 format can be made available upon request.
42 In this respect, the time-frame of the CDSF would be similar to that underlying the current practice of 
assessing country performance with reference to indicator variables. For example, the HIPC Initiative's 
country performance assessment observes the evolution of CPIA and debt indicators between the 
decision and completion points, and the IMF PRGF conducts detailed assessments based on 
implementation and outcome indicators during the three-year arrangements.
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equilibrium  values of a LIC's balance of paym ent flows. These reference values, in 
turn, w ould need to be considered as the expression of a broader concept of 
equilibrium relating to the debtor's economy, including GDP growth, inflation, real 
exchange rate and the other BOP determinants. Of course, an accurate identification 
of such equilibrium benchm arks on the basis of historical BOP observations at any 
point in time w ould have to rely on a set of assumptions derived from largely 
subjective forecasts and trend conjectures in relation to the equilibrium  values of an 
LIC's key BOP determ inants over the whole period relevant to analysis. However, in 
contrast to the simple deterministic approach, this w ould require the inclusion of 
benchm ark revision clauses in the underlying CDSF contract, in order to avoid 
disagreements am ong the parties in relation to disputed benchm arks underm ining 
the determ ination for automatic compensation of contingent effects. Ultimately, the 
negotiation complexities of any benchm ark adjustment mechanism w ould be likely to 
hold up  compensation and underm ine the ex-ante nature of the CDSF, hence the 
effectiveness of the entire scheme.
In sum, if a simple deterministic definition of BOP benchm ark trend values is to be 
preferred over benchm ark negotiations in the context of the CDSF, then it follows 
that such trend values need to be defined as self-adjusting measures of a country's 
BOP trend variation in each period. In contrast, the assessment of BOP effects over 
several subsequent periods on the grounds of non-negotiable benchm arks relating to 
a specific base year is bound to introduce a cumulative bias in the estimates of the 
scheme, with the potential for underm ining its feasibility. Indeed, the limits of such 
an approach are evident from our application to the case of Uganda.
6.3.3 Indexing to ad-hoc base year benchm arks
Consider, for example, 1995 as the base year arbitrarily chosen to gauge the BOP and 
external debt situation of U ganda prior the introduction of the HIPC Initiative, and 
1999 as the base year corresponding to the country's qualification for increased debt 
relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative.43 The CDSF accounting m ethod is
43 For the sake of consistency with setting 1995 as the base year in relation to the original HIPC Initiative, 
we would have preferred the year 1998, instead of 1999, as the base year relating to Uganda's 
qualification for enhanced HIPC relief. However, since the BOPS data underlying computations are 
inconsistent during the period before and after 1998 (see Appendix A6.1), this led to the choice of 1999 as
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im plem ented over the three periods subsequent to base years 1995 and 1999, with 
trend values of effects (i.e. the benchmarks) com puted as three-year averages 
observed in the base year. With regard to exports, for example, the benchm ark 
volume in the base year 1995 reflects average real export flows during 1993-1995, 
against w hich actual and hypothetical export volumes during 1996-1998 are assessed, 
according to identities (9) and (20) of Chapter 5.
Graph 6.14 illustrates the simulation results relating to U ganda's aggregated exports 
of goods and services, in real terms. In both simulation periods, actual export volume 
is shown to widely outperform  trend exports. For, the latter are based on average 
grow th in w orld dem and for U gandan exports, which am ounted to only 0.7 and 1.0 
per cent in the three years up to 1995 and 1999, respectively.44 The vertical distance 
between actual and trend exports expresses the proportion of U ganda's real exports 
that was not expected on the basis of past trend grow th rates in w orld dem and. In 
contrast, hypothetical export volumes are calculated as cum ulative grow th rates of 
world dem and in the periods 1996-1998 and 2000-2002. In either case, the difference
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between trend and hypothetical exports is small; the largest difference is accounted 
for by a 7.1 per cent increase of w orld dem and in 1996 (see A ppendix A6.2). The
the second base period for reasons of better data consistency. For the purpose of the subsequent 
discussions, the change of base year is of minor importance.
44 Detailed data on yearly growth rates in world demand are listed in Appendix A6.2.
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vertical distance between actual and hypothetical exports represents the proportion 
of real exports that is not explained by changes in the actual grow th rates of world 
dem and over the periods of observation. In terms of the CDSF accounting 
framework, this difference is ascribed to volume effects ensuing from factors internal 
to U ganda's economy, be they the result of deliberate policy measures or positive 
output shocks. However, it should be noted that the w idening gap between actual, 
trend and hypothetical volum e measures in Graph 6.14 mainly reflects the 
shortcomings from applying the same benchm ark years to a num ber of subsequent 
periods. Thereby, a significant departure from trend values during earlier periods, 
for example in 1996, leads to a cumulative gap which over-estimates the trend 
deviations during subsequent periods. While such accounting flaws would clearly 
underm ine the effectiveness of CDSF compensation, it will be dem onstrated below 
that the CDSF m ethod is accurate w hen deviations from trend and hypothetical 
values are calculated on the basis of m oving averages.45
The sensitivity of simulation results to the choice of base year is particularly striking 
w hen seen in terms of U ganda's export price evolution, displayed in Graph 6.15.
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45 However, it should be noted that in contrast to trend deviations per se, the CDSF estimations of price 
shock effects are only indirectly affected by the price components of trend deviations (e.g. effect (d) of 
identity (14) in relation to exports). Therefore, the bias would mostly affect the debt relief mechanism of 
the CDSF, and only marginally increase the aid allocation effects through the contingent credit line.
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Since it overlaps w ith the peak of the commodity price cycle, the benchm ark set in 
1995 remains in stark contrast to the actual trend reversal during 1996-1998. The 
assessment of BOP effects on the basis of trend values prevailing in 1995 w ould thus 
lead to a severe overestimation of price shock effects as the result of a cumulative bias 
in the assessm ent benchmarks. In contrast, the simulation period 1999-2002 displays 
a remarkable correspondence between trend expectations and actual prices. 
However, such correspondence is coincidental, due to the relatively constant rate of 
decline in U ganda's export price index during 1995-2002 and thus including the base 
year 1999.46
As expected, a CDSF centred on ad hoc reference periods appears to be largely 
unsuitable for a country characterised by sudden trend reversals and a pronounced 
volatility of trade prices and volumes. Nevertheless, the first results from this 
analysis provide a valuable insight into the basic working and operational limits of 
the accounting mechanism underlying the CDSF.
6.3.4 Continuous indexing to moving averages of BOP flows
The most relevant application variant of the CDSF accounting m ethod is reflected in 
the set of simulations based on 'continuous indexing' of BOP items. Similarly to the 
above approach, this involves the calculation of BOP effects along identity (14) of 
Chapter (5), bu t in relation to moving average trend values updated  in each period t. 
More precisely, we im plem ent the CDSF over the entire period 1988-2002, by 
com puting the BOP effects as each period's trend deviations from the moving 
average, and then sim ulating the implications of the contingency instrum ents. 
Moving averages were initially chosen to alternatively range from six years (MA6) to 
one year (MAI) prior to the period of observation. While prelim inary simulation 
results have shown quantitative differences between alternative lengths of moving 
averages, we observed them  to be relatively small and generally not to affect the 
qualitative conclusions from the analysis. However, the exact duration of moving 
averages in the context of the CDSF remains largely a m atter of judgement, mainly in 
relation to the duration of economic cycles, including of w orld dem and and
45 As much as the discrepancy introduced by the choice of base year 1995 is a coincidence relating to its
overlap with the peak year of the export price cycle.
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commodity prices.47 In the context of the present discussion, we opt to present and 
evaluate in detail only the results relating to the adoption of year-to-year (MAI) 
deviations in the calculation of BOP flows deviations, and of three-year moving 
averages in the com putation of w orld dem and, GDP and price factors underlying the 
calculation of trade balance effects. The main advantage of this approach lies in its 
affinity w ith the simplest conception of the CDSF, w here each assessment period t 
can be viewed as overlapping w ith the annual consolidation of the country's balance 
of data accounts. Furthermore, it facilitates the interpretation of results, which yield 
the percentage contribution of single effects to yearly changes in U ganda's balance of 
paym ents and net official transfers.48 Finally, the choice of three-year averages for 
world dem and and GDP in the calculations of trend and hypothetical im port and 
export values allows for uniformity with the MA3 averages applied to price 
deviations, and is acceptably close to the average half-life duration of w orld business 
cycles.49
Tables 6.7 shows all the relevant balance of paym ent effects calculated under the 
assum ptions specified in the previous paragraph. Table 6.8 sum m arises the same 
results as a percentage of overall BOP effects, instead of nominal US dollars. The 
results are ordered along the three CDSF categories of effects, which are now 
discussed in turn.
Export Volume and Price Effects
47 An estimation of the average duration of commodity price cycles in the case of Uganda during the 
period of observation is beyond the scope of this study. A relevant indication regarding the average 
duration of price cycles involving sub-Saharan African countries is derived from a series of studies 
conducted by Paul Cashin and his IMF co-authors (see Cashin et al. 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004), According to 
these studies, the average duration of price booms is 3.6 years, and that of price slumps is 4.2 years. 
However, they also find that, similarly to a number of other countries in the region, Uganda's price 
shocks tend to be of permanent nature.
48 Alternatively, the percentage changes would have to be thought of in terms of deviations from longer- 
term trends, for example MA3.
49 The IMF and NBER generally estimate average duration to be less than four years. See, for example, 
the discussion in chapter III of the World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2002). Further, note that the World 
Bank adopts four-year moving averages in its simulations of indexed debt mechanisms, discussed in 
Chapter 4 above, but without specifying the rationale underlying this choice. However, the differences 
in CDSF simulation results between MA4 and MA3 averages was of insignificant magnitude (the report 
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Graph 6.16 shows actual exports to generally outstrip hypothetical and trend values, 
w ith all series in differences following a steep upw ard sloping trend since the early 
1990s. The apparently close correspondence between trend and hypothetical values is
Graph 6.16: Uganda Export Volumes (1988-2002)







1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
----- •------ Actual XGS Volume
— -* ------Trend XGS Volume .— Hypothet ical  XGS Volume
Data Sources: Author’s  calculations based  on data from IMF BOPS, STATCAN WTA, World Bank WDI, FAOSTAT D atabases
explained by the relatively low scale factor of differences between actual grow th rates 
in w orld dem and for U gandan exports against three-year averages. However, in 
terms of CDSF accounting, Table 6.8 shows this difference -  item (a) -  to count as a 
highly volatile and relevant exogenous BOP effect, ranging from -4.5 to 6.3 per cent in 
terms of overall BOP deviations during 1988-2002. Nevertheless, on average, volume 
changes in export dem and over the whole period of observation are shown to have 
added only US$ 3 million to U ganda's yearly ex-post dem and for official financing, 
which explains only 0.4 per cent of the dem and for official finance.
More significant, in both absolute and relative terms, w ould appear to have been the 
difference between U ganda's actual and hypothetical exports. For, w ith the exception 
of the years 1990 and 1995, actual exports consistently outstripped export growth 
explained by changes in w orld dem and, thus reflecting U ganda's increasing export 
capacity of traditional crops, combined w ith the introduction of non-traditional 
agricultural exports since the mid-1990s.50 In line with the CDSF categorisation of 
effects, this so-called 'internal change in exports volum e' is grouped under the mixed
50 For a brief outline of Uganda's export diversification performance over time, see section 6.2.2 of this 
chapter.
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endogenous-exogenous effects, category (II), and is shown to have accounted for a 
sizeable 10.2 per cent detraction in U ganda's average yearly requirem ent for 
concessional loans (item (g), table 6.8). The standard deviation of 10.3 per cent during 
1988-2002 also shows a significant variability in yearly export differentials, reflecting 
a high incidence of policy effects and/or real shocks to U ganda's export sectors.51 
However, by treating real output deviations as mixed effects that do not qualify for 
compensatory m easures by any of the CDSF instrum ents, the accounting 
methodology avoids the burden  of assessing the information necessary to further 
disentangle the internal exports volume effects. Instead, item ( d )  of the BOP effects 
extrapolates the price trend deviation component of changes in exports volumes, as 
part of the total exogenous effects. As a measure of the debt-inducing effect of price 
shocks around trend in relation to export volumes, tables 6.7 and 6.8 show effect ( d )  
to have mostly taken a positive sign during 1988-2002, reaching high peaks in single 
years around an average 1.6 per cent increase in net transfers. It can be seen, for 
example, that in 1991 alone the price shock effect neutralised almost half of the debt- 
deducing effect of U ganda's efforts to increase export volumes.




1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
-----•-----  Actual XGS Price Index -----Trend (MA3) XGS Price Index 1
Trend (MA6) XGS Price Index 1
Dala Sources: Aulhoi's calculations based  World Bank WDI D atabase
51 For example, the 1995 kink in real exports is likely to have been determined by both changes in stock- 
management under the expectation of further price increases, and by the onset of the output effects of 
the severe droughts during 1995-1997. Similarly, the relative decline in export growth against trend 
values in 1998 at least in part reflects the output effects of the torrential rainfalls associated with the El 
Nino phenomenon during 1997-1998. On the effects of these climatic disasters, see Ndikumana et al. 
(2002).
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G raph 6.17 shows the time pattern of export prices against moving average trends. In 
addition to the three-year moving average underlying the results presented here, the 
graph shows the sensitivity of the moving average to alternative choices of range. For 
example, the indexation to six-year moving averages w ould lead to a sharp increase 
in price deviations relating to the early 1990s and 2000s. More generally, longer-term 
moving averages better reflect the price trend over the entire period of observation, 
bu t also have an increasing effect on price deviations in the years between relative 
peak levels. Or, in other words, longer averages tend to have an increasing effect on 
single years' shock measures, and a lowering effect on single years' trend m easures.52 
However, regardless of the choice of moving average, it can be observed that 
U ganda's declining export price trend has led to a persistent shortfall of actual prices 
against trend, w ith the exception of the temporary price hum p around 1995. 
Therefore, U ganda's export price trend effect -  item (h) in tables 6.7 and 6.8 -m ostly 
takes a positive sign over the years, and also takes on large m agnitudes indicating a 
generally strongly debt-inducing effect (as high as 10 per cent in 2001).





1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
----- •------ Actual MGS Volume
----- *■—— Trend MGS Volume •— -*—  Hypothetical MGS Volume
Data Sources: Author's calculations b ase d  on data from IMF BOPS, STATCAN WTA, Wortd Bank WDI, FAOSTAT D atabases
Imports Volume and Price Effects
Similarly to the case of exports, items (e) and (f) capture the exogenous effects -  while 
items (i), (j), (k) and (I) m easure the mixed effects -  relating to U ganda's imports.
52 In the context of the CDSF, this will affect the relative incidence of the continent credit line and debt 
relief instruments.
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G raph 6.18 displays U gandan im port series, which are show n to have been following 
a steeply increasing trend during most of the 1990s, and then again from 2000 
onwards. It should be noted that the apparent dow nw ard kink in actual imports 
between 1998 and 1999 partly reflects the above m entioned change in the accounting 
method underlying the BOPS data, w hich however has been duly taken into account 
in the com putation of effects.
Interestingly, U ganda's actual real im ports clearly fell short of both trend and 
hypothetical values during 1999-2000, pointing tow ards strong internal forces 
curtailing the country's imports. Again, it should be em phasised that the CDSF 
accounting framework treats such deviations as mixed effects, to avoid the risk that 
the intrinsic indeterm inacy underlying the exact cause of variation in im port volume 
could unduly affect the compensation operated by the CDSF instruments. 
Nevertheless, from a purely analytical perspective, the sheer m agnitudes of item (i) 
during 1999 and 2000 -  between 12 and 15 per cent of overall BOP effects (see Table 
6.8) -  seems to provide some evidence of a strong im port crunch determ ined by a 
significant deterioration in U ganda's balance of payments, caused by declining terms 
of trade (item c) and sharp shortfalls in private remittances (item n), as corroborated 
by the events reported in the Bank of Uganda quarterly and annual reports. 
Considering the relatively stable supply of official grants and loans during 1999 and 
2000, these years w ould thus appear to offer a striking case exemplifying the main 
shortcomings of the extant aid allocation mechanism in the case of Uganda, 
particularly w ith regard to its unresponsiveness to the occurrence of adverse 
exogenous shocks. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 show that, instead of countering the shock, a 
decline in net transfers (positive sign) w iped out most of the increase in official grants 
(negative sign). The burden  of BOP adjustm ent thus fell mostly on real exports, 
which expanded by about 12 per cent between 1999 and 2000, while real im port 
contracted by about 15 per cent.53 In contrast, the simulation results presented below 
dem onstrate that the existence of the CDSF w ould have brought a significant cash
53 The unresponsiveness of official loans is explained by Uganda's qualification for enhanced HIPC relief 
in 1999 and subsequent years, and its emphasis on the development of debt burden indicators and debt 
relief associated with a restraint on additional loan financing. Furthermore, the front-loading of debt 
relief to the years immediately following the country's qualification has evidently led to a substitution of 
debt relief for new financing, at least in the short term.
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flow relief to U ganda's balance of payments, thereby effectively countering the real 
effects of the unfavourable contingencies the country was facing during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s.
The im port volum e effect of GDP (item k) is based on the differential between trend 
and actual GDP growth rates, and had a predom inantly positive effect on Uganda's 
balance of paym ents development. During 1988-2002, the country has enjoyed solid 
GDP grow th rates, averaging 6.7 per cent yearly in real terms. However, significant 
year-to-year fluctuations, particularly around the coffee price boom  raising Uganda's 
GDP growth rate to almost 12 per cent in 199554, are reflected in the MA3-deviations 
underlying the im port volum e effect. Table 6.7 shows the im port volum e effect to 
have translated into a m oderate 0.7 per cent debt-deducing effect relative to overall 
BOP deviations, albeit w ith significant year-to-year variations. For example, in 1997- 
1998, as U ganda's GDP growth rate returned to its average level after the price boom, 
hypothetical im ports fell below trends, and the im port volum e effect of GDP 
favourably accounted for more than 10 per cent in overall BOP deviations. During 
these years, GDP variation in itself offset almost half of the strongly debt increasing 
effect of internal changes in im ports volume (item i), calculated as the vertical





1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 •------  Actual MGS Price I n d e x  • Trend(MA3) MGS Price Index
Data Sources: Author's calculations based  World Bank WDI D atabase
54 See Appendix A6.3 for GDP growth data.
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distance between actual and hypothetical im ports.55
All the rem aining trade balance items of categories (I) and (II) are price effects, based 
on U gandan im port prices. G raph 6.19 displays actual and three-year moving price 
averages. U ganda's im port price index appears to follow a slowly falling trend, after 
a tem porary spike around the year 1990. With the exception of this period, both the 
price trend for im ports and deviations from trend were significantly less pronounced 
than those relating to U ganda's exports. The m agnitudes of the price shock 
components of im port effects -  that is, items (e) and (f) -  are thus correspondingly 
low, adding little to U ganda's total exogenous BOP effects. Similarly, the mild trend 
component of im port prices causes items (j) and (I) to m easure only minor shares of 
the overall im port value effects.
The Terms of Trade Effect
Representing the CDSF's central price effect, item (c) is calculated on the basis of 
export and im port price trend deviations and measures the effects of U ganda's terms 
of trade on the overall balance of paym ents and net official financial flows. Tables 6.7 
and 6.8, together w ith Graph 6.20, emphasise the weight of the terms of trade
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Graph 6.20: Uganda - Terms of Trade Effect vs. Total Exogenous Effects
Current US$, millions
o  o  -
T erm s of T rade E f f e c t  * All Exogenous Effects
Data Sources: A uthors calculations based  on data from IMF BOPS, STATCAN WTA, World Sank WDI, FAOSTAT D atabases
55 Indeed, Graph 6.18 shows trend imports to lie between actual and hypothetical values. The distance 
between the two series measures the internal change, which also includes the difference between trend 
and hypothetical values, accounting for GDP growth deviations.
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effect in the case of U ganda.56 As the driving factor behind the overall shocks element 
w ithin U ganda's balance of paym ent deviations, the favourable terms of trade shock 
in 1995 accounted for almost US$ 300 million, or about a third of overall BOP 
deviations. In contrast, the sharp decline in the terms of trade since 1996 explains 
more than US$ 700 million of U ganda's cumulative dem and for net official transfers 
up to 2002, equivalent to more than 11 per cent of yearly net transfers per annum. In 
the year 2000 alone, which marks the deepest point of the export price cycle, the 
terms of trade effect added US$ 235 million to U ganda's need for official BOP credit 
support, and explained more than a quarter of the overall BOP deviations registered 
that year. Thereby, the debt-inducing terms of trade effect more than offset the strong 
debt-restraining effect of the internally determined forces on exports and imports 
flows.
Non-Debt Creating Financial Effects
The remaining items of tables 6.7 and 6.8 belong to category (III), including the non­
debt financial effects plus a residual. On average, the results show total trend 
deviations of these items to have had a debt-deducing effect on U ganda's balance of 
payments, reflecting the overall increasing trend in financial inflows to the country 
over time. However, year-to-year fluctuations in this category appear to be extremely 
pronounced, pointing to a particularly frequent incidence of sudden variations in the 
yearly inflows of remittances (item n), official grants (item m), and to a lesser extent 
FDI (item o). Furthermore, item (q) appears to pick up a considerable am ount of 
residual BOP volatility, left unaccounted for by the other BOP effects.57 In contrast, 
deviations in reserve holdings (item p) reflect the active role played by the central 
bank's m anagem ent of U ganda's international reserve assets, in term s of foreign 
exchange interventions countering the effects of substantial foreign capital inflows, as 
well as a buffer mechanism to yearly BOP fluctuations. For example, in the year 2002,
56 It should be noted that the terms of trade, similarly to all the other BOP listed or graphed, is expressed 
in terms of its debt-inducing or -deducing effect on Uganda's balance of payments. For example, Graph 
6.20 displays the sharp rise in coffee prices around 1995 as a substantial debt-deducing effect on 
Uganda's balance of payments, causing the terms of trade effect to kink downward.
57 To a large extent, the residual measure reflects the sporadic presence of exceptional BOP flows, large 
net errors and omissions, as well as the BOP accounting adjustment described above.
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a disinvestm ent in net foreign exchange holdings offset almost a third of the 
country's overall debt-inducing BOP effects.
Total Exogenous, Mixed and Non-Debt Financial Effects
Overall, the outcomes of the CDSF accounting mechanism reveal a clear pattern with 
regard to the various categories of BOP determinants. Graph 6.21 summarises the 
distributional features of each of the three categories during 1988-2002. The shaded 
boxes display the percentage distributions w ithin the 25th and 75th percentile




(III) Non-debt Financial Effects
-40 -20 0 20 40
P ercentiles of Total Absolute T rend Deviations 
Note: The (-) sign denotes a  dec rease  and the (+) sign an  increase in the dem and for official loans
of observations, and the whiskers extend over the adjacent values in each category. 
The position of the boxes relative to the zero mean line indicates a strongly debt- 
inducing (positive sign) effect of exogenous effects, while the mixed effects are 
shown to have had a predom inantly debt-deducing (negative sign) effect, reflecting 
the strong incidence of increasing export volumes over time. In contrast, the 
percentile distribution of non-debt financial effects appears to be fairly balanced, 
while displaying the w idest spread of observations outside the 50 per cent core 
around the median. Although relatively less marked, the extension of whisker 
boundaries in Graph 6.21 evidences the significant volatility of total exogenous and 
mixed effects. In sum, the percentile distributions show Uganda to have experienced 
predom inantly unfavourable price shock effects, which tended to be offset by mixed 
effects, while financial and residual effects had a strong influence in adding to the 
country's overall balance of paym ents volatility.
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Graph 6.22 displays 1988-2002 averages of the single BOP effects listed in Table 6.8. It 
highlights the general pattern of debt-inducing effects of price shocks and trend 
factors, and the debt-deducing effect of strong increases in export volume that more 
than outw eighed those in imports. It can also be seen that the net average effect from 
non-debt financial flows ensued from a generally favourable pattern of official grants 
and private capital flows, which however is offset by the residual measure of BOP 
flows.
Graph 6.22: Average Balance of Payments Effects
(Averages 1988-2002)
(a) Volume Change in Exports Demand 
(b) Price Effect of (a) 
(c) Terms of Trade
(d) Price Trend Deviation of (g)
(e) Price Trend Deviation of (i)
(f) Price Trend Deviation of (k) 
(g) Internal Change in Exports Volume
(h) Price Trend Effect of (g) 
(i) Internal Change in Imports Volume 
(j) Price Trend Effect of (i) 
(k) Import Volume Effect of GDP  
(I) Price Trend Effect of (k) 
(m) Deviation in Grants 
(n) Deviation in Remittances 
(o) Deviation in FDI 
(p) Deviation in Reserves Holdings 
(q) Deviation in Other Flows
-5 0 5
Percent of Total Absolute Trend Deviations
(-) sign denotes decrease and (+) sign denotes increase of demand for loans
Finally, Graph 6.23 offers a visualisation of the yearly composition of balance of 
paym ents effects broken down into the three main categories, from which further 
two interesting observations would appear to emerge. Firstly, the mixed effects tend 
to take opposite sign with respect to the exogenous and non-debt financial factors, 
particularly since the early-mid 1990s. As was mentioned above with regard to real 
exports and imports, variations in prices and financial flows would thus appear to 
have strongly affected U ganda's real trade balance. To the extent that official 
financial flows did not respond, or responded insufficiently, to the contingencies 
affecting the country 's balance of payments as a whole, the BOP effects had 
necessarily to be offset by higher real exports in the face of declining prices, 
sporadically in combination with a drain on imports. Secondly, Graph 6.23 
em phasises the significant m agnitude of exogenous effects relative to the other
-2 6 3 -
balance of paym ent effects. Indeed, during the entire period of analysis, factors 
outside the control of the country authorities are shown to have played a key role in 
shaping U ganda's balance of payments, thus testifying to the country authorities' 
difficulties in carrying out effective BOP planning. Such a lack of control is reflected
Graph 6.23: Uganda - All BOP Effects (1988-2002)
Current US$, millions
o  o  -
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
H H H  Exogenous Effects (i) I I Mixed Effects (II) I-- I N on-Debt Financial Effects (III) 
D ata Sources: Author's calculations based  on data from IMF BOPS. STATCAN WTA, World Bank WDI, FAOSTAT D atabases
in the highly erratic pattern in the yearly net variations of the balance of payments, 
which is equal to U ganda's net dem and for concessional credits (Graph 6.24). As a 
reflection of the latter, U ganda's external debt stock evolution is thus largely a 
function of variables outside the country's control.
Graph 6.24: Uganda - Net Transfers (1988-2002)
Current US$, millions
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
ESfeirS,-1 Trend Deviations of Net Transfers 
Data Sources: Author's calculations based  on the World Bank WDI D atabase
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6.3.5 Simulations of the effects of CDSF on Uganda's debt flows and stock
The CDSF envisages two basic financial instrum ents to assist low-income countries in 
their task of achieving lasting debt sustainability in the face of adverse external 
factors: a contingent credit line, providing full compensation for the tem porary losses 
or gains ensuing from exogenous factors; and an ex-ante debt relief mechanism, 
converting a share of outstanding credits into grants, proportional to the impact of 
adverse trend factors during any period t.
On the basis of the results of the CDSF accounting framework applied to Uganda, the 
basic implications on the country's debt flows and stocks from im plem enting the two 
financial instrum ents can be simulated. Again focussing on the historical period 
spanning from 1988 to 2002, we calculate the cumulative effects from adjusting 
U ganda's net official credit flows by the am ount of yearly total exogenous shocks. 
Similarly, we m odulate U ganda's external debt stock by the negative trend 
deviations ensuing from the relevant BOP effects, to derive a set of alternative debt 
stock series. Finally, we calculate debt stock and flow ratios, as well as roughly 
estimating the order of m agnitude of the overall costs to donors involved in 
im plem enting the CDSF. The simulation results are sum m arised in Table 6.9, and are 
now discussed in turn.
Debt Flow Adjustments
The upper section of Table 6.9, together w ith Graph 6.25, compares U ganda's actual 
and adjusted disbursements, amortisation, and net flows of official concessional 
loans. Disbursements are m odulated by the sign and am ount of total exogenous 
shocks faced by U ganda each year, listed in Table 6.7. For ease of analysis, Table 6.9 
accounts for the net outcome in terms of overall disbursem ents to Uganda, rather 
than separately indicating the credit line balance. For example, the occurrence of a 
hugely favourable price shocks in 1995 w ould have had the effect of automatically 
debiting a corresponding am ount to U ganda's contingent credit line, while the 
sequence of unfavourable price shocks during 1998-2002 w ould have validated the 
disbursem ent of compensatory cash flows from the facility. On average, the 
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US$ 44 million each year during 1988-2002 (Table 6.7). While this corresponds to an 
increase of about 15 per cent above actual loan disbursem ents to U ganda over the 
entire period, the crucial function of the credit line is to provide large-scale 
adjustm ents in single years of special need. For example, in the year 2000 Uganda 
w ould have benefited from an additional cash flow that w ould have more than 
doubled the am ount of actual disbursements, and which w ould have been sufficient 
to replace almost entirely the balancing effect operated through internal changes to 
im port and export volum es (compare Table 6.7, items g  and /). The overall strong 
m odulation effect of the CDSF over the entire period of analysis is best seen in the 
upper section of Graph 6.25.
Graph 6.25: DIS, AMT, and NFL: Actual vs. Adjusted (1988-2002)
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To provide an estimate of the ex-ante relief implications of the CDSF, Uganda's
official loans am ortisation series is m odulated by the observed incidence of
unfavourable price trend effects, while it remains unaffected during the few years
-2 6 7 -
w hen trends were favourable to the country.58 As a reflection of the generally 
deteriorating price trends facing Uganda during 1988-2002, the simulated 
amortisation data show considerably accelerated debt repaym ents over time (Table 
6.9 and G raph 6.25), exceeding US$ 30 million per year on average (Table 6.7). Of 
course, the difference between actual and adjusted amortisation w ould not im ply any 
further deduction of funds from U ganda's accounts, and are instead reflected in the 
grant conversion of outstanding debts by the donor community. Therefore, the 
adjusted net flows series indicated in Table 6.9 should be considered a notional 
measure, incorporating the accounting equivalent of adjusted disbursem ents net of 
amortisation.
Debt Stock Adjustments
U ganda's debt stock sim ulation assesses the benefits from the adoption of the CDSF 
on the country's external debt evolution. Before turning to the simulated series, it 
should be noted that the total external debt stock over time is determ ined not only by 
the cumulative effects of changes in yearly net transfers of loans, but also by a 
num ber of other factors. As a category, these factors are conventionally termed stock- 
flow reconciliation, and include all changes to the external debt stock other than 
those explained by debt flows in any period. Most notably, they include debt 
forgiveness or reduction, the accumulation or capitalisation of interest arrears, and 
changes in the cross-currency valuation of foreign-exchange denom inated external 
debt. Table 6.5 lists the composition of U ganda's stock-flow reconciliation, showing 
that changes in the country's debt stock partly accounted for debt relief and changes 
in cross-currency valuation, besides net flows on debt. For example, in the year 2000, 
a favourable change in currency debt-valuation, together with substantial am ount of 
debt relief, more than offset the debt stock addition from net flows on debt. In 
contrast, a total change in U ganda's debt stock outpaced by far the net effect from 
new debt flows and relief in the year 2002, caused by an unfavourable shift in the 
U.S. dollar exchange rate against the other major currencies in which U ganda's 
external debt is denom inated. As a result, in 2002 U ganda's debt stock increased by
58 Note that accelerated amortisation implies a grant conversion of outstanding loans, with the specific 
purpose of lowering the outstanding debt stock.
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US$ 224 million on the sole basis of valuation changes, leading to an overall US$ 260 
million increase in the country's external debt stock.
It follows, that in the context of our simulation exercise a meaningful comparison of 
the debt stock effects associated with the im plem entation of the CDSF with those 
observed in its absence requires the preliminary extrapolation of cum ulated stock- 
flow reconciliation factors from U ganda's debt stock series. The ensuing net stock 
series thus serves as an approxim ation of U ganda's external debt burden in the 
absence of valuation changes exogenous to the country, as well as the stock effects of 
both the Paris Club and HIPC debt relief initiatives over time. Besides offering a 
more meaningful expression of a debtor country's debt stock evolution based on 
actual borrowing and repaym ent performance, the net external debt stock provides 
the basis for com puting the comparative debt stock implications of the CDSF against 
the extant regime.
The debt stock simulations are sum marised in Table 6.9. The actual external debt 
stock (EDT) is first purged of the cumulative effects of stock-flow reconciliation over 
time, starting in 1988. The ensuing net EDT series is thus the result of cum ulated net 
flows alone. On the basis of the latter, we compute two sets of debt stock series, one 
including the cum ulative debt stock effects of HIPC and Paris Club Relief (HIPC 
EDT), and the other sim ulating the debt stock implications of the CDSF (CDSF EDT). 
Both series are com puted over the whole period of analysis (1988-2002), as well as a 
shorter period of time (1996-2002).59 In line with the CDSF proposal in Chapter 5, we 
assume that any positive balance on the contingent credit line w ould eventually have 
to be relieved. To arrive at a meaningful debt stock m easure for comparison with the 
HIPC EDT series at any point in time during the period of observation, we derive a 
notional debt stock measure, which is net of both the shock and trend factors dealt 
w ith by the contingency instrum ents, provided that the contingent credit relief 
carries a positive balance in any given year. The sim ulated series is thus suitable for 
direct com parison between the stock benefits associated w ith the CDSF and those
59 The start year of the shorter simulation period is set to correspond with the initiation of the original 
HIPC Initiative.
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resulting from the extant debt allocation and relief framework, which also provides a 
measure of the relative costs involved in either scheme.
The stock simulations shown in Table 6.9, as well as in Graph 6.26, lead to number of 
relevant observations. During the decade up to 1997, the upw ard trend in U ganda's 
debt stock was fuelled by substantial am ounts of net flows, which dwarfed the 
mostly moderate relief provided by the Paris Club during the early and mid-1990s. 
Neither would the CDSF have been effective in countering the massive build-up of 
debt. For, its contingency credit line would have been mainly balanced, as a result of 
its curbing effect of the cash-flow surge during the coffee price boom around 1995, 
while its debt relief mechanism would have accelerated amortisation to yield a 
noticeable stock effect only in three years of unfavourable trends (1993, 1994, and 
1996). Notwithstanding the CDSF's significant buffer effects, in contrast to the 
HIPC/Paris Club regime's sporadic ad-hoc interventions, by 1998 U ganda's external 
debt stock would have been similar under either regime.
Graph 6.26: Uganda Debt Stock Adjustment (1988-2002)
Current U.S. Dollars, millions
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Net Debt Stock
Net Debt Stock, after CDSF relief
Net Debt Stock, after HIPC/PC relief
Data Sources Author's calculations based on data from IMF BOPS. ST AT CAN WTA World Bank WDI. FAOST AT Databases
The benefits from the CDSF over those of the HIPC regime mainly emerge from 1999 
onwards, when the contingency measures would have led to a reversal in Uganda's 
debt stock and to a steady decline thereafter. In contrast, U ganda's debt stock under 
the HIPC regime is shown to have rapidly declined between 1998 and 1999 as the 
result of a massive relief operation, but quickly returned on a growing trend in the 
subsequent years. This finding relates to the simulation over the entire period, but it
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is confirmed also by the outcome relating to the period 1996-2002. Furthermore, the 
difference in debt stocks between the two regimes appears to be larger in the shorter 
simulation period. By the year 2002, the CDSF w ould have reduced U ganda's debt 
stock by about US$ 266 million below the FHPC/Paris Club Initiatives after a period 
of im plem entation of seven years, while this difference shrinks to US$ 72 million over 
the im plem entation period of 15 years. Of course, the reason is the persistent 
deterioration of U ganda's terms of trade after 1995, which w ould have led to a 
relatively higher debt relief com ponent in the CDSF's overall compensatory 
functions.
However, more im portant than differences in levels, it is crucial to appreciate fully 
the benefits from the trend inversion brought about by the operations of the CDSF. 
For, the simulation results seem to dem onstrate the scheme's suitability to effectively 
m odulate U ganda's debt stock in the face of deteriorating trend factors by means of 
an ex-ante debt relief facility, besides its key role of providing beneficial flow effects 
through the contingent credit line (Graph 6.25). Put differently, the im plem entation 
of the CDSF w ould have led to a substantial compensatory or sm oothing effect in 
U ganda's yearly balance of paym ents flows, and at the same time outperform  the 
extant debt relief mechanisms in term s of debt stock implications. It may thus be 
argued that the Uganda case study lends strong support to an ex-ante approach in 
terms of its effectiveness in countering both liquidity and debt stock implications 
from adverse exogenous circumstances.
Finally, to complete the assessment of the simulation outcomes, it remains to be 
addressed w hether the proposed contingency scheme w ould have actually 
contributed tow ard rendering U ganda's debt position sustainable, compared to 
HIPC/Paris Club, and at w hat comparative costs. These two questions are now 
addressed in turn.
The Cost of CDSF vs. HIPC/Paris Club
The bottom row  of Table 6.9 reports the estimated costs relating to the two periods of 
simulation. The total cost of the CDSF relates to the cum ulated shock and trend 
factors com pensated by this scheme, and thus appears as the difference between Net 
and CDSF EDT in 2002. Equivalently, the total cost results from the sum  of
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exogenous and unfavourable price trends over the period of simulation (Table 6.7).60 
Interestingly, our estimates indicate total costs of the CDSF at around US$ 1.2 billion 
for both periods of application. This is explained by an increase in the relative cost of 
the contingent credit line from more pronounced price trend deviations after 1995, 
com pared to the entire period spanning from 1988 to 2002. At the same time, 
however, the latter period involved higher costs through the ex-ante debt relief 
mechanism, for compensating the country for a deeper overall deterioration in its 
terms of trade since 1988.61
The CDSF's cost of US$ 1,216 million over the 15-year period w ould represent a 
significant am ount of additional aid flows to Uganda, equivalent to 28 per cent of 
total loan disbursem ents during 1988-2002, or about 30 per cent of the country's 
actual external debt stock in 2002. However, the estimated donors' burden  involving 
the CDSF compares favourably to HIPC and Paris Club interventions. The total 
nominal debt relief committed by the original and enhanced Initiative to Uganda 
over a w indow  of 30 years am ounts to US$ 1,950 million.62 Thus, in terms of average 
commitments over 15 years, those implied by the CDSF simulations w ould exceed 
the HIPC's by roughly a quarter. However, a more relevant comparison is m ade in 
terms of debt relief actually delivered to Uganda, including the bilateral donor- 
borrow er Paris Club operations. Table 6.9 shows U ganda's overall relief operations to 
sum  up to US$ 1,145 million, pointing tow ards a negligibly small difference in 
nominal costs between the two alternative schemes.63 In relation to the period 1996- 
2002, the observed costs fall to US$ 896 million, mainly involving HIPC relief 
(including the US$ 465 million in 1999 alone).64
60 This applies with the exception of years characterised by positive trend factors.
61 Of course, this applies to the case study of Uganda and not in general. For example, if shock and trend 
factors had developed favourably during, say 2000-2002, the shorter-term cost simulations would have 
been considerably lower. Nevertheless, to the extent that there is some degree of reversal of price 
deviations towards a long-term trend, costs associated with the CDSF should be relatively lower in the 
long term.
62 Of which US$ 983 million were committed by the International Development Association, and US$ 
210 million by the IMF (see the HIPC Statistical Update: IMF and IDA, 2003:10),
63 A large share of HIPC relief to Uganda involved the BWI, rather than the Paris Club creditors. 
Between 1997 and 2002, the actual HIPC relief to Uganda by IDA and IMF together amounted to a 
combined total of US$ 510 million (see IMF and IDA, 2003).
64 Of course, the higher costs of the CDSF involving the shorter period reflect the above mentioned 
difference in debt stocks between CDSF and HIPC in the year 2002.
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In sum, the CDSF is estimated to involve similar m agnitudes of costs, particularly 
over the entire period of simulation. The conclusion is thus twofold. First, the 
contingency scheme w ould involve costs comparable to those actually supported by 
the donors during 1988-2002, which invalidates -  at least in the case of Uganda -  any 
argum ent typically pu t forward in relation to the costliness of ex-ante schemes.65 
Second, if the costs involved are roughly the same, the dem onstrated effectiveness of 
the CDSF in substantially m odulating U ganda's debt flows and stocks (at least in the 
face of severe trend deterioration) can only appear favourable in comparison to the 
HIPC's inherent failure to provide any kind of contingent relief.
Debt Ratios and Sustainability
The simulation results should leave little doubt about the potential supremacy of the 
CDSF over past regimes, by effectively dealing with U ganda's debt problem. W ith 
regard to the debt flow implications, the contingent credit line of the CDSF was 
shown to exert substantial m odulating effects on U ganda's liquidity in the face of 
exogenous shocks. Despite its analytical crudeness, the CDSF accounting framework 
appears to be suitable to capture an im portant share of exogenous factors affecting 
the country's overall balance of paym ents flows during a historical period 
characterised by particularly pronounced shocks and adverse trend effects.
With regard to the debt stock implications of the contingency mechanisms, it will be 
recalled from Chapter 5 (Chart 5.1) that the CDSF has the crucial function of 
adjusting a country's debt stock in compensation for adverse trend factors contingent 
on any period t. In contrast, the debt stock evolution over the longer term is 
addressed by a more comprehensive debt sustainability analysis which, together 
w ith the CDSF performance assessment, will inform future aid allocation and grant 
share. These decisions fall into the realm of the overall aid allocation system, rather 
than the CDSF as such, and cannot be addressed within the simulation framework of 
this chapter. Nevertheless, the introduction of the CDSF compensation mechanism 
has been shown to be effective in reversing the further build up of debt under the 
persistent presence of highly adverse circumstances. Everything else being the same,
65 Chapter 4 discusses at length the restrictions imposed on debt service modulation schemes on the 
grounds of their cost implications and 'additionality' to existing aid commitments.
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the CDSF simulations thus dem onstrate an increase in U ganda's capacity to carry 
higher levels of debt in comparison to the extant framework, which is equivalent to 
attesting increased debt sustainability during the historical period under analysis.
Finally, it has already be m entioned that conventional debt burden ratios widely lose 
their significance in the context of the CDSF. To illustrate the point, Table 6.9 lists the 
ratios of external debt stock to GDP or exports of goods and services, together with 
the debt service ratio. A comparison of these ratios in relation to the CDSF and HIPC 
regimes simply reflects the effect of either scheme on U ganda's debt stock and service 
over time. However, w ithout a set of estim ated debt sustainability benchm arks for 
each of these ratios, their absolute level is mostly meaningless, and their trend merely 
provides some vague indication with regard to U ganda's debt evolution over time. 
Of course, in line w ith our benchm ark estimates in Chapter 3, it would, in principle, 
be possible to derive indicative benchm arks similar to those applied by the BWI-DSF, 
w ith low-income countries' debt ratios ordered along EVI rankings, rather than 
CPIA. However, as should be clear from the discussions in Chapter 5, an assessment 
against average benchm ark indicators w ould be misleading in the context of the 
CDSF, since it w ould fail to appropriately reflect the scheme's country-specific effects 
by m odulating debt flows and stock. As a result, the central feature of the CDSF, 
tailoring official assistance to the BOP factors facing any specific country, w ould force 
the donor com munity to depart from its current practice of assessing LICs' debt 
sustainability according to policy-dependent benchmarks, and to start reasoning in 
terms of a country 's unique vicissitudes and financial requirem ents instead.
6.4 C oncluding rem arks
Chapter 5 has outlined the basic features of a contingency debt sustainability 
framework, and postulated that its compensatory financial instrum ents could 
represent a breakthrough in the donor-com m unity's approach to the unresolved debt 
crisis involving low-income countries. This chapter's simulations of the CDSF's 
application to the case of U ganda have delivered encouraging results, which largely 
confirm the scheme's potential benefits. Indeed, in the face of U ganda's exposure to 
extreme price fluctuations and deteriorating trend factors during 1988-2002, the 
application of the CDSF w ould have been effective in delivering substantial flow and
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stock support to the country, rendering its external debt profile more sustainable. In 
contrast, despite im plying similar costs to the donors, the m ultitude of bilateral and 
multilateral support efforts im plem ented during this period failed to achieve their 
central aim of putting U ganda on a sustainable path.
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Appendices
Appendix A6.1: Data issues relating to Uganda's balance of payments
In common w ith all the publicly available BOP data on U ganda available for this 
study, the IMF BOPS data on Uganda shows some apparent inconsistencies during 
the mid-to-late nineties. In particular, the BOPS trade balance data display a 
structural break between 1998/99, resulting from a change in the reporting method. 
This is manifested by a significant value drop in the goods and services import- 
export series, which is neither supported by the country authorities' own reports on 
trade performance during the period concerned, nor by the national statistics data of 
the W orld Bank's W orld Developm ent Indicators.66 While the IMF BOPS does not 
provide any particular indication w ith regard to the specific causes and effects of 
such a shift in accounting, these can be evinced from carefully cross-checking the 
BOP data from the alternative sources available. From a thorough analysis of 
alternative datasets and on the basis of information gathered from the Bank of 
U ganda67, a combination of explanatory factors could be identified:
• A switch in the classification of merchandise im ports from CIF (cost, 
insurance and freight) to FOB (free on board) in 1998/99, explaining a large 
share of the disproportional plunge in the trade balance.
• There have been significant changes in the m ethod applied to estimate 
governm ent project imports, ensuing in a 15 per cent dow nw ard revision in 
1998/99.68
• "Other sectors' transfers" comprises w orkers' remittances and other 
transfers, mainly those from NGOs and international aid agencies to non-
66 See, in particular, the statistics published by the Bank of Uganda in its Annual Reports and Quarterly 
Economic Reports (BOU, various issues), and the World Bank's World Development Indicators CD- 
ROM (2005).
67 The author conducted several telephone interviews with BOU officials of the research department 
during 2006.
68 See Bank of Uganda (undated), "Uganda: Balance of Payments Concepts, Sources and Methods", 
http://www.bou.or.ug/indexstat.htm
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governm ental domestic entities. This BOP item is currently derived as the 
residual after deducting all identified BOP inflows from total purchases of 
foreign exchange by authorised dealers.69 Therefore, at least part of the CIF- 
FOB difference has to be reflected in the "other sectors' transfers" BOP item. 
This appears to be evident in the case of Uganda during 1993-1998.
For the purpose of the analysis presented in this chapter, it was crucial to keep intact 
the internal consistency of the BOPS series in any given year. Therefore, it was 
decided not to revise the data for time-inconsistency in light of the above insights 
(e.g. by estim ating the am ount of CIF on im ports during 1993/98 and revising all BOP 
series concerned accordingly). Instead, the shift in accounting has been dealt w ith ad- 
hoc, depending on the specific simulation exercise at hand. In the MA(3) forward- 
looking effects simulations over three years, these have been set to cover 1995-1998 
and 1999-2002, so as to reconcile the marking of U ganda's pre-and post completion 
point HIPC debt relief episodes w ith the break year 1998. In the MA(1) and MA(3) 
simulations based on yearly accounting, the structural break has been accounted for 
by offsetting the moving average of the trade balance series between 1998/99 by the 
equivalent of their differences in levels. This avoided moving averages being unduly 
affected and carrying forw ard the break in the data. At the same time, however, the 
true information on the actual volum e and price effects between 1998/99 is foregone.
On the basis of commonly accessible data for research, there appears to be a lack of 
an optimal alternative to the use of IMF BOPS data, given the specific purpose of 
analysis. For, BOP data of the Bank of U ganda are available only for the periods 1993- 
1999 and 1997-2004, im ports enter the two datasets as CIF and FOB, respectively, 
making the two sets scarcely reconcilable w ith the limited inform ation available.70 An 
interesting path  for future refinem ent of the accounting technology presented in this 
chapter w ould be m ade possible by gaining greater access to the detailed datasets of 
the Trade and External Debt D epartm ent (TEDD) of the Bank of Uganda, the 
country's key ministerial departm ents (including the custom 's department), and
69 Ibid. Also see IMF (2003).
BOU officials referred the author to the central bank's Quarterly Economic Reports as their most 
reliable source of data. Unfortunately, the BOU would not make available a consistent dataset over a 
longer period of time.
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various other domestic authorities, such as the U ganda Coffee Development 
Authority (UCDA).
Finally, as a third alternative source of balance of paym ents data, we analysed the 
series draw n from W orld Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). These are 
sourced from both national authorities and the IMF BOPS, thus overlapping w ith the 
original sources already considered. However, the WDI contains longer series of 
trade flows data from national sources, which appear to be m ost coherent with 
respect to the recording of im port flows and do not display any apparent accounting 
shift during the 1990s. Unfortunately, other than basic aggregates, the WDI does not 
offer a sufficiently detailed and comprehensive set of BOP data, necessary to this 
analysis.
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Appendix A6.2: Growth of world demand for Uganda's exports
The table below lists the estimated weights relating to the dem and for U gandan 
exports. Growth in total dem and is mainly determ ined by European, African and 
Asian dem and for food and agricultural goods, which are the major components in 
U ganda's overall export basket.
Table A6.1 Total Growth Of World Demand For Uganda's Exports
European, African, and Asian 
Total Weighted African Growth for Growth in Demand for Pood
Year_________Demand Growth (%)______ Manufactures {%) and Agricultural Goods (%)
1988 -0.3 11.3 -0.6
1989 2.7 4.2 2.7
1990 2.8 7.5 2,7
1991 -3.0 1.9 -3.2
1992 4.7 13.8 4.3
1993 -3.2 -12.1 -3.0
1994 8.2 4.3 8.2
1995 -4.7 38.4 -5.2
1996 7.1 -8.2 7.5
1997 1.3 2.1 1.5
1998 0.4 -6.4 0.8
1999 1.4 -2.4 1.6
2000 2.8 0.7 3.8
2001 -0.5 -2.0 -0.5
2002 0.9 2.6 1.0
S ource : A u th o r 's  o w n  c a lc u la tio n s  o n  th e  b a s is  o f W T A , W D I, a n d  FA O ST A T  d a ta .
African dem and for m anufactures is highly volatile, reflecting the region's overall 
economic instability, particularly in term s of annual purchasing power. For example, 
at its peak, the commodity price boom caused a rise in African im ports of 
m anufactures of more than 38 per cent. Unfortunately, this upsw ing has not much 
benefited U ganda's exports in their share of manufactures, the latter being negligibly 
small in comparison to food and agricultural exports. Overall, the impact of change 
in w orld dem and on Ugandan exports is relatively contained, yet significant: during 
1988-2002, the average annual grow th in total dem and was 1.4 per cent, w ith a 
standard deviation of 3.6 per cent.
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Appendix A6.3: Estimation of import elasticity
Combined data on U ganda's GDP, im ports of goods and services and official grants 
in real terms are available for the period 1982-2002 (U.S. Dollars millions):
Y e a r I m p o r t s GDP
------------+
G r a n t s  I
1 988 792 3 62 0 187 I
1 98 9 774 3 8 5 0 177 |
1990 763 4 1 0 0 2 57  |
1991 727 4 3 3 0 314  1
1992 71 6 4 48 0 33 6  I
1 99 3 692 4 8 50 2 6 0  I
1994 772 5 160 3 1 9  1
1995 1 200 5 7 6 0 400  |
199 6 1 36 0 6280 3 3 6  i
1997 1380 6 6 0 0 342  |
199 8 1420 6 9 2 0 3 58  |
1 99 9 1580 7 470 3 7 9  1
2 000 1450 7 880 527 |
2001 1 470 8 28 0 3 73  1
200 2 1760 8 8 3 0 421 |
As is to be expected for the case of a highly aid-dependant country, pair-wise 
correlation between grants, im ports and GDP over the entire period of data 
availability is extremely high.
Pairwise correlations between imports, GDP and official grants (natural logarithms, 
1982 -2002) :
I l n m g s  l n g d p  l n g r t
l n m g s  I 1 . 0 0 0 0
l n g d p  | 0 . 9 5 2 9  1 . 0 0 0 0
l n g r t  I 0 . 7 8 7 9  0 . 8 5 8 6  1 . 0 0 0 0
All variables are transform ed into natural logarithms, w hereby lnmgs denotes 
im ports of goods and services, lngdp is GDP, and lngrt is official grants. Since the 
contem poraneous estimation of im port elasticities of GDP and grants by OLS 
regression presents a severe problem  of multicollinearity, we estimate elasticity as a 
simple regression of im ports on GDP. Insofar as official grant disbursem ents are 
partially reflected in GDP, the estim ated elasticity also reflects the effects on grants 
on imports. The table below lists selected results, showing estim ated coefficients and 
the other basic OLS statistics. Over the entire period 1982-2002, the GDP elasticity of 
im ports is estim ated at slightly above unit value, and increases a little w hen 
estim ated over the shorter period 1988-2002 (the latter reflecting the chosen 
simulation period of the CDSF). The value of the coefficient on lngdp falls when 
estimation is limited to 1982-1995, probably reflecting a relatively smaller aid im pact 
on im ports and GDP. Grants elasticity of im ports is estim ated as being generally
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lower than GDP's, particularly during the earlier years of observation. As expected, 
the multiple regressions on both GDP and grants are problematic, and the coefficient 
on grants is statistically insignificant. A final series of regressions included the 
natural logarithm  of U ganda's exchange rate to the U.S. Dollar, to test for its relative 
effect on imports. The two specifications in the above table show coefficients on lngdp 
to increase by approxim ately 30 per cent, while R-squared (adjusted) is maximised.
Selected OLS-Regression Results: 
Dependant variable: lnmgs_______
Regressor(s) Coefficient(s) t-statistic(s) and (R*) Period
l n g d p 1 . 0 5 1 3 . 7 0 ( 0 . 9 0 ) 1 9 8 2 - 2 0 0 2
l n g d p 1 . 1 0 8 . 6 9 ( 0 . 8 5 ) 1 9 8 8 - 2 0 0 2
l n g d p 0 . 7 5 4 . 40 ( 0 . 6 2 ) 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 9 5
l n g r t 0 . 4 0 5 . 58 ( 0 . 6 2 ) 1 9 8 2 - 2 0 0 2
l n g r t 0 .  84 3 . 52 ( 0 . 4 9 ) 1 9 8 8 - 2 0 0 2
l n g r t 0 . 4 6 4 . 1 9 ( 0 . 5 9 ) 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 9 5
l n g d p 1 . 1 6 7 . 69 ( 0 . 9 1 ) 1 9 8 2 - 2 0 0 2
l n g r t - 0 . 0 6 - 0  . 84
l n g d p 1 . 3 4 4 .  96 ( 0 . 8 7 ) 1 9 8 8 - 2 0 0 2
l n g r t - 0 . 2 9 - 1  . 27
l n g d p 1 . 3 6 14 . 8 3 ( 0 . 9 5 ) 1 9 8 2 - 2 0 0 2
l n f e x 0 . 34 4 . 2 8
l n g d p 1 . 3 6 12 . 11 ( 0 . 9 3 ) 1 9 8 8 - 2 0 0 2
l n f e x 0 . 4 1 3 . 8 0
On the basis of the above results, and w ithout further digressions into more 
sophisticated specification attempts, we decided to adopt GDP elasticity of im ports at 
unit value. This m easure is derived from the rounded value of the estimation results 
involving the full set of observations available, which best represent the long-term 
elasticity underlying the specification of hypothetical and trend values of im ports 
w ithin the CDSF. A lthough alternative specifications point tow ards a certain 
underestim ation of unit elasticity, we find this to represent a m ore cautious approach 
in calculating the hypothetical values w ithin the CDSF framework. Such caution 
appears to be desirable particularly in light of the BWI's adoption of elasticity at unit 
value or slightly below in their DSA relating to U ganda71.
Finally, the com putations underlying trend and hypothetical im ports in the above 
simulations are based on real GDP growth data from the WDI database (rgdp_d), 
which are listed below:
71 Further on this point, see footnote no. 40 in this chapter.
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T ---------------------------------------+
I y e a r r g d p _ d  I
f
1 1 98 5
“  1 
- . 0 3 3 1 3 2 5  I
I 1 986 . 0 0 3 1 1 5 3  I
1 1987 . 0 4 0 3 7 2 7  |
1 1 98 8 . 0 8 0 5 9 7  |
1 1 98 9  
|




. 0 6 4 9 3 5 1  |
1 1 991 . 0 5 6 0 9 7 6  |
I 1992 . 0 3 4 6 4 2  I
1 1 9 9 3 . 0 8 2 5 8 9 3  I
1 1 994  
1 _ . 0 6 3 9 1 7 5  I|
1 1 99 5
-  _  | 
. 1 1 6 2 7 9 1  t
1 1 99 6 . 0 9 0 2 7 7 8  I
I 1997 . 0 5 0 9 5 5 4  I
1 1998 . 0 4 8 4 8 4 8  I
I 1 99 9  
1 —
. 0 7 9 4 7 9 8  I
1
I 2 00 0
1
. 0 5 4 8 8 6 2  I
1 2 001 . 0 5 0 7 6 1 4  I
I 2 002 . 0 6 6 4 2 5 1  I
1 2 0 03 . 0 4 8 6 9 7 6  I
4-------------------------- --------------- 4
7 Summary Conclusions and Agenda for Further Research
Part I of this study laid the theoretical grounds in support of state-contingent debt 
contracts. It found that there is a strong consensus w ithin and between the relevant 
strands of sovereign debt and contract theory literature w ith regard to the benefits 
from state-contingent debt contracts. Such financial instrum ents should allow 
creditors7 lending and relief operations to be optimally tailored to a debtor's 
repaym ent and debt carrying capacity, on the basis of a distinction between policy- 
induced and state-contingent factors. The desired contract outcome by either party to 
the contract is thereby achieved by locking in ex-ante lenders' optimal response 
functions to the states of nature contemplated by the (incomplete) contract, and by 
providing an enabling environm ent for contract renegotiation in relation to all the 
factors falling outside the realm of ex-ante regulation.
Part II of this study identified the shortcomings of the current IDA aid allocation and 
debt sustainability frameworks against the basic tenets of the theoretical literature, 
and in relation to their implications for a successful solution to low-income countries' 
long-standing debt crisis. It was pointed out that instead of addressing the 
vulnerability concerns of LICs in relation to exogenous causes, BWI lending and debt 
relief is centred on the CPIA, w hich fails to identify the sources of vulnerability. 
Instead, the CPIA embodies the multilateral agencies' optimism about the benefits of 
tying aid to their ow n model of the developm ent process, and presents the essential 
vehicle for enforcing the BWI doctrine across the developing countries. However, as 
a result of its detachm ent from the central tenets of optimal debt contracting, the 
outcome of the BWI approach to aid and debt relief has been to consistently distort 
borrow er's incentives to adhere to contractually defined conditionality, leading 
instead to a vicious cycle of exasperating reciprocal m istrust by both sides to the 
contract. W ithout dow nplaying low-income countries' own share of responsibility, 
the historical record of severe vulnerability to shocks and terms of trade deterioration 
against the background of inappropriate multilateral support should leave no
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reasonable doubt about the BWTs responsibility for the failure of these countries to 
overcome their long-standing debt crises and to move on to a sustainable path of 
economic development.
Considerable em phasis w ithin our assessment of the BWI approach was devoted to 
re-estimating the empirical grounds on which the new CPIA-centred DSF is built. 
Following a methodology similar to that adopted by Kraay and N ehru (2004) and 
related IMF analysis to identify the factors underlying debt distress episodes in low- 
income countries over the last few decades, we find that m easures of economic 
vulnerability are highly significant predictors of crisis episodes, while the CPIA or 
KKM governance indices are not. We conclude that the empirical studies underlying 
the indicative CPIA-debt thresholds of the BWI-DSF do not represent a sufficiently 
robust basis on w hich to build the central thrust of the new  DSF. Moreover, we note 
that w ithout the crucial link provided by the CPIA, between selectivity-based aid 
allocation and debt sustainability analysis, the entire argum ent in support of the BWI 
approach collapses, and in its stead emerges its true aim of reinforcing a priori the 
role of the CPIA in determ ining the gradual shift from m ultilateral loan to grant 
financing.
Against the background of the continuing failure of the BWI to address the low-
income countries debt and developm ent crisis at its roots -  namely shock
vulnerability and long-term terms of trade deterioration -  we argued that the stage is
set for low-income countries' lasting debt sustainability to be further underm ined by
inappropriate m ultilateral policy, despite recurring debt relief initiatives. Against this
background, Part III of the study advocated the introduction of a compensatory debt
allocation and relief mechanism that w ould closely fulfil the requirements of an
optimal debt contract, as suggested by the theory discussions of Part I. O ur central
aim was thus to define the basic elements of a so-called Contingency Debt
Sustainability Framework, which w ould be able to identify and deal ex-ante w ith the
key exogenous factors affecting repaym ent capacity, and to allow for renegotiation in
relation to all the other factors affecting the donor-borrower relationship. The
proposed solution lies in a scheme, which centrally rests on an accounting method
suitable for distinguishing exogenous shock and trend factors from BOP variations
that are under the partial control of country authorities, and which devises a set of
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compensation and assessment facilities to deal comprehensively with the 
multifaceted causes of balance of paym ents vulnerability and the ensuing dem and 
for developm ent finance.
The sim ulated im plem entation of the CDSF to the representative case study of 
U ganda produced encouraging results, dem onstrating the potential benefits of our 
proposal: the country w ould have been effectively insulated from the severe price 
shocks experienced during 1988-2002, and w ould also have received adequate 
compensation in the face of terms of trade deterioration. However, while 
em phasising its great potential, it should be highlighted that w e presum e neither that 
the basic scheme outlined in the preceding chapters could serve as an operational 
framework in its current form, nor that the empirical evidence produced provides a 
fully exhaustive dem onstration of its suitability to achieve lasting sustainability in the 
case of all the LICs. Far from any such ambition, the present study hopes instead to 
represent a relevant contribution tow ards a more concrete definition of a debt 
sustainability framework based on the key insights from the relevant theory, but 
which was still outstanding in the extant literature. In order for this initial effort to 
eventually lead to the definition of a fully-fledged CDSF, w e identify the following 
non-exhaustive list of analytical and empirical im provem ents as the central subject 
for future research:
1. By focussing exclusively on the balance of payments, the CDSF only looks at the 
external balance effects of debt financing. It is thus crucial that the accounting 
fram ework be integrated w ith a fiscal sheet, to capture the dim ension of LICs' 
debt sustainability resulting from the fiscal accounts. In the above approach, the 
fiscal aspects of vulnerability have been conveniently assum ed away, and with 
them  all the complications relating to the definition of ex-ante instrum ents able to 
deal w ith fiscal and BOP shocks in combination.
2. The CDSF accounting m ethod is to be refined w ith regard to its inclusiveness of 
factors affecting a L IC s key economic sectors and industries reflected in the 
aggregated balance of paym ents. It should be recalled from identities (9) to (12) of 
Chapter 5 that the m easurem ent of actual against trend and hypothetical values is 
envisaged to include all of a country's main export and im port sectors and
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industries, in order to allow for a more detailed specification of the sources of 
BOP shocks. Unfortunately, from the publicly available datasets used for the 
current study it has not been possible to create a consistent dataset that w ould 
allow for a detailed breakdow n of U ganda's key sectors and commodities over 
the entire period of sim ulation.1 Future research will have to source the data from 
LICs' central authorities and agencies, and further explore the need for upgraded 
inform ation processing and auditing systems by the BWI in order to guarantee 
the availability of timely data for the proposed accounting method to be fully 
practical. Probably, the contingency scheme will thereby have to be m ade 
sufficiently flexible to allow for interim  compensations on the basis of provisional 
data, and to subsequently im plem ent corrective measures as soon as consolidated 
data become available.
3. Contingency accounting is also to be revised in relation to its specification of the 
variables affecting hypothetical series. For example, w ith regard to trade balance 
volumes, simple indexing to w orld dem and and GDP, as the CDSF does, is not 
fully suitable to capture the key factors determining change in real exports and 
im ports flows. Furtherm ore, the methodology identifying exogenous shocks 
ought to be expanded to the non-debt creating financial flows of the balance of 
paym ents, as suggested in Chapter 5.
4. The question of equity and fairness of any country-specific compensatory scheme, 
among LICs and between LICs and the rest of the aid-recipient community, needs 
to be further addressed before it could possibly be im plem ented. In particular, 
questions arise in relation to the definition of countries' qualification and 
graduation procedures from the contingency scheme, and the related implications 
in terms of adverse selection problems. Similar concerns apply to the 
coordination problem s affecting the donor community, particularly w ith regard 
to the CDSF's performance assessment in view of the likely incompatibility
1 The Bank of Uganda (BOU) collects all the data relating to the trade balance from the various line 
ministries (the Customs Office, in particular) and the Central Office of Statistics. However, the author's 
request to BOU for a detailed dataset for the purpose of the current study has not been granted, and 
instead reference was made to the annual and quarterly BOU reports for all the data available.
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between the specific conditions on policy and assessment methodology requested 
by single donors or group of donors.2
5. Following the above revisions, more research needs to be devoted to modelling 
and sim ulating the contingency mechanism 's performance and cost implications 
across countries and time. In order to fully gauge the likely benefits from the 
CDSF in terms of broader balance of paym ents and macroeconomic sustainability, 
rather than sustainability of external debt alone, a fully-fledged simulation 
framework w ould draw  from the more advanced versions of World Bank's 
Revised M inim um Standard Model (RMSM XX) and structuralist CGE models. 
Closing these models in line w ith the three-gaps approach to the role of external 
developm ent finance -  thus including a fiscal gap -  w ould appear to be the most 
prom ising line for future research in this direction, in conjunction with the 
application of bootstrapping methodologies to em ulate LICs' historical BOP 
vulnerability in the assessment of the CDSF under the occurrence of a range of 
likely shock scenarios.
Finally, we believe that the relevance of this thesis and the future research that will 
build on it goes beyond the narrow er focus of debt sustainability, particularly w ith 
regard to its implications on the aid allocation debate and the broader literature on 
developm ent financing. For example, recent contributions within the aid 
effectiveness literature have shown the benefits from aid to be highest w hen funds 
are disbursed in response to (or concomitant with) negative exogenous shocks (e.g. 
Collier and Dehn, 2001; Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001). However, the empirical 
assessment of the grow th impact of shocks-targeted aid has been lacking a suitable 
m ethod to identify the broader range of BOP shocks affecting aid recipients. 
Therefore, estimations had to rely mainly on simple shock indices (e.g. Dehn, 2000b), 
which entered the aid-allocation models applied to longitudinal datasets (Collier and 
Dehn, 2001; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001). As a result, 
the growth-enhancing role of vulnerability-targeted aid is likely to have suffered 
from a relatively severe underestim ation bias. By providing a m ore comprehensive
2 A point brought to our attention by Dr Jane Harrigan, at the presentation of excerpts from this thesis at 
a workshop held at SOAS in November 2006.
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method to identify BOP shocks and to quantify the ensuing liquidity implications, a 
fully-fledged CDSF accounting mechanism could provide a fundamental element to 
re-estimate aid-effectiveness in view of LICs' BOP vulnerability. The possible 
applications could include a panel approach capturing historical BOP vulnerability 
across developing countries, to test the findings of the critical literature that has 
countered the aid-policies-growth link advocated by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and 
subsequent research in that line. Furthermore, the CDSF simulation framework 
modelled along the lines of a structuralist CGE could lead to interesting results 
highlighting the potential benefits of targeting aid according to shocks and 
vulnerability criteria, in comparison to the CPIA and the Country Performance 
Rating more generally.
A further point of broader relevance of this thesis, beyond the main focus of debt 
sustainability, can be identified in its role of having highlighted the lack of robustness 
of BWI empirical analysis, as mentioned above. Similarly to Hansen and Tarp (2001) 
and related studies, which forcefully challenged the empirical grounds underlying 
the aid-policy link identified by Burnside and Dollar (2000), our empirical work in 
this thesis corroborates the critical view about IMF and W orld Bank research 
practices, which all too often appear to be tailored to favourably support a priori the 
policy conclusions set by the BWI's Boards of Governors. However, against the 
practice of weeding out findings that contradict BWI orthodoxy, and to use 
favourable research instead -  as an independent evaluation report of World Bank 
research recently attested (Deaton et al., 2006) -  it is crucial that critical findings be 
produced and disseminated through the appropriate channels. In this regard, it is 
unfortunate that the research community seems not to be devoting sufficient efforts 
to examining more thoroughly the empirical analyses produced by the BWI in 
support of their central policy frameworks, thus failing to more effectively counter 
the unchallenged proliferation of largely unsubstantiated orthodoxy. From this 
perspective, it is hoped that the empirical part of this thesis will raise the necessary 
interest to stimulate further contributions from other researchers, to ensure that the 
fundamental criticism of the BWI empirics will not go unnoticed,
A final area of influence of the present study has been identified in the field of
multilateral trade regulation. Particularly w ithin the World Trade Organization, there
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has been m uch debate recently about the way in which the international regulatory 
trade framework could be modified in order to optimally capture developing 
countries' need for special and differential treatment (SDT). While proposals for a 
progressive approach to WTO regulation according to the specific economic 
vulnerabilities faced by single member countries have recently been advanced (e.g. 
Cottier, 2006), the discussions in the trade-related literature about suitable methods 
for classifying and dealing with country vulnerability are still at an early stage. It 
w ould thus appear that there exists some scope for a method similar to the CDSF 
accounting framework to be applied to the trade-regulatory framework, particularly 
with regard to a sector and/or product-specific analysis of vulnerability.
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